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AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH TO REFORMING

THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL

GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS:
A CASE STUDY OF THE INDIAN TASK FORCE
OF THE WESTERN FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCIL

Barry J. Wishart

The administration of public policy has always

been a challenge in the United States because power is
divided and dispersed on both an institutional and a

regional basis.

Nowhere is this more obvious than in

the administration of the federal grant-in-aid programs

which developed during the 1960's.

Effective adminis

tration of these programs has been hampered at the inter

governmental level by the tremendous explosion in the
number of grant-in-aid programs, the increasing reliance

on categorical grant-in-aid programs, the confusing net
work of red tape, the development of a "function bureauc

racy" which has alienated state and local officials, and

the lack of a guiding philosophy or master plan.

Many

observers of these problems have called for a comprehensive

restructuring of the administrative machinery.

The Nixon

Administration made an initial attempt to reform the
administrative machinery by an Executive Order in 1969,
which reorganized those federal agencies most involved
with the grant-in-aid programs, within common regional

boundaries with Federal Regional Councils.
This study traces the historical development of

grant-in-aid programs and describes the causes of the

administrative and intergovernmental difficulties arising
from the grant-in-aid programs established during the

I960’ s.

However, the primary purpose of this study is

to determine the potential of Federal Regional Councils

to reform the administration of grant-in-aid programs by
designing and implementing interagency and intergovern

mental strategies to coordinate these programs with state
and local communities.

This potential was determined by

observing the activities of the Indian Task Force of the
Western Federal Regional Council located in San Francisco,

California from 1970 to 1974.
Designing and implementing an interagency approach
to intergovernmental relations has neither been swiftly

arrived at, nor readily developed.

In the case of coor

dinating federal grants-in-aid to Indian tribes, the
Western Federal Regional Council was slow to respond and

inept in its initial organizational efforts.

These failures

can be partially excused by the fact that councils suffer

from the handicap of being unable to force their decisions
ii

upon individual members.

Such a handicap is the result

of efforts on the part of the Executive Office to create

an organization to coordinate the various federal agencies,

without developing another autonomous bureaucracy.

Notwithstanding these initial shortcomings, the

Indian Task Force subsequently coordinated the various

federal agencies of the Western Federal Region to meet
some of the needs of the Indians in this region.

The most

notable achievement was the development of an Integrated
Grant Application (IGA) for the Salt-River Tribe.
This study concludes that the activities of the

Indian Task Force not only demonstrate the importance of

aggressive leadership, but they also demonstrate the
ability of Federal Regional Councils to design and imple

ment interagency and intergovernmental relations capable of
correcting the most basic maladies plaguing the adminis
tration of grant-in-aid programs.
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INTRODUCTION

The administration of public policy has always

been a challenge in the United States because political
power is divided and dispersed on both an institutional
and regional basis.

Nowhere is this more obvious than

in the administration of the federal grant-in-aid

programs that developed during the 1960’s.

Effective

administration of these programs has been hampered at
the intergovernmental level by the tremendous explosion

in the number of grants-in-aid, the increasing reliance
on categorical grant-in-aid programs, the confusing net

work of bureaucratic red tape, the development of a
"functional bureaucracy" that has alienated state and

local officials, and the lack of a guiding philosophy
or master plan.

Many observers of these problems,

including administrators, have called for a comprehensive
restructuring of the administrative machinery.

The

Nixon Administration made an initial attempt to reform
the administrative machinery by an Executive Order in

1969 which reorganized those federal agencies most
involved with grant-in-aid programs within common regional
boundaries with Federal Regional Councils (FRC’s).

Although

very little is known about FRC’s to date, the achievements
1

2

of one, the Indian Task Force of the Western Federal

Regional Council has, during the past two years, resolved

some of the most basic difficulties plaguing federal
grants-in-aid, by providing an organizational framework
for interagency and intergovernmental coordination.

Background

Such grant-in-aid programs have not always been
seen as an impediment to the administration of public
policy.

Judging from the tremendous explosion in the

number of grants during the 1960’s, they would appear
to have been a rather popular administrative device

among congressmen and administrators alike.

It was

not that grant-in-aid programs had simply become fashion

able — after all, they were not exactly a novelty in

either Washington or the state capitols and their begin
nings had even predated the Constitution — as much as

they came to be viewed as a vehicle for programmatic
leverage.^

By offering the temptation of "free money,"

the grant-in-aid programs served as a device to entice

the states to become involved in the administration of

federal programs.

As a result, by 1970, grant-in-aid

programs became the proto-typical form of federal domestic

Michael D. Reagan, The New Federalism (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 75-76; Edward Banfield,
"Revenue Sharing Theory and Practice," Public Interest,
XXIII (Spring, 1971), 33-45. Banfield argues that Congres
smen like grant programs, because they provide them with
an opportunity to obtain special treatment for constituents

3

involvement.
However, as this proto-typical form of domestic

involvement became more widespread, the cooperative
atmosphere of the intergovernmental partnership deterior

ated.

By 1965, both state and local government became

very critical of the grant-in-aid programs.

Not only

was the administrative process overly complex and con
fusing, it was virtually impossible to coordinate and

control.

By the end of the decade, federal politicians

and administrators also became aware that the grant-

in-aid administration was in trouble.

To them, its

most obvious affliction was the red tape that threatened
3
to drown the system beneath a mass of paperwork.
What factors contributed to the development of

this situation?

How did the grant-in-aid programs,

which Michael Reagan regards as a "major social innovation
4
of our time," become so bogged down?

This rapid deterioration was the result of many
factors.

According to James L. Sundquist, it was the

2
zIbid., p. 57.
3
Dwight A. Ink, "The Origin and Thrusts of the
New Federalism," American Society for Public Administration,
(September, 1973) , 31; James L. Sundquist, Making Federalism
Work, (Washington, D. C. : Brookings Institute, 1969),
pp. 14-17; Edmund S. Muskie, "The Challenge to Creative
Federalism," Saturday Review, June 25, 1966, pp. 12-14.
4
Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 57.

4

result of changes in both the quantity and quality of

grant-in-aid programs.

5

Changes in quantity are graphi

cally portrayed by such statistics as the increase in
the number of grant-in-aid programs from 160 in 1962

to over 12,200 by 1973.

This, in turn, increased the

financial commitment by the federal government from
$7.9 billion to $43 billion during the same period.

So

great was the increase, that a catalog of catalogs was
g
needed just to list all of the available programs.
While this dramatic expansion in the number of

grant-in-aid programs was probably sufficient to provide

many administrative headaches, the most serious problems
arose out of changes in the quality of the programs.

Prior to 1960, grant-in-aid programs were seen as a way

to help state and local government achieve their objectives.

7

The states were allowed to assert their authority over the

grant-in-aid administration because the money was usually
disbursed by the federal government on a formula basis,

which emphasized eligibility rather than responsibility.

These grant-in-aid programs also gave the states consider5

Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, pp. 2-3.

The exact number of grants is very difficult to
determine because of different enumeration techniques.
For a review of the various statistics, see Federal Grants;
The Need for Reform (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1973),
pp. 7-30; A Fiscal Program for a Balanced Federalism
(New York: The Committee for Economic Development, 1967),
pp. 15-25; William H. Kolberg, "The New Federalism: Regional
Councils and Program Coordination Efforts," American Society
for Public Administration, (September, 1973) ", 51.

Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, pp. 2-5.

5

able freedom, within broad statutory limits, to de
termine exactly how the money was actually spent.

Not

withstanding efforts by the federal government to formally
supervise these programs, the actual relationship between

state and federal officers was one of collaboration with
the federal officers playing a passive role.

8

Since such

an unobtrusive relationship became the expectation of the

states, it was not surprising that they were shaken when

the federal government curtailed their freedom after 1960,

by converting the grant-in-aid mechanism to achieve federal
government objectives.

In order to achieve its objectives, the federal
government began to control the purpose of grants-in-aid,

by issuing highly specialized — and highly confusing —
categorical grant-in-aid programs.

For example, under one

such program administered by the Farmers’ Home Administration,
only cities with populations of less than 5,500 could apply
for financial assistance to develop sewage-collection systems.

On the other hand, cities whose populations were larger
than 5,500 were obliged to submit their sewer applications

to yet another agency, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD).

Moreover, when an "inteceptor sewer" was

needed, the community involved had to obtain permission from
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

o

In the event,

V. 0. Key, Jr., The Administration of Federal
Grants to States (Indiana: R. R. Donnelley and Sons
Company, 1937),pp. 369-373.

6

however, that financial assistance was needed to construct
a sewer in a depressed area, only the Office of Economic
Opportunity (0E0) could provide relief.

By controlling

the purposes of the grant in this manner, the federal

government was able to centralize the policy-making in
9
Washington.
By 1973, 550 of these grants were "mainline"
grants, i.e., money given directly to private agencies,

special purpose districts, and so forth.

The essential

and significant aspects of such grants was that they by
passed the state and local executives who had become

accustomed not only to the role of administrator, but
also, because of the administrative discretion allowed

by the old style programs, to that of policy-maker.

While state and local governments were eligible for most

of these grants, they were made ineligible recipients in
twenty-three cases.

The effect of this circumvention of

state and local elected officials was to place them in
the unenviable position of being responsible to citizens

for programs over which they had no control; but most

important of all, it kept them from coordinating the many
diverse programs into a realistic administrative whole.

Perhaps the greatest impediment to the administration

of the grant-in-aid programs and the root cause of such
maladies, was the initial failure of policy planners to

9

Reagan, The New Federalism, pp. 59-61.

■^Kelberg, "The New Federalism," p. 51.

7
consider each individual program from the perspective of a

general policy framework.

According to Jane Clark, these

programs grew "in a hit-or-miss fashion, without chart or

i

compass, blown by the winds of political exigency and ad
ministrative necessityAs a result, there was little,

if any consideration of either their intergovernmental im
pact or of whether the programs could even be administered
12
according to established principles of management.
In

I

his landmarked study of federal grant-in-aid programs,

V. 0. Key, Jr. concludes that neither Congress nor the
groups seeking grant-in-aid legislation were primarily con
cerned with the impact of such programs on intergovernmental

relations. 13

Moreover, many of the programs enacted m the

II

1960’s were so broadly defined and so experimental, that none

of the assumptions about their actual administration were
openly challenged.

In the case of the War on Poverty pro

grams, the federal policy-makers assumed intergovernmental
cooperation.

And since, in theory, intergovernmental rela

tions had been viewed by important scholars as basically coop
erative, such an assumption was, theoretically, logical.

Un

fortunately, the practicalities of administering these programs

told another story — one of competition, confusion, frustration
Hjane P. Clark The Rise of New Federalism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1938) , p. 139.
12
RobertA. Levine,Public
Planning:Failure and Redirection (New York: Basic Books, Inc.publishers, 1972), pp.1-2.

13 V. O.Key, Jr., TheAdministration
Grants,
p. 1.
■■■
...........

ofFederal

I■

I
I
■
■

■

8
and failure.
The intergovernmental tensions and conflicts

that developed from these rapidly expanding, specifi
cally designed and poorly planned grant-in-aid programs,

generated considerable resentment and bitterness among
the mayors and governors.

In 1965, the U.S. Conference

of Mayors publicly criticized the War on Poverty grantin-aid programs as being virtually impossible to coordinate
with many of the existing programs.

15

One reason for this

coordination problem was the differing philosophical
approaches of those administrators involved in War on
Poverty programs and of the administrators of the estab

lished state agencies.

Whereas the War on Poverty programs

emphasized self-help and earning type programs, the existing

state programs emphasized welfare.

Consequently, the

personnel of the two agencies were loath to work with each
other.

So great was the criticism, that both Congress and

the Johnson Administration instituted reforms.

In 1968,

Congress passed the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act.

While it was hailed as a major step toward bringing order
14

Sanford Kravits, "The Community Action Program —
Past, Present, and its Future?" in On Fighting Poverty, ed.
by James L. Sundquist (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969),
p. 60.
15 Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, pp. 14-17.
16

Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Poverty Program (Washing
ton^
C"? : United States Printing Office, 1966) , pp. 23-39
75-153.

9

to federal-state-local relations, a study in 1970 revealed
that the full potential of this legislation was yet to be

realized.

17

Primarily, the large number of categorical

grant-in-aid programs (one of the major causes of confusion)
remained intact.

More fundamental than the shortcomings of

this particular legislation, however, was subsequent
Congressional reluctance to develop the additional legis
lation to complete the task they had only just begun.

This reluctance was probably as much a result of the in

fluence of interest groups, as of the fact that stream
lining grant-in-aid administration involved "pick and
,
i ii
shovel

i 18
work.
The Johnson Administration also sought to remedy

these intergovernmental problems by designating Vice

President Humphrey as the federal liaison with state and

local executives.

The Bureau of the Budget was also

ordered to consolidate overlapping programs.

While several

successes were recorded, reforms appeared to be little more

than a token response to criticisms from the governors and
19
mayors, rather than far-reaching reform.
If the Johnson Administration was reluctant to
17

Leigh E. Grosenick, "Institutional Change to Im
prove State and Local Competencies," American Society for
Public Administration, (September, 1973) , 97.
18 ACIR Fourteenth Annual Report, January 31, 1973,

p. 14.

19
p. 3-4.

ACIR Eleventh Annual Report, January 31, 1970,

10

institute far-reaching reforms, the Nixon Administration
Under the rubric of the New Federalism, which

was not.

Dwight Ink describes as a return to traditional federalism,
the Nixon Administration sought to change the "balance
which presently exists between federal capacities and

responsibilities and the capacities and responsibilities

of state and local governments."

Accordingly, the Nixon

Administration sought to establish a new pattern of action
that would not only explode the notion that Congress and
the federal government could solve the people’s problems,

but would also help strengthen state and local capacities.

20

These new patterns were based on the following logic:
since the federal government is largely effecting the

erosion of state and local capacities by centralizing
policy-making, the first steps toward reform must be made
by the federal government.

21

Achievement of this reform involves three basic
approaches:

general revenue sharing, special revenue

sharing, and revamping the grant-in-aid administration.
General revenue sharing was implemented in 1973, but

special revenue sharing has yet to receive the necessary

congressional support.

While general revenue sharing may

help correct the fiscal inequities that existed, and may
20

James S. Dwight, Jr., "The Four ’D’s’ of the
New Federalism," American Society for Public Administration,
(September, 1973) , 17.
21

Grosenick, "Institutional Change," p. 97.

11
also prevent the further expansion of categorical grants-

in-aid, it has done little to solve its present problems.
Thus, the only remaining option was to reform the grant-

. .
.
22
in-aid administration.
The Nixon Administration approached this task

with the following objectives:

emphasis on planning and

review, decentralization, coordination, and elimination

of categorical grants-in-aid.

In order to implement this

ambitious set of objectives, the Federal Assistance Review

(FAR) program was established.

FAR attempted to redesign

the federal part of the grant-in-aid administration by

organizing those federal agencies most involved with

grant-in-aid programs, into ten standard federal regions

with regional councils to serve as an organizational frame
work.

The underlying assumption of FAR was essentially

that this interagency reorganization would facilitate the
development of more cooperative intergovernmental relations.

Nature and Purpose
In order to determine if there is any basis for
such an assumption, this study will focus on the activities

of the Indian Task Force in executing its primary task
of assisting the tribes in the planning and finalizing
aspect of the grant-in-aid process.

The specific purpose of this study is to determine

whether the potential of FRC's to reform the grant-in-aid
...................
22
zzIbid.

12

administration has been achieved, by describing and
analyzing the activities of the Indian Task Force, which

was established by the Western Federal Regional Council

(WFRC).

This task force was established with the objective

of providing technical assistance, to help Indians in the
Western Federal Region obtain desired grant-in-aid programs.

As such, it was seen as a specific approach to one of the

explicit functions of the WFRC:

"The development of long

term regional interagency and intergovernmental strategies
for resource allocation to better respond to the needs of

state and local communities.’’

23

Sources of Data
The letters and memoranda of the Indian Task

Force (ITFF), kept by the WFRC Secretariat, constitute
the primary source of empirical data utilized by this

study.

Informal interviews with federal officials and

representatives of Indian tribes are also utilized to

"fill in" gaps in the ITFF, as well as to describe the
informal activities of the task force.

Hardy Pearce,

Executive Secretary of the Indian Task Force, and Beau

Carter, Executive Secretary of the WFRC, are the primary
sources of interview data.

Their strategic locations in

the WFRC Secretariat and Indian Task Force afforded the

best overview of the activities of the task force as it
related to the Council, the Indians, and the other federal

23

See Appendix B.

13

agencies in the Western Federal Region.
Assumptions

This study assumes that the activities of the
Indian Task Force — its evolution into a viable inter

agency and intergovernmental organization, as well as
its successes and failures — reflect the activities of

most of the other task forces in the WFRC.

This study

also assumes that federal-Indian relationships approxi
mate federal-local and federal-state relationships

involved in the administration of grant-in-aid programs.

The Indian Task Force was chosen from among the
many task forces within the WFRC, because the extensive
activities of the Council precluded studying every task

force, and because this particular task force was recom
mended by Beau Carter as the "best example of inter

agency and intergovernmental coordination."

Support is

lent to this claim by the fact that Webb Otis, Chairman
of the Indian Task Force, was just appointed the new
WFRC Chairman for 1974-1975 by President Nixon.

In any

event, this is a case study designed to collect basic
information which can serve as the substance for the

development hypothesis which, in turn, will serve as the
basis of empirical theory building.

CHAPTER I

FEDERALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF

MODERN GRANT-IN-AID PROGRAMS
Introduction

It has been argued that the principle of federalism,
as interpreted and applied by both the founding fathers and
subsequent government officers, has been a primary determinant of many features of the American political system.

24

An often cited example of this hypothesis is the relatively
undisciplined and often fractured nature of American
25
political parties.
Assuming the validity of this hypothesis
and the status of federalism as the independent (causal)

variable, it could also be argued that the development of

the many grant-in-aid programs during the 1960’s was a
consequence of the historical developments of federalism.

Such a hypothesis, however, is altogether too simple.
While federalism may have initially facilitated the develop
ment of the grant-in-aid device, its increasing role in

domestic policy during the twentieth century — especially

24

Martin Diamond, Winston M. Fisk and Herbert
Garfinkel, The Democratic Republic (2nd ed. ; Chicago: Rand
McNally and Company, 1970).
25
Frank J. Sorouf, Party Politics in America (2nd ed.;
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 65-85.

14

15

during the 1960's — placed it in a position of modi
fying federalism.

place?

How and why did this modification take

What are the implications of this change?
The Historical Development of
American Federalism

The Constitution and the
federal principle
One reason for this modification is the lack of

a clear, concise definition of federalism.

Actually,

there are as many definitions of federalism as there are
writers on the subject.

According to one widely shared

definition, the federal principle is "the method of dividing

powers so that the general and regional governments are

each within their own sphere, coordinate and independent."

26

Another writer defines federalism as "a device for dividing
27
decisions and functions of government."
Still another
writer defines federalism" as the mode of political organi

zation that . . .

(distributes) power among general and

constituent governments in a manner designed to protect the
28
existence and authority of both."
According to all of

these definitions, the essential federal characteristic is
the division of governing power between the national govern26

Kenneth C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1964) , p. 11.

27 The President's Commission on National Goals,
Report of the Commission, The Federal System (New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960)^ p^ 265.
2 8 Daniel Elazar, American Federalism (New York:
Thomas H. Crowell Company, 1972), p. 2.

16

ment and the member states.

In the United States, the concept of federalism
has been associated with the constitutional division of

powers and functions between the national and state govern
ments.

When the framers of the Constitution met in Pen

nsylvania in 1787 to seek remedies to the chaos of the

Confederation of states, none of the delegates came armed
with a clearly conceptualized definition of federalism,
let alone prepared resolutions or even loose notions that
could be called federal.

Instead of arising out of the

process of rational debate, the principle of federalism
embodied in the Constitution was the outgrowth of conflict

•
30
and_ comp romis
e.
The most basic issue faced by the framers was the

question of how to divide the powers and functions among
the national and state governments.

With the support of

the larger states, the delegation from Virginia provided

its answer to this fundamental political question, in the
form of the Virginia Plan.

The basis of this plan was an

indictment of the Confederation as both impotent and inept.
According to their assessment, the Confederation was innq

Diamond, et al., The Democratic Republic, p. 131.

3QIbid., pp. 52-62; Robert E. Merriam,"Federalism
in Transition," in Federalism Today, ed. by William A. Jump
and I. Thomas McKillop (Washington, D. C. : U.S. Department
of Agriculture, 1969), pp. 5-17.

17

capable of providing for either the security of liberty

or the general welfare.

Because of these substantial

shortcomings, the delegation was reluctant to recommend
a mere modification of the Articles of Confederation.

A new approach to governing was needed.

Therefore, the

Virginia Plan advocated scrapping the whole "merely federal"

system 31 and replacing it with a strong, national govern, 32
ment.
Although the Virginia Plan received widespread

support during the initial stages of the convention, it
became the basis of a bitter controversy.

Opposition to

the plan came mostly from the small states.
however, some support from the larger states.

There was,
The dele

gation from New York, for example, was split over the issue.
The opposition to the Virginia Plan was based on the fear

that large republics would undermine cherished liberties
and freedoms.

While this opposition was united in its

31 The term "merely federal" has been a source of con
fusion for many students of American government. According
to Martin Diamond, when the framers used the term "merely
federal," they meant confederal. At this point in the con
vention, the framers had no intention of establishing what we
in the twentieth century call "federalism." Moreover, when
Madison described the Constitution, he argued that it was
"neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composi
tion of both," Federalist 39, p. 250. For a further explanation
see Martin Diamond,"The Federalist’s Federalism," in Essays in
Federalism, ed. by George C. S. Benson (Claremont: Institute
for the Study of Federalism, 1961), pp. 21-66.
32 Benson, Essays, pp. 52-62; The Democratic Republic,

pp. 40-41.

18
criticisms, it was not united in its support for an alternate

plan.

Notwithstanding this lack of total unanimity on all

issues, the opposition was sufficiently cohesive to present

an alternative plan in the form of the New Jersey Plan.

However, it proved unacceptable to most of the framers, and
was voted down by a 7-3 margin.

33

The framers finally found a reasonable resolution to

this conflict through the Connecticut Compromise, which pro
vided for a two chamber Congress, one based on population, and

the other on the states.

From this compromise emerged a

peculiar brand of federalism which Martin Diamond calls a

"mixed government," to be distinguished from unitary and
confederal governments.

According to Diamond, the framers

altered the traditional federal form by eliminating the

decisively federal features of state sovereignty over all

internal function, by adding decisively national features.
Now, for example, the national government could also collect

taxes and post levies.

This was "a new form of government,

neither federal nor national, but an admixture of both

characters."

34

William Riker correctly refers to this

admixture by the more descriptive term of "centralized
35
federalism."
Although the framers were sufficiently able to
33

Diamond, The Federalist's View, pp. 52-66.

34Ibid., pp. 40-41.
33William Riker, Federalism (Boston:
and Company, 1964) , p. xii.

Little, Brown

19

resolve the conflicts of how to distribute the powers of
government to deliver the Constitution for state approval,

it does not necessarily mean that they clearly described
this new brand of federalism.

The framers significantly

refused to adopt a once-and-for-all disposition of the

distribution of government power.

Neither were their

intentions regarding this new brand of federalism entirely

clear.

The language of the Constitution is sufficiently

general and vague to require on-going interpretation, in
36
the light of current issues and problems.
As a result,
the evolution of federalism in America has been accompanied

by changes in the distribution of government power.

"Thus

any attempt to argue for a particular relation between the
national government and the states — in particular the

precise divisions between them — must fall flat for the
lack of constitutional corroboration."

37

The emergence of modern federalism
Since the founding fathers "bequeathed us an openended system,"

38

it is unrealistic to view American govern

ment in terms of neatly divisible levels — national, state
and local — each possessing its own clearly delineated
political jurisdictions.

Moreover, the most important

36

Roscoe C. Martin, The Cities and the Federal
System (New York: Atherton Press, 1965), p. 24.

37 Richard H. Leach, American Federalism (New York:
W. N. Norton and Company, 1970), p. 9?
38_,
. , , p. 24.
Ibid.
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"government functions needed by the American people can

be performed only by exertions of power at two or even
39
three levels of government simultaneously."
This point

is clearly demonstrated by the intergovernmental approach

to solving the problems of both the nineteenth and the

twentieth centuries.

During the nineteenth century, the

four major problems were:

the disposition of the public

domain, internal improvements, education and slavery.
The major problems of this century, to date, are: resource

conservation and utilization, education, civil rights and
race relations.

Grant-in-aid programs provided a significant

intergovernmental approach to the first three problems on
, ., , . .
40
both lists.
The genius of the grant-in-aid device, according to
Michael D. Reagan, is that it avoids the formal resurrection
of the debate about the federal division of authority,
which proved impossible to resolve to the satisfaction of
every delegate at the Constitutional Convention.

Reagan

explains:

. . . by using grants, one doesn’t have to face
the question: At which level of government does
this function belong? If the activity is tradi
tionally a local one, its direct operation can
remain there, while the financial problems are
solved with federal aid.
If the federal govern-

39^Ibid., p. 26.

Italics added.

40 W. Brookes Graves, American Intergovernmen ta1
Relations: Their Development and Current Status (New York:
Charles Scribner Sons, 1966), p. 478.
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ment wants to inject its sense of values and
priorities into the shaping of a program, that
grant provides a vehicle for programmatic leverage
without it being necessary to take over the whole
function and remove it from local hands.41
These advantages, Reagan argues, have made grant-

in-aid programs "a major social innovation of our time and
the proto-typical . . . form of federal domestic involve42
ment."
The importance of grant-in-aid programs was
noted by V. 0. Key, Jr., as early as 1935, when he observed
that it had profoundly modified the federal system. 43
This modification can be seen in the demise of the

old-style federalism with its emphasis on state sover
eignty, and its replacement by the "new style federalism,"
better known and identified as "intergovernmental relations."

41
42

44

Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 58.

Ibid. According to Sharkansky, grant-in-aid
programs are the single most prominent feature of federalism;
Ira Sharkansky, Public Administration (Chicago: Markham
Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 241-257; also see Jane P.
Clark, New Federalism, p. 137; Carl W. Stenburg, State
Involvement in Federal-Local Programs: A Case
Study of the "Buying-In" Approach (Washington, D. C.:
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1970).
43
...
V. 0. Key, Jr., Administration of Federal Grants,
p. xv.
44
Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 3. Reagan argues that
the new federalism is better referred to as intergovernmental
relations because the cutting edge of federalism is the
actual administrative relationships between governments. The
term "intergovernmental relations" has been in popular use
among scholars and administrators in the United States for
only about thirty years. This popular usage seems to have
developed from reports of the Committee on Public Administra
tion of the Social Science Research Council, which was
active from 1928 to 1932 and from 1936 to 1945. However,
the original concept and idea had its genesis during the
colonial period. For the purposes of this paper, the term
"intergovernmental relations" will be used to refer
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While intergovernmental relations obviously involve

more than the part played by administration of grant-inaid programs in domestic policy, the pre-eminent role

of these programs makes them the "cutting edge" of

federal relationships.

This is so, precisely because

they influence the ebb and flow of political power among
the various units of the political structure which, in

turn, determine the policies which will be used to
resolve the nation’s problems.

Thus, while the develop

ment of the grant-in-aid device was facilitated by the

malleable characteristics of American federalism, the

grant-in-aid device wrought a profound impact on the
nature of American federalism.

In order to determine the consequences of the
interplay of federalism and the grant-in-aid device,

it is necessary to seek answers to the following questions:
What is a grant-in-aid?
system develop?

this system?

How did the modern grant-in-aid

What are the important characteristics of

What impact have these developments had on the

making and administering of public policy?

to vertical relationships between national, state and local
governments. William Anderson, Federalism and Tntergovernmental Relations (New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation,
1972) , preface; William Anderson, Intergovernmenta1 Re1ations in Review (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1960), pp. 3-4; Graves, Arne ri can In tergovernmen tai
Relations, pp. 3-31.
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The Development of Modern Grants-In-Aid

Definition
The modern concept of "grant-in-aid" is a rather

technical one.

The term seems to have originated in

England, where it was used to describe funds provided by

Parliament to assist local units, such as counties and

boroughs.

In the United States, such grants to state

and local governments are identified by the term "federal
aids."

The term "federal aids" also covers additional

kinds of federal outlays such as loans, payments to indi

viduals and corporations in the form of subsidies, and
emergency grants-in-aid to states.

The grant-in-aid must

also be distinguished from shared revenues, which refer

to general outlays from federal to state and local governments
with few, if any conditions attached.

Given these distinc

tions, "grant-in-aid may be defined as money payments fur

nished by a higher to a lower level of government to be used

for specific purposes and subject to conditions spelled out
45
in law or administrative regulation."
The historical basis of
the modern grant

The early forerunners of the modern grant, replete

45

Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 55.
In this study,
the term "grant" will be used as a substitute for the more
accurate though cumbersome "grants-in-aid." For a discussion
of the origin and development of grants, see Clark, New
Federalism, pp. 137-258; William Anderson, The Nation and
the States, Rivals or Partners?
(Minne apolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1955), pp. 175-190.
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with its complex criteria and administrative regulations,
revolved around the disposition of the public domain and

federal aids to the states.

In a resolution adopted on

October 10, 1780, the Continental Congress declared its
intention to financially assist the states in the develop
ment and protection of vast tracts of western lands.

The

Land Ordinance of 1785 subsequently required that all

townships established on public lands allocate lots for
public schools.

"There shall be reserved for the United

States out of every township . . . lot No. 16 . . . for

the maintenance of public schools."

This legislation

significantly established the precedent of providing aid
to states, and providing it conditionally. 46

The subse

quent history of grant programs in the United States

reflects not only the proliferation of such grants, especial
ly in the 1960’s, but also an expansion of its horizons and
conditions.

The precedent of combining the disposition of the

public domain with educational policy was extended by the

Morrill Act of 1862, which established land-grant agricul

tural colleges.

This legislation established another

important precedent.

Not only was the grant given for a

specific purpose, the governors of the recipient states
were required to report annually to Congress regarding

46

483.

Graves, Intergovernmental Relations, pp. 478-
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the disposition of the funds.

Also, for a state to

benefit from the minimum endowment of 90,000 acres, it

must channel its revenues to provide for the construction
of buildings.

"Thus, implicitly, this specific grant

became for all practical purposes a conditional grant . .
forerunners of the later ’matching’ grants."

47

The federal government also provided assistance
to state governments by the assumption of state debts in

1790; the development of state militias; internal improve

ments such as roads, canals, and railroads; and the dis
position of surplus funds in 1838.

Although these forms

of assistance do not qualify as grants, as rigidly defined
in this study, they did establish important patterns for
^-48
future action.
However, the intricate categorical and conditional
features which have wrought such a profound impact on

intergovernmental relations, is a twentieth century pheno
menon.

As the United States entered the twentieth century

it faced many social and economic changes.

No longer was

it a nation where men pursued simple agrarian life styles.

The growing cities and the complex forces of urbanization

47 Michael E. Levy and Juan de Torres, Federal
Revenue Sharing with the States: Problems and Promises
(Illinois: National Industries Conference Board, 1970) ,
p. 4.
4 8 Graves, Intergovernmental Relations, p. 483.
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rendered inadequate the Jeffersonian visions of self49
reliance.
The political leaders faced the complex

ities of the new and changing environment by passing two

far-reaching enactments.

In 1913, they broadened the

base of the federal financial system by instituting
income taxes, thereby assuring a substantial annual
50
income.
In 1914, Congress passed the first major

grant program, in the form of the Smith-Lever Act.

This

legislation established the Agricultural Extension Service

and "represented an initial cash grant of unprecedented
size from the national government to establish a continuing

state aid program."

51

This legislation also incorporated

the three basic features of most subsequent grant programs:
(1) an apportionment formula for distribution of funds

Urbanization is a difficult concept to define.
It refers to both where and how people choose to live.
Scholars of urban affairs are by no means in agreement
on either the definition or theory of urbanism, nor its
impact on urban dwellers. The best known efforts at this
definition and theory came out of the "Chicago School."
See Robert E. Park, et al., The City (Chicago: The Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1925); Louis Wirth, "Urbanism
as a Way of Life," American Journal of Sociology, XLIV
(July, 1938), 1-24. For a critique of the Chicago School’s
perspective, see Gideon Sjoberg, "Comparative Urban Sociol
ogy," in Sociology Today, ed. by Robert K. Merton (New
York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), pp. 334-359. For a chal
lenging analysis of the impact of urbanism on the family
structure, see Michael Harrington, The Other America
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1962). For a response,
see Marvin B. Sussman, "The Isolated Nuclear Family:
Fact or Fiction," Social Problems, VI (1959), 333-340.
50 .
Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid: Perspectives and Alternatives (Washington, D. CT: Public Policy
Research, 1968), p. 5.
51

Chicago:

Daniel J. Elazar, ed., The American System
Rand McNally, 1966), p. 43.
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among the states,

(2) state matching requirements, and

(3) advance federal approval of state plans.

52

Such conditional features were written into grant
programs to ensure the implementation of congressional

policy.

Although both money grants and the early land

grants had conditions attached to them, albeit very general
conditions in the case of general purpose grants, even the

Morrill Act of 1862 which was considered one of the most

capably administered of the land grants, suffered from the

lack of administrative supervision.

An inquiry in 1912

into the various grants, revealed gross maladministration

in the form of obscure records, delays by states in matching

federal money, and the use of federal income for other than
stipulated purposes. 53

In order to secure national guidance of state

agencies and effect national policies, various mechanisms
and devices were subsequently employed.

The device of

advanced approval of contemplated state action provided

the dual benefits of assuring the national government that

state plans were in accordance with the goals of the
52

Wright, Federal Grants, p. 26. Various scholars
have traced the origins of the modern grant system to various
points; some to the Smith-Lever Act of 1914, others to the
Morrill Act of 1862, and yet others to the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787. However, it was not until the 1920’s that the
scholars recognized the "grant system" as a "regularized mode
of conducting national business." Martha Derthick, The In
fluence of Federal Grants (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1970T,' p.~5".------53

pp. 27-28.

. .
Key, Administration of Federal Grants to States,
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legislation as well as compelling a planning attitude
which, in turn, "permitted federal technical advice and

assistance to be offered at a time it may exert the
54
greatest influence."
The audit and a system of reports
provided the information which could serve Congress and the

public as the basis for further action.

Unfortunately,

many of the reports were simply "filed," without analysis.
The most potent of all controls was the merit system

imposed by the United States Employment Service, requiring
minimum qualifications for state employees.

Matching

requirements and state legislation imposing mandatory
expenditures for counties and other local units, also
contributed to the administrative structure designed to
effectuate national policy.

The ultimate device, however,

was the power of the federal government to discontinue
While rarely invoked, it was the

payments to the states.

"shotgun behind the door," and served potentially as a

very potent threat.

55

V. 0. Key, Jr. concludes, however

that while,
The relationship may be in the form of control . . .
the actual operations tend to be in the form of
collaboration. Nor are federal administrators
grasping for power.
If a state agency is operating
smoothly and competently within the broad framework
of the federal legislation, the federal administrators
are inclined to play a passive role . . . they dis
like to int rvene to correct an unsatisfactory
situation.$

54
*Ibid., pp. 369-370.
55

Ibid., p. 373.

56Ibid.
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More direct supervision of grant programs did

occur briefly during the 1930's when the economic
problems created urgent financial needs, especially in
the nation's cities.

With the financial plight of the

cities as a pretext, the federal government short-cir
cuited the states and dealt directly with the cities

through such federal agencies as the Federal Emergency

Relief Administration (FERA), the Civil Works Adminis

tration (CWA), and the Public Works Administration
(PWA), to mention a few examples.

Such incursions into

areas of state jurisdiction, however, were the result of

the severe economic conditions of the times, rather
than the explicit desire of federal officials to increase

federal control over grant programs. 57

In all, the Roosevelt Administration established

only fourteen additional grant programs.

While most of

the grants established during the depression were in the

form of emergency aids, the most well-known addition by
the Roosevelt Administration involved a reform of the

welfare system.

The Social Security Act of 1935 included

three public assistance titles providing matching grants
for Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children, and
Aid to the Blind, according to a sliding scale.

The

objective of these grants was to "strengthen the existing

state programs and to encourage the States to establish
57
Paul K. Conkin, The New Deal (New York:
H. Crowell,1967).

Thomas
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categorical programs where they did not exist."

58

As the welfare expenditures for state and local
governments rose during the 1950's, the size of the
grants was also expanded.

In addition, about thirty new

grant programs were inaugurated.

With the exception of

grants for community renewal, beach erosion control and
water quality control, which were "mainline" grants of

money flowing directly from the federal government to the
grant recipient, most of the grants were channeled through

the states which enhanced the state financial policy-making
role.

59
Beginning in 1961, however, the number of grant

programs increased dramatically as the federal government

sought to remedy the many problems generated by the impact
of urbanization, especially in the large metropolitan
areas.

The number of grant-in-aid programs increased from

160 in 1962 to over 1,200 in 1973.

Federal disbursements

increased from $7.9 billion to $43 billion during that

same period.

More significant than this tremendous quanti

tative increase was the growing dependency of state and

local governments on the federal government for financial

assistance.

In 1962, grant-in-aid programs constituted

only 12.3 percent of all state and local revenues. By
- ,
... . ■ . ■•
’
58
U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations, The Role of Equalization of Fiscal Grants
(Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1964), p. 9. ACIR, Eleventh Annual Report, pp. 1-2.

59 Stenberg, State Involvement, p. 11.
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1973, federal assistance represented twenty-two percent

of all state and local revenues.

Administration of these

programs involved 150 agencies and bureaus, and over 400

federal offices in the field — all supported by the
triple alliance of pressure groups, congressional sub

committees and federal agencies.

In the light of these

quantities, it seems inconeeivable that prior to 1930,

federal aid was available in only ten major program areas
and amounted to only $0.1 billion, about 1.5 percent of
the total state and local revenues.

The Eighty-ninth

Congress (1965-1966) alone passed twenty-one new health
programs, seventeen new education programs, fifteen new
economic programs, twelve new programs for cities, seven

teen new resource development programs, and four new man
power training programs.^
The pace of "direct federalism" also increased

during the 1960’s.

Of the twelve hundred or so grant

programs that existed in 1973, 550 of these were "main

line" grants.

This involved an enormous amount of money

bypassing state governments.

In fact, twenty-three of

these grant programs explicitly made states ineligible
—_______
For a review of the various statistics describing
the growth of federal grants, see Federal Grants: The
Need for Reform (New York: Tax Foundation, Inc., 1973),
pp. 7-30; A Fis'cal Program for a Balanced Federalism (New
York: The Committee for Economic Development, 1967), pp. 1525; Deil S. Wright, Federal Grants-in-Aid, pp. 51-72;
Levy and de Torres, Federal Revenue Sharing with the States:
Problems and Promises, pp. 1-10; Richard H. Leach/ American
Federalism, p. 165.
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recipients.

Some of these programs even circumvented

local governments and were given directly to special
61
purpose districts.
The range of activities covered by grant programs
also increased during the 1960's to include such activities

as water and sewer facilities, urban beautification, and

community health services for the aged and the poor.
Although most of these grant programs were targeted for
urban areas, the most notable development was the unprece

dented federal intrusion into areas such as law enforce
ment and education, previously considered the private
domain of state and local governments. 6 2

Another important change in grants during the 1960's
was the development of "private federalism."

Non-govern

mental units such as universities, private institutions,

non-profit groups, and even individuals were eligible for

some of the grants administered by HEW and the National
Institute of Health.

The most well known of these grants

is the Community Action Program of the OEO.

While federal control over the administration of

grant programs was obviously increased by the growth of
direct federalism, private federalism, and the proliferation
of grant programs, additional federal control was also
61

William H. Kolberg, "New Federalism," p. 51;
Stenberg, State Involvement, p. 11.
62
Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, p. 1.
g2
Stenberg, State Involvement, p. 11.
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achieved by the development of categorical grants and

project grants.

While these two types of grants should

not be considered mutually exclusive forms, they do pro
vide the analytic distinctions necessary to describe the

increased federal control and further erosion of state
discretion in the implementation of grant programs.

64

A categorical grant is a specifically and narrowly
defined grant which leaves the recipient government with

little discretion in administering the grant.

For example,

under one such program administered by the Farmers’ Home

Administration, only cities with populations of less than

5,500 could apply for financial assistance to develop
sewage collection systems.

On the other hand, cities

with populations larger than 5,500 were obliged to submit

their sewer applications to yet another agency, the Depart
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).

Moreover,

when an "interceptor sewer" was needed, the community

involved had to obtain permission from the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA).

In the event, however, financial

assistance is needed to construct a sewer in a depressed
area, only the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) could
provide relief.

64

Thus, by narrowly defining the categories

Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 60. Categorical
grants are often described in contrast to bloc grants.
For a discussion of the origin and development of bloc
grants, see E. Douglas Harman, "The Bloc Grant: Readings
from a First Experiment," Public Administration Review
(March/April, 1970), 141-1KTT
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of activity covered by a grant, the federal government

effectively changed the location of policy-making from
/" r
the state and local to the national level.

This shift in the location of policy-making
gained momentum by the increased reliance on project
grants.

Whereas categorical grants contributed to this

shift by specifically and narrowly defining the purposes

of grant money, project grants narrowly defined the

criteria for the distribution of grant money.

Project

grants were developed as an alternative to formula grants
which were widely used prior to 1960.

Formula grants

were issued to the states on the basis of such criteria

as total population, number of low income residents, fiscal

capacity of recipient governments, tax effort, and so
forth.

The primary role of the federal government in the

administration of these grants was to determine the exact
financial eligibility of each state.

The actual adminis

tration of the grant was left to state and local officials.66
Project grants, on the other hand, required special

approval by the officials of the awarding agency.

Rather

than providing the grant on the basis of eligibility ac

cording to fixed criteria, project grants were designed to
meet specific problems such as mental health in urban areas.

Although all urban communities, in theory, had access to

funds to develop mental health centers, the limited size of
65

Reagan, The New Federalism, p. 59.

66Ibid., pp. 59-66.
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the fund naturally limited the number of urban com

munities that could be aided.

As a result, the grant

was often awarded to that community "whose proposal most

nearly satisfied the definitions of appropriate action
in the minds of federal officials administering the
67
grant program."

In summary, the foregoing historical overview of
grants reveals the ongoing effort on the part of the
federal government to ensure that grant programs achieved
federal objectives.

While the money has always been

given to the states conditionally, little effort was

made to ensure that these conditions were met in the
nineteenth century.

However, as the size and number of

grants increased during the twentieth century, the federal
government made an effort at supervision through such
devices as the merit system and audits.

Moreover, it was

not until the federal government concentrated on refining

the conditional features of grants, rather than relying
upon supervision, that it could guarantee that grants

were being used to satisfy federal objectives.
The problems

Reagan lists four problems plaguing such grant

programs:

(1) project grants run counter to the need

to equalize resources among jurisdictions,

(2) in spite

of the large number of grants, there are still areas of

67Ibid., p. 64.
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state services such as fire protection, which fall out
side the aided categories,

(3) the entire grant system,

and project grants specifically, tend to skew state and

local budgets; and most important of all,

(4) the pro

liferation of categorical grants has created substantial
68
coordination problems.
While the first two problems
existed to some degree before 1960, the last two problems
should be seen as an outgrowth of the grant system that
developed after 1960.

Project grants prevent the equalization of re

sources among jurisdictions, argues Reagan, because "those
state and local governments which have the best profes

sional staffs are likely to prepare the best proposals
and thus receive the most project aid."

evidence to support this claim.

There is some

It appears that in order

to obtain a "fair share" of available money, at least
eighteen states and an unknown number of cities have

maintained offices in Washington, D. C. to "help those
governments grapple with the maze of Federal aid programs

and to reduce chances that they might ’miss out’ on some
70
available ’Federal’ dollars."
Some states and cities
have even sought help from private consultation firms.

This has led to the development of the art of "grantsmanship."

Mayor Joseph Doorley describes this art as "the

68

Ibid., pp. 86-88.
Ibid.

70

Wright, Federal Grants, p. 20.
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.

practical aspects of getting things done."

71

Aside

from the technical skill required to fill out all of the

desired application forms "correctly," Doorley unabashedly

confesses, "I am unalterably committed to exert every
possible bit of political muscle I have to secure federal
aid for my city."

This involved cultivating relation

ships with Congressmen and Senators.

Thus, "with the

assistance of Congressman Fernand St. Germain ... I
had the first demolition project in the country funded."^

Although such "grantsmanship" techniques may have

maintained the inequity of resources, it is important
to recognize that it certainly did not produce the inequity.
The first efforts to equalize resources came in the 1930*s.

They proved, even then, overly generous to the more af

fluent states.

Also, since the equalization provisions

were restricted to welfare grants, the effort must be

considered a mere token.

Besides, the provisions were

often based on complex and confusing formulas that rarely

reflected state needs.
The charge that project grants skew state and

71

Joseph A.Doorley,"The Art of Grantsmanship," in
The New urban Politics, ed. by Douglas M. Fox (California:
Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1973), pp. 90-92.

For a comprehensive analysis of the role of
equalization of federal grants, see ACIR, The Role of
Equalization of Federal Grants (Washington, D. C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1955).
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local budgets by forcing state governments and city coun

cils to put their money where the grants are, if they de

sire to maximize the use of their dollars, is both true and
false.

Actually, the entire grant system skews the budgets

of these recipient governments, enticed by generous matching

provisions to invest significant portions of their budget in
This entice

to federally defined and controlled projects.

ment stems from the dire financial problems facing most state

and local governments.

The importance of the federal grant

money to state and local budgets can be seen in the rapid

growth of the simple percentage statistics.

Whereas various

forms of federal "grants" in 1902 amounted to only one per

cent of state-local revenues, it had increased in 1962 to

13.5 percent and in 1971 to 21.1 percent.

As a result,

grants "induce state and local governments to adopt a pat
tern of expenditure in which the emphasis is somewhat dif

ferent from that which would prevail in the absence of
75
grants."
This rapid expansion of grant monies as a per

centage of state-local revenues can create serious financial
difficulties when the federal government decides to adopt a

restrictive budgetary policy.
The problems of coordinating the many categorical
grant programs that emerged during the 1960's, were basically

political in origin rather than administrative.

Indeed,

there were and still are administrative problems, but they
are symptomatic.

The reported conflict between an urban
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renewal project approved by one agency for a location

through which another agency planned a freeway does not
belie this claim.

Nor does the duplication, overlapping

and inconsistent provisions of categorical grants disprove
the claim that the most basic causes preventing coordination

are political.

All of these administrative difficulties

arose out of the political decision to bypass state and
local executives by the use of main-line grants.

These

executives were replaced by a "functional bureaucracy" 76

which is described by William H. Kolberg in the following

selection:
The red tape generated by this type of organization
is beyond belief. Every one of the 550 programs has
been operated by specialists. Responsibility for
their administration has run from the top specialist
in Washington right down to the specialist at the
state or local level. Each group of functional
specialists has its own procedures and its own
methods of communication. In some respects this is
good, because specialists are required to operate
complicated programs. They are concerned first and
foremost with their immediate program responsibilities,
and secondly with some coordination of related programs
within the agency. Outside the agency's responsibilities
there is little or no interest in coordination.77

By establishing functional relationships between
federal agencies and their state, or local, or private
counterparts, the program not only escaped the control

of governors and mayors, it allowed a complex of other

interests such as middle-management program administrators,
76

ACIR, Tenth Annual Report (Washington, D. C.:
United States Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 8;
ACIR, E1eventh Annua1 Report, pp. 2-3.
77
Kolberg, "Regional Councils," p. 51.
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Congressional subcommittees and pressure groups to

determine the direction of the grant programs rather than
top policy makers.

Twenty-three of the grant porgrams

enacted after 1960 completely bypassed the states.

Where

the states could not be avoided, the "delivery system"

of the grant was emphasized by "hardening the categories"
of the grant.

Controlling the delivery system was also

facilitated by project grants which, it was assumed, would

assure the poor and the blacks a "fair shake" from state
governments.

However, while it may have thwarted discrimin

atory practices — especially in the South toward the blacks —

it also undermined efforts to achieve a simplified and flex78
ible federalism.
So great was the power of the functional bureauc

racies that they became "vertical autocracies."

The power

that supported these vertical autocracies was a result of
balkanization:

each agency and even each grant program

had its own bureaucracy, congressional sponsorship, and
supporting interest group.

esting contradiction:

This support produced an inter

specialist administrators, according

to attitude studies, were "quite satisfied" with the opera

tion of the system, while governors and mayors have "fumed
at procedures which have created administrative fiefdoms

that are quite impervious to any type of central management
78

Fox, The New Urban Politics, p. 35; ACIR, Tenth
Annual Report, p. 8; ACIR, Eleventh Annual Report, pp.
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control and coordination."

79

This lack of coordination was primarily a result

of a decision on the part of federal policy-makers to by

pass the elected officials at the state and local level.

This decision placed these officials under the unenviable
handicap of being responsible to the citizens for the

results of programs over which they have no control.
More important, bypassing the local executives precludes
a close intergovernmental structural relationship necessary

to "develop the kind of coordinate relationship required

to make the system a realistic whole."80
As serious and debilitating as these problems may
be, there is an even more basic impediment to the adminis

tration of the grant-in—aid programs:

the grant program

was not developed according to a master plan.81

Examination

of the entire system will not reveal a clear pattern of
development.

It appears to have grown in what Jane Clark

calls "a hit or miss fashion, without chart or compass,
blown by the winds of political exigency and administrative
82
necessity."
As a result, little consideration was given

either to its intergovernmental impact or whether the pro79

80

81
82
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grains' objectives could even be achieved within the

current administrative structure.

There appears to be

nothing new about this tendency, however, for according

to V. 0. Key, Jr., neither interest groups nor Congress
have ever been preoccupied with the impact of grant
.

r

?

programs on intergovernmental relations.
While the potential impact of grant programs on
intergovernmental relations has never been a primary

consideration of either Congress or groups seeking pas

sage of legislation, an administrative apparatus which
provided guidelines for federal-state relationships in

administering the grants had evolved.84

This does not

mean, however, that there was a superior-subordinate re
lationship between these two governments with a stream
of orders flowing from federal to state agencies.

Rather,

the relationship was one of collaboration and "consulta
tion concerning, and approval of, prospective action to

be undertaken within the broad limits of legislation,

coupled with a review of past actions through inspections,
85
reports and audits."
While such an apparatus may have

provided state and local governments with too much influence
in planning and too much freedom in administration, it

nevertheless provided a reasonably intimate structure,
g

..................
Key, The Administration of Federal Grants, p. 1.

84Ibid., pp. 1-3.
85Ibid., p. 369.
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together with procedural guidelines for intergovernmental

relations.

As the policy'-making process was centralized
during the 1960’s, however, this collaborative structure

was undermined.

This collaboration was further under

mined by the highly experimental nature of such programs
or
as community action programs.
Their potential impact
on intergovernmental relations received little attention.

In fact, many of the grant programs were developed and

launched in such a euphoric atmosphere that their adminis

trative impact was not openly discussed.
The development and administration of certain

aspects of the War on Poverty demonstrates the experimental
nature of many of the project grants and their implications
for intergovernmental relations.

According to the 1966

report by the Commission of Intergovernmental Relations

(ACIR), the Economic Opportunity Act prescribed an inter
governmental attack on poverty by creating new approaches

such as Community Action Programs (CAP), Job Corps and
VISTA.

The major focus of CAP was a direct federal-private

and federal-local relationship.

This relationship emphasized

involvement of private non-governmental groups.

86
87

States were

Sundquist, Making Federalism Work, p. 13.

Sanford Kravits,"The Community Action Program —
Past, Present and Its Future?," p. 60.

virtually bypassed and local governments avoided.

The following case study demonstrates the lack of

consideration of intergovernmental relations by the
policy-makers of the War on Poverty.

Community Action:

An Approach to Social Reform

Introduction

Occasionally the public’s peace of mind has been
elbowed by descriptions of poverty in America.

For the

most part, however, Americans believed in the miracle that
nobody starves in America, and that no adult is broke for
long.

This belief in widespread prosperity was not a

myth held by the layman alone.

It seemed that even those

individuals one would expect to be aware of poverty — the
scholars, journalists and politicians — also believed

that the American dream had been realized.

Though there

were a few prominent individuals who dissented from this
optimistic view during the 1950's, their references to
poverty were either laughed at or brushed aside as too
insignificant to warrant the attention of the national

88

ACIR, Intergovernmental Relations and the
Poverty Program (Washington, D. C.: United StatesGovern
ment Printing Office, 1966), p. 2.
89

Herman Miller, Rich Man, Poor Man (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowal Company, 19 64) , p. 37. Miller argues that
the conventional wisdom promulgated by the economists,
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myth that incomes in the United States were becoming more
evenly distributed.
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government.$$
However, when President Johnson declared an

"unconditional war on poverty" in his 1964 State of the
Union Address, it was evident that the attitude toward
poverty had changed.

While the public was yet to be

captured by this new mood, government officials now

conceded the widespread and pernicious aspects of poverty.

Within a year, the War on Poverty became the most publicized
component of President Johnson’s Gr^at Society Program.
The following three years were to see it become one of the

most motly debated policies in the country.
What brought about these changes?

Various interpretations have sought to explain the

timing in launching the War on Poverty in 1964.

Most inter-

pretations offer other than clear, concise, or readily
quantifiable explanations.

In fact, as one attempts to

acocunt for the climatic nuances that made it respectable

to talk about poverty as an aspect of public policy, it

becomes obvious that it was the result of an interweaving
of various subtle threads.

It is the objective of this

part of the study to identify these threads, account for

their origins and trace their interweaving into the fabric
of public policy.

90

John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society
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Since the term "War on Poverty" has been used to

designate the veritable arsenal of legislative weaponry
developed by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to

fight poverty,

the subject is obviously too broad for

the purposes of this study.

For that matter, the Economic

Opportunity Act of 1964, considered the most significant

weapon of this arsenal, is also too extensive a subjpct
for the scope of this study.

Besides, and most important,

all of this legislation with the exception of Title II

the Economic Opportunity Act can be considered as

"fundamentally conservative."

Not only did the major

bulk of the poverty program emphasize the American virtues

of education, training and character building, it was also

based on the experience of past programs.

The distinctive

element of the War on Poverty was the inclusion of the
"Community Action Program" under Title II.

CAP constituted

a "new departure in public policy and program."^

since

it was this aspect of the War on Poverty that caused such
turbulence in local, state and national politics, an
accounting of its development will constitute an important

part of this study.
91
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The government discovers
community action
President Kennedy initiated the process which

was to develop the CAP.

While reviewing the economic

condition of the nation during December, 1962, it became

obvious to him that the bulk of his legislative program
was ineffective in eliminating poverty.

Perceiving a

need for an innovative strategy to symbolize his New
Frontier, the President asked Walter Heller to provide

him with the "facts and figures ... about the poverty
problem in the United States."

Robert Jampman to the task.

Heller, in turn, assigned

By May, 1963, Lampman presented

data which revealed a drastic slowdown in the rate at which

the economy was taking people out of poverty.

On the basis

of this information, an article in the New York Herald

Tribune reporting a rival antipoverty program, and encourage
ment from the President, Heller asked Lampman and others
for ideas that might constitute a Kennedy antipoverty pro

gram.

The upshot of this request was the formation of an

informal interagency group known as the "Saturday Club."$4

The formative stages
When Kennedy finally revealed his intentions on
November 19, 1963, to include antipoverty measures as a
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part of the 1964 legislative program, the "Club" developed
the initial framework called "Widening Participation in
Prosperity."

The Club was in the midst of reviewing

this framework with the Bureau of the Budget, the Council
of Economic Advisors and the White House staff when the

news of President Kennedy’s death arrived from Dallas.

In spite of the fact that President Johnson quickly assured
the Club of his support and assigned the Bureau of the
Budget to coordinate the program, progress halted for the

lack of a clear rationale which would distinguish it from
previous programs. 95
While the Bureau of the Budget was "floundering"
for a rationale, Heller received an idea from David

Hacket and Richard Boone, who had experience with community

action programs sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the
President’s Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth

Crime.

They suggested that community organizations similar

to the ones they had used be utilized in the antipoverty
When Heller presented this idea at a Budget-

program.

C.E.A. meeting, William Cannon of the Bureau of the Budget

saw it as an answer to his problem.

Cannon attached the

label "Development Corporation" and suggested that ten
demonstration areas be established as prototypes for
experimental purposes, similar to those conducted by Hacket
and Boone.

95

During meetings of the next week, Charles
Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 13 7.
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Schultze proposed the name of "Action Program;"96
Frank Mankiewicz suggested "Community" be put in front;

and the result was "Community Action Program."97

While this discussion explains how the informal
process set in motion by President Kennedy generated the

term "Community Action Program," it fails to explain why
it was accepted as a feasible approach and rationale for
an antipoverty program.

As seasoned members of the

Administration, these men knew they would eventually be
required to explain and justify the community action

concept to inquiring and often skeptical legislators.
It must be assumed, hterefore, that Heller, Cannon and

the others had a reasonable basis for accepting the com

munity action approach to an antipoverty program.
What was this reasonable basis?
Social innovation and the development
of the community action approach
to social problems
During the formative stages of antiproverty plan

ning, Heller, Lampman, Cannon and the others were influenced
by the most recent innovative developments and intellectual

opinions in four basic areas of public policy:

urban re

newal, juvenile delinquency, manpower training and public

Not only had new theories and perspectives

welfare.

96
97
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Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunder
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York; The Free Press, 1969), preface.
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emerged, but practical applications in the form of ex
periments and prototype agencies had been developed to
apply the theories.

These theories and experiences were

brought to the attention of Heller and the others during

1963.

By 1964, many of the men who were responsible for

these innovations were contacted and incorporated into
both the planning and administration of what was to

become the War on Poverty.
Urban renewal. — Like many of the government

efforts to improve the conditions of living in America,
urban renewal has been subjected to widespread criticism

from both conservatives and liberals alike.

Although

Congress enacted the Housing Act of 1937, it was designed

to stimulate the building industry, rather than clear the

slums.

The severe housing shortage following the second

world war prodded the Congress into passing the more comp
rehensive Housing Act in 1949.

Unfortunately, its explicit

goal of "a decent house ... for every American" was
never realized.

The Housing Act of 1949 was amended in

1954 with the specific object of focusing local as well as

national forces on slum clearance.

In spite of the legis

lation, the slums were not cleared, the poor were not af
fected, and many Americans lacked decent housing.98
Although the legislation failed to produce major

changes, there were some significant efforts at reform by

98
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Richard Lee, the mayor of New Haven and Paul Ylvisaker
of the Ford Foundation, which led to the conceptualiza
tion of community action programs.

Under Lee’s leader

ship, New Haven’s Redevelopment Agency established a tenyear plan to eliminate slums.

As a result of Lee's un

matched ability to obtain federal funds made available
under the 1949 and 1954 housing legislation, combined with
Edward Logue's administrative skills as the program direc

tor, the first slums were cleared by 1956.

However, when

faced with the task of relocating displaced individuals,
it became obvious to Logue that urban renewal involved
more than the physical process of clearing slums.

A

necessary prerequisite to a successful program was con
vincing displaced persons (either as displaced persons,

or as members of ethnic groups) that urban renewal was
for their benefit.

Fortunately for New Haven’s urban

renewal program, Mayor Lee’s leadership skills provided
the confidence necessary to forestall the crisis.

So as

to prevent a recurrence of a similar crisis, Logue set
about organizing a coordinated program which would provide
a comprehensive effort to deal with the social problems
of slums. 99
Meanwhile, Paul Ylvisaker, head of the Ford
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Foundation’s Public Affairs Program had arrived at a

similar, though not so precise, conclusion.

Having become

disillusioned with the efforts of the Foundation during
the 1950’s, he and his fellow workers began to look for a

new approach.

Hearing of Ylvisaker’s interest in a broader

approach to social reform, Logue met with him in December,

1959, and revealed his experiences of the past five years

in New Haven.

This contact could not help but inspire

Ylvisaker toward implementing a program.

Ylvisaker thought

he had found the appropriate challenge in the form of a

request from the superintendent of the Chicago schools, to

help the "culturally handicapped."

He discovered, how

ever, that working within an educational framework was
impractical, given the limited scope of institutions.

An

effective program required a new and more encompassing
agency.

So, with the objective of developing an umbrella

type agency which would coordinate government and civic
agencies in tackling "the human problems in gray areas,"
Ylvisaker and his colleagues developed the Foundation’s
"Community Development Program."

Beginning in 1961, the

Foundation made its first grant of $2 million for the

development of such a program to the City of Oakland.

During the next two years, five additional grants were
made which comprised the CDP, more commonly known as the
Gray Areas Project,100

100Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform,
pp. 13-15, 124-125, 180-182. '

53

As director of urban renewal in Boston during

1962-63, Edward Logue was in contact with Paul Ylvisaker
and his Gray Areas Project.

Perceiving the more complex

and conflict-ridden nature of Boston’s community, Logue

set about to establish a community organization through

the Gray Areas Project as a way of coordinating and
reconciling the differences between the Yankee business
elite, the Irish Catholics and minority groups.

This

community organization was to contribute and consequently
support the Redevelopment Authorities* plans which Logue
saw as the primary means of social reform.

Ylvisaker,

however, was unwilling to tie the Boston Gray Areas Project
exclusively to Logue's urban renewal goals.

Thus, as the

Gray Areas Project established its own goals and methods,
Logue felt increasingly betrayed, and for good reason.
His interest in the Gray Areas Project was more than
simply instrumental; for he felt he had initiated the idea

of community action in New Haven.^^

Juvenile delinquency. — Neither Logue nor Ylvisaker
were the first to conceive of, or to implement community

action programs.

Similar broad-based organizations had

been employed in Chicago during the 1930's as a method of
mobilizing community resources to combat juvenile delin102
quency.
However, what proved to be the most significant

102 .
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program in influencing public policy was begun in 1957

when J. M. Kaplan, a businessman-philanthropist, together

with the Board of Directors of the Henry Street Settlement
sought to develop a program to meet the delinquency prob

lems that arose with the immigration of Puerto Ricans and
Southern Negroes into New York City.

With the aid of

private and public agencies, the program developed into
the Mobilization for Youth, Inc.

(MFY).103

Since two of the men on the Board of Directors
were the Dean and Assistant Dean of the New York School

of Social Work of Columbia University and the New York

School of Social Work provided substantial financial
support, it would be reasonable to assume that from its

inception MFY would be heavily influenced by the ideas,
opinions and theories of the intellectuals.

This as

sumption acquired an almost irrefutable credence when
MFY submitted its planning proposals in the form of a

request for funding from the National Institute of Mental
Health in December, 1961.

The 617-page "request" entitled,

A Proposal for the Prevention and Control of Delinquency

by Expanding Opportunities, while interested in juvenile
delinquency, planned to organize the whole community.104

Thus, whereas broad-based community organizations had been
conceived as an approach to combat the social problems of

103
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juvenile delinquency and urban renewal, it was now

directed toward more comprehensive changes.105

More

importantly, whereas it was loosely conceived, it now
had the support of a more sophisticated framework and

rationale.
The theme of opportunity was based on a theory
of juvenile delinquency developed by Lloyd Ohlin and

Richard Cloward of the New York School of Social Work.
Presenting the opportunity theory of delinquent behavior,
they argued that delinquency was the result of the lack

of opportunity to achieve socially acceptable goals through
socially acceptable means.

Thus, rather than develop a

program to rehabilitate a "sick" individual, a broaderfocused program is required which will change the "sick"
institutions that influence and shape the character of

the individual.105
Prodded by an embarrassing question at his first
press conference in March, 1961, President Kennedy ap

pointed David Racket as a special assistant to the Attorney

General and asked him to develop a program to combat
juvenile delinquency.

Having no experience in this subject

Racket set about collecting ideas.

Almost immediately he

was contacted by the Ford Foundation executives, who pre

sented Cloward and Ohlin’s theory.

105

These ideas were, in

Sundquist, Public Policy, pp. 140-141.
106 .
Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delin
quency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs
(New York: The Free Press, I960).

turn, relayed back to the President, who responded in

May by establishing the President's Committee on Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Crime which was to be constituted

by the Attorney General, the Secretary of H.E.W., the

Secretary of Labor, with the objective of coordinating

communities to enhance opportunities for youth.10^
In September, 1961, Congress passed the Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act which approp

riated $10 million to be distributed to states and com
munities for the purpose of developing programs which

would lead to "intensive and coordinated efforts on the

part of private and governmental interests" to prevent
and control delinquency.

Although the Secretary of H.E.W.

was authorized to make the grants, his power was abridged

by the requirement that he consult and consider recomi no
mendations of the PCJD.
Such a specific grant of authority necessitated

the more continuous aspects of bureaucratic organizations.
The Committee consequently appointed David Racket as its

Executive Director.

Racket immediately set about developing

and promoting programs in the areas of delinquency, edu

cation, employment, etc., as well as announcing the pro
visions of the legislation and inviting applications for

funds.109
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Since both the PCJD and the Juvenile Delinquency
and Youth Offenses Control Act were based on the same

theoretical principles as some of the recent innovative
theories and experiments, it is not surprising that
Hacket collected an energetic and distinguished group of

men around him.

The most notable men of this group were

Richard Boone of the Public Affairs Department of the
Ford Foundation and Lloyd Ohlin of MFY.

Also, by virtue

of the fact that PCJD provided sixteen percent of the
funding for MFY and co-sponsored many projects with other

public and private agencies, Hacket, as a confidant of
Robert F. Kennedy, was exposed to the implications of these
most recent innovations.

The PCJD differed from the founda

tions by emphasizing elaborate planning and a conceptual
framework.

However, despite the varying approaches, they

were all motivated by a common philosophy.

Most signifi

cant, however, was the fact that they emphasized changing

the environment, coordinating agencies, and incorporating

individuals to be affected by the program into aspects of
..
, . . ,
,.
110
its
administration.
Manpower training programs. — Prior to the declar
ation of the War on Poverty in 1964, most economists and
politicians saw poverty in terms of unemployment.

Although

the New Deal policies were a tacit recognition by the
government of its responsibility to ensure full employment

and economic growth, it was not until the passage of the

110Tbid.

58
1946 Employment Act that recognition of this responsibility

was formalized.
The high unemployment rates of the late 1950’s
and the early 1960’s would indicate that the Eisenhower

Administration did little to meet this responsibility.
In fact, when Congress presented the President with employ

ment legislation, he responded on both occasions with the
veto.

The legislation, having languished in Congressional

committees for six years, was finally passed in 1961 as
the Area Redevelopment Act.

Its goal was to attract industry

to depressed areas which, it was assumed, would automati
cally create jobs.

However, due to its unrealistic expecta

tions, the pittance of the appropriation and the general
slack in the economy, the program floundered.m

In 1962, the Manpower Development Training Act was
passed after a few hasty months of planning and legislative
hearings.

MDTA emphasized training the unemployed.

Ac

cording to Sar Levitan, the shift in emphasis was due to
the persistently high level of unemployment, especially

obvious among negroes.

Though Kennedy hailed the MDTA

as "perhaps the most significant legislation in the area

of employment since the historic Employment Act of 1946,"
•
112
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growing realization that unemployment, poverty, crime and
other social ills were so inextricably related that piece
meal programs such as the ARA and MDTA could hardly be

relied upon to produce the desired changes.
Welfare;— When the public assistance of "welfare"
system was established in the 1930’s, it was directed

toward specific categories of people who could not work
because of old age or disability, and were not covered

by social insurance.

It was anticipated that as the

economy recovered and more people were covered by social

insurance, that the need for public assistance would de
cline.

Rather than wither away, public assistance payments

continued to increase.

Also, the composition of the public

assistance roles have changed to include additional cate
gories such as Aid to Dependent Children (ADC).

By the

1960's, the public assistance program had developed to
a point where neither taxpayers,nor administrators, nor
■ .
.
113
recipients were satisfied with it.

Seeing the need for an overhaul, the Kennedy
Administration presented Congress with a set of proposals
which passed as the Amendments to the Social Security Act

in 1962.

By providing a larger grant to the States and

by allowing federal money to aid families with unemployed
fathers, it was assumed that the states would take the

113
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initiative to reform and rehabilitate their programs.
Little reform was forthcoming.

In fact, by 1970 only

twenty-three states had chosen to take advantage of the
ADC provisions of the Amendment.

Thus, though the Kennedy

Administration hailed the Amendment as a "landmark" and
representative of a "new spirit," it should be obvious

from the previous discussion that the private view of the

Administration was somewhat less optimistic.114
Conclusion
Conclusion
President Kennedy entered the Office of the

Presidency with the awareness of growing social ills,
but lacked a program for their solution.

In search of

a replacement for the worn-out patchwork of impotent

programs, Kennedy demonstrated his willingness to innovate.

The initial processes of innovation in the four areas dis
cussed above forged links with similar and, in some cases,

more advanced innovative efforts.

Contact and interaction

with these additional and more experienced efforts led

to the refinement of ideas which, in turn, served as the
basis for launching community action programs as a feasible

public policy.
The war is declared

Having decided on the rationale for the antiH^Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), pp. 226-231;
Sundquist, Politics and Policy, pp. 129-131.
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poverty program, the matter was turned over to Kermit

Gordon (Director of the Bureau of the Budget).

Since

Gordon had been somevhat skeptical about the idea of
community action, its advocates called on Paul Ylvisaker
to convince him.

Ylvisaker presented a convincing argu

ment based on his own experiences.

In order to rein

force his argument, he brought in several administrators
from community action programs to meet with Gordon,

Cannon and the others over breakfast.

The testimonies

of these administrators, together with the arguments from
Ylvisaker, Boone, Hacket and the others, proved decisive.

Gordon, with the aid of Heller, proceeded to convince
President Johnson that the concept was a solid one, based

on time-tested methods.

So, on the basis of this advice,

the President declared "an unconditional war on poverty."
However, while the antipoverty rationale had been

decided upon and the war declared, the exact strategy of
the community action program was yet to be developed.

Three interpretations of
community action

Even before the president announced the War on

Poverty, the Budget Bureau, and CEA and the White House

staff labored to refine the concept of community action.
115
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The fact that the concept was both unique in its present

context and subject to a variety of interpretations did
not help matters.

Morris has identified three conflicting

strategies arising from the different interpretations.117
The first view rose out of Ford's Gray Areas pro
jects.

It emphasizes planning, working through traditional

institutions and incremental change.

The strategy of these

projects assumed the urban society was a benevolent anarchy
constituted by ambitious and highly competitive groups and

individuals.

In order for justice to be achieved, every

individual must have an equal chance to be competitive.
To achieve this view of justice, institutions must be made
relevant by turning outward to consider the needs of those
they ought to serve.

Such a goal required an independent

agency that can reorient and reintegrate institutions.

On

the basis of experimentation, the effectiveness of the

various programs on those it serves can be determined.

And

on the basis of these determinations, the agencies can
appropriately stimulate the institutions.

The underlying

assumption is that this community agency can produce

coalitions and a concensus within a highly competitive, if
not conflicting context. 118
The second view is usually identified with Richard

Cloward and his work with MFY.

117
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opportunities for the poor.

It assumes that the lack

of opportunities for the poor is the direct outgrowth
of a lack of power.

Thus, in order to remedy the in

justice, it is necessary to get behind the "power struc

ture" — to mobilize the poor to assert and defend their
The key to social reform, therefore, was
participation by the poor. 119

own interests.

The third perspective was characteristic of the

approach used by the PCJD.

It relied on the power of

It assumed that through careful research,

knowledge.

experimentation with prototypes and rigorous evaluation,
new approaches that were at once scientifically sound,

administratively feasible and politically acceptable

would be developed.

It was also assumed that such infor

mation would prove irresistible and would be incorporated
. .
.
120
into
public policy.
While the planners of the antipoverty program
appeared to some researchers to choose the Ford approach,

a more realistic conclusion is that, given the vague nature
of Title II of the Economic Opportunity Act and the way
the program was finally administered, no real choice was

made at all.

Also, there is little evidence to support the

view that the planners, to be distinguished from its advo
il Q

Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform,

pp. 52-55.

120 Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 140.
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cates, perceived these views as divergent.121

Besides

the planners were primarily interested in developing a
rationale.

It is not surprising, therefore, that after

the rationale was generally agreed upon, the attention

of the planners was redirected toward the issue of admin

istrative jurisdiction.

While there were sorties by those

disposed to community action for primarily intellectual

reasons, the major battle was over who would administer
the community action program.122

The program is reassembled;
the Shriver task force
Perceiving the inertia resulting from the juris
dictional squabbles and anxious to take advantage of the
symbolic value of the program for his 1964 campaign,

President Johnson appointed Sargent Shriver on February 1,
to set up a task force.

Drawing from various departments,

Shriver quickly organized his task force.

It included

such prominent individuals as Daniel Moynihan, Harold

Horowitz, James Sundquist and Hymen Bookbinder, together
with several other representatives, his unofficial advisors

and resident intellectuals.123

Having been quickly briefed concerning the develop
Kravitz, "The Community Action Program," pp. 52-70.
122

Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Beginnings of O.E.C.," in
On Fighting Poverty, ed. by J. L. Sundquist (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1969), pp. 34-51.
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ments of the program under the direction of the Bureau
of the Budget, two things became obvious to Shriver:

(1) little, if any planning had occurred since December,
when Cannon and the other planners adopted the rationale

of community action for the anti-poverty program, and
(2) a genuine anti-poverty program needed more than

community action programs.

So, within one week after

his appointment, Shriver began to resurrect the old

proposals shelved by the Bureau of the Budget.

He also

canvassed, as best he could, for suggestions from leaders

of the business and educational communities, together
with state governments, local governments and private
agencies. 124
This reevaluation was to have an effect on the
final proposal.

Labor Secretary Wirtz, for example, lost

little time in bringing to Shriver's attention the fact

that prototype community action programs such as those
employed by MFY, Ford and the PCJD provided few jobs

or the poor.

Shriver was also made aware of the

congressional criticism of the PCJD as long on research
and short on concrete results.

Qn -j-he basis of such

criticisms, Shriver was quick to dismiss the previously
held approach that community action programs begin slowly

124

Sundquist, Politics and Policy, p. 142.

125
,
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with a few experimental projects and proceed cautiously.127
In fact, there were several days during which Shriver
considered eliminating community action from the proposal
altogether, on the grounds that he cound not see how it

could be operative.

However, during the next fortnight,

the program was reassembled such that while community
action was retained as the central theme, it was not to

constitute a major program in the antipoverty proposal.
Not only was it to become merely one of the five titles

of the antipoverty legislation, but community action
programs were to be made community options.128

The CAP proposal
The community action concept was first presented

in operational terms in a report prepared by Fred Hayes
and Sanford Kravitz during the first week of briefings.
According to Kravitz, the outline of how community action

would work went something like this:

A community would

carefully study its poverty problems, locate the most se

vere pockets of need and identify them as target areas
which would affect all relevant institutions, that is,

the schools, social services, job opportunities, etc.
It would enhance its ability to implement its program
objectives by inclusion of political leadership.

It would

127
Don R. Broyles,"Poverty and Social Reform"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School,
1971), p. 86.
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"remain honest

to its purposes by inclusion of voices

representing the poor, residents of the target neighbor129
hoods.

This model assumed local government at the city
and county levels had the capacity to organize itself for

cooperative action in the War on Poverty.

It assumed

that there was an agreed-upon definition of poverty.

It also assumed the poor would play the pivotal role of
keeping the program "honest."

a

concensus structure,

Above all, it also assumed

based on the power of persuasion.

While both Kravitz and Hayes were aware that these as

sumptions were by no means self-evident, they were so
captured by the euphoric prospects of launching a nation

wide program, that none of these assumptions were openly
challenged.130

It was because of the gnawing questions posed by
these assumptions that the advocates of community action

(Ylvisaker, Boone, Hacket and Kravitz) initially suggested

the cautious approach so that the program could be developed
by trial and error.

However, because the reaction of other

members of the task force and the anticipated criticisms
from Congress, already mentioned, the "building block"

approach was adopted.

In effect, this approach meant that

funds would be available to each "block" or community.

129
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which could be funded and developed without waiting
for results of other projects or the development of a

"conceptual framework" to guide the program.131

Presidential approval:
key decisions
As Shriver assembled the program, he was guided
by the Presidential rhetoric of an "unconditional war"

on poverty.

It is not surprising, therefore, that he

saw the adult employment program as the major item of

first task force proposal.

Upon presentation to the

cabinet on Fecruary 18, he suggested that adult employ
ment be appropriated $1.25 billion to be financed by a
five percent cigarette tax.

Though Wirtz and other

members of the cabinet spoke in favor of the program,
the President quickly dismissed the idea as incompatible

with his objective of cutting taxes.

Had the President

accepted Shriver's proposal, the central theme of the
War on Poverty would have been "employment strategy."
However, the initial theme of community action was
reattached.132

On February 23, Norbert Schlei, Harold Horowitz,
Boone, Ylvisaker and Hacket produced the first task force

draft of the "Human Resources Development Act of 1964."
During the next three weeks, while the bill was discussed

further, Shriver managed to convince the President that

132Ibid., p. 61.
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the new agency should be placed in the Executive Office.
Finally, on March 16, the draft was presented to Congress

as the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964.133
Conclusion: the
impact of CAP
Some of the specific intergovernmental problems
arising out of such an approach to poverty were discussed

in a report on poverty by the ACIR in 1966.

To begin

with, local government felt that the 0E0 had failed to

provide clear guidelines describing the form of organi
zation of the various CAA’s or their program substance.

The states were similarly critical.

Not only were they

virtually ignored, their cooperation or neutrality was
Because of the lack of administravite coordin

assumed.

ation, CAP's could not get necessary lists of welfare

recipients from the State Welfare Department so as to
develop a case list from which to work.134

Also, their

philosophical approaches to poverty differed; State
Welfare agencies emphasized a welfare approach to poverty
rather than self-help or earning type programs.

As a

result, many persons lost state welfare benefits when

they made exploratory moves to try job training.13^

The

ACIR report on poverty concluded that, among other things:
133

Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,
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134
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The Community Action program adds one more layer
to the growing number offederally aided urninL

and agencies at the local and regional 1X1
~
concerned with physical and human resource nTann-in-,
^TdgveLopmen^ ht also adds one more agegg^

must be established. Aside from ke problems of
confusion, friction, duplication, and coordination,
this impact increases the strain on community
leadership resources, particularly in rural areas
and makes countrywide leadership more difficult.1^6
Following such conclusions the report proceeded

outline fourteen recommendations, nine of which were
specifically designed to help improve the administrative

coordination of the federal and state governments.

For

example, Recommendation No. 7 "recommends that the Econ
omic Opportunity Council establish the necessary machinery

to assure integrated planning at the state and federal
levels, to assure integrated planning."137

The Commission

also recommended that local government units rather than

private non-profit groups organize CAP's.

Other recom

mendations included improving information, providing the
Governor's veto, and establishing uniform procedures.

The basic issues raised by the criticism from state
and local officials centered around the lack of formal

guidelines for intergovernmental relations:

To what degree

should CAP’s at the local level be subordinate to or inde
pendent of local government?

136

Ibid., pp. 75-153.

1377Ibid., p. 161.
138Ibid., p. 174.

Should state governments act
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as political and administrative "brokers" between

Washington and local CAP's?

How should existing wel

fare agencies relate to the newer poverty programs^
Should established programs be modified to give the
newer programs "elbow room" to innovate and experiment?139
Lack of planning on the part of national policy-makers

simply precluded systematic consideration of these pos

sibilities.

Thus, if CAP can be considered as an accurate

sample of other grant programs of the 1960's, it would

suggest that they were also made in the face of similar

uncertainty as to results and impact, and were based on
assumptions of the problems, far more than from available
data.
Conclusions

The failure of the policy-makers to consider and

plan for the intergovernmental impact of the grant pro
grams enacted in the 1960's was the primary cause of

the many administrative problems which developed.

The

significance of this development has been discussed by

several noted authors.

Charles Adrian and Charles Press

argued that the lack of detailed planning was the result

of the failure of policy-makers to account for Opportunity
Costs, which is "what we pay in a way of giving up on a

desirable thing in order to gain the opportunity to choose
139
Ibid., pp. 174-189; ACIR, Eighth Annual Report
(Washington, D. C. : United States Government Printing
Office, 1967), pp. 13-15.
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an even more desirable thing."140

In other WQrd^

politics is not only "who gets what, when and how," it

is also what gets left undone.

However, public officials

have all too often fallen prey to the tendency of the
typical citizen to think that achieving goals is a

function of wishing and commitment without facing the
sobering question of whether or not a particular set of
policies is feasible within the current context of the

political culture.141
Theodore Lowi argues that the lack of planning
by policymakers is an outgrowth of "interest group liberal

ism" which is hostile to rational and responsible admin
istration which requires law, choice, priorities and
moralities.

Interest group liberalism interferes with the

political process and changes the basic rules of political

behavior.

As such, it undermines democracy as a formal

political system of norms which answers the basic political
questions of how political decisions are made, who makes

them, and what limits are placed on government authority.
To the degree which lack of planning undermines clear
140

Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, American
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Company,
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and/or interest groups.
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answers to these basic questions, it poses a threat

to the legitimacy of the American political system.142
Whether or not the consequences of the lack of

planning are as dire as Lowi claims, other scholars sup
port his contention that planning is impossible in the
American governmental system.

According to Thad L. Beyle

and George T. Lathrop, planning is impossible because of:
(1) the fragmented nature of the government system _
both in structure and power,

(2) the basic dichotomy

between those who make the policy and those who administer
it,

(3) the lower levels have insufficient funds to make

long-term commitments, and (4) there is no continuity of

leadership in either the legislative or executive branches.
Yet, in spite of all of these impediments, planning has

been carried out.

However, it has been at the state and

local levels and has involved such things as planning the

World

Events

Fair, and planning to build "beautiful cities."

of the 1960’s however, changed all of this, making

Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism. Michael
eagan also laments the tendency of journalists and scholars
o be concerned with the how of administrative processes and
government activity, rather than the what. Systematic
po icy-making requires a connection between the two. See
. ^ea9an/ ed. , The Administration of Public Policy
( llinois: Scott Foresman and Company, 1969), preface,
ore argues that the fragmentation between planning and
implementation of public policy points out the inadequacy
0 current models in explaining decision making as a pattern
° interactions and a collective response to perceived
problems.
See William J. Gore, "Decision Theory Fragment,"
in
Administration of Public Policy, pp. 22-25. Also see
hchael Reagan, 'Toward Improving National Policy Planning,"
Public Administration Review, XXIII (March, 1963), pp. 10-19.

planning "the captive of the bureaucracy, with its
reports and data reflecting biases of past decisions

and protection for the agency and the program in the

future.

Robert Levine also indicts the policy-making
process in the United States.

He argues "that most public

programs in the United States have not worked well; some

have not worked at all."

The primary cause of this state

of affairs is that while planning and implementation are
usually closely intertwined, public planners to date are
demanding implementation of a sort that cannot be delivered.

Before programs can be delivered by administrators, both
planners and administrators must understand each other’s

limitations and motivations, as well as the political

context in which they are to operate.144

This lack of an

integrated and intergovernmental planning attitude is

the root of the problem of CAP and probably many other
grant programs instituted in the 1960's.
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pp. 1-2. Richard Leach argues that "planning has been a
suspect word in the United States" and policy is developed
pragmatically without analysis of future trends or possible
problems. Leach, American Federalism, p. 49.

CHAPTER II
THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL REGIONAL COUNCILS

Introduction
All presidents have been harried with the dif

ficulties of controlling the administrative apparatus.
Some have almost despaired at the challenge of exer
cising effective administrative control over what appears

to be a "bureaucratic wilderness."145

It is no wonder

that all recent presidents have come to rely more heavily
on members of the Executive Office whose loyalty is
easier to insure.

Presidents, however, have not been

alone in their concern for effective administration.

In

1798, the Fifth Congress conducted its first reorgani
zation of administrative procedures.

While a superficial

glance at the history of reorganization efforts would

tend to emphasize the periodic purges, it is important to
recognize that administrative reform has been an ongoing

feature of American government, even though it has not

been formally stamped with the label of "reorganization.”
The Constitution itself could be considered the result
of the first effort to achieve administrative reform.
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Although the Constitution certainly provided more than

that, its great appeal, as well as source of ongoing
controversy, was its executive provisions which were
notably non-existent in the Articles of Confederation.146
Recent Efforts to Reform the Grant System

The Johnson Administration

President Johnson sought to remedy the inefficiencies
and confusion of the transformed grant system by designating
the Vice President as the federal liaison with state and

local executives.

He also ordered the Bureau of the Budget

to consolidate overlapping grant programs.in 1966,
a number of federal agencies with the help of the Eighty

ninth Congress made several efforts to achieve this objective.

The Comprehensive Health Planning and Public Health Services
Amendments replaced over a dozen separate grant authoriza

tions for categorical health programs in such fields as
communicable diseases, cancer, and venereal disease, into
a single program.

The Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan

Development Act permitted greater flexibility by providing
funds to be used by local agencies for purposes determined

by local agencies.148
146u v
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^ecutive Management (Alabamal University of Alabama
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147T
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in 1967, the Bureau of the Budget issued Circular

A-85, which attempted to resolve the conflict between the

functional autocracies and the state local executive

officers, by requiring that grants be submitted for

reaction and comments by governors, mayors and county
While this new procedure received a cool

officials.

welcome from federal program administrators, as well as
some of their functional counterparts at the state and
local levels, it showed some promise of success by the

end of 1968.

Also, in 1967, Congress added the

Green Amendment" to the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act.
This amendment gave local governments the "first option"

over private organizations in administering CAP’s.

How

ever, since few local governments took advantage of this

option, it would seem that the amendment was designed as
a token response to the "grass roots revolt" rather than

as a far-reaching reform.150
The most important Congressional effort to reform

the grant system came on October 16, 1968, with the pas

sage of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act.

This

act was implemented through the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Circulars A-95, A-96, A-97 and A-98.

Circular

A-95 served as the heart of the management system by

providing for project notification and review as well as
149
150
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Circular

A-96 provided state administrators with more flexibility

in administering grants.

For example, no longer did

federal agencies require states to deposit grant funds

in bank accounts separate from other state funds.

Circular A-97 directs federal agencies to make technical
expertise available to states and localities.

Circular

A-98 directs federal agencies to provide the State
Central Information Agency (SCIR) information regarding

each grant awarded the state and for its political sub

divisions . 151
A study conducted in 1970 concluded that the

potential impact of this act was yet to be realized.
Rather than reform what state and local officers saw as

the "functional tyranny" of the categorical grant system,

the act simply transferred it to the federal and regional
clearinghouses established by Circular A-95.

States

played a lethargic role and failed to take advantage of
the

services" aspects of the act.

Besides, it left

intact many basic impediments such as the sheer size of
the categorical grant system.152

In order to remedy the problems arising out of the

"The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968:
Survey of Federal and State Implementation," in Coming
together (Washington: The Council of State Governments,
1971), pp. 6-9.
152

Grosenick, "Institutional Change," p. 97. It
ls interesting to note that in 1971 President Nixon began
vetoing all additional grant legislation. In 1972, he
vetoed sixteen grant programs.
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large number of grant programs. President Nixon recom

mended the passage of a grant consolidation act.

How

ever, after 1968, Congress gave little support to this
and subsequent reform efforts.

Although the proposed

amendments to the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act

(S3140) received full bipartisan support in the Senate,
they failed in the House.

Had the Amendments been

adopted, they would have provided for, among other things,

the President submitting grant consolidation plans to
Congress which would have become effective if not vetoed
by either house within sixty days.

The failure of Congress

to support this recommendation specifically, and further

reform of the grant system generally, stems from the fact
that streamlining the many categorical grants is arduous

"pick and shovel" work.

"Perhaps the largest part of the

problem, however, is rooted in the continuing strength
of the program specialists, their interest groups and

legislative allies at all levels."153

The Nixon Administration
If Congress was reluctant to further reform the

grant system, the Nixon Administration was not.

After

all, most of the problems that existed before the passage

of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act remained intact.

Besides, not only was the Nixon Administration besieged
by a

literal torrent" of criticism of the grant adminis

tration system, it was becoming clearly apparent that no
153*^
ACIR, Fourteenth Annual Report, p. 14.
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matter how hard the federal bureaucrats were trying,

many grant programs were being drowned in tons of paper
work.

The awareness and desire of the Nixon Administra 

tion to remedy these problems brought about the New
Federalism which Dwight Ink, the Assistant Director of

OMP, responsible for intergovernmental relations, describes
154
below:
In order to properly define New Federalism, we must
examine patterns of action rather than seek compre
hensive definitions. Basic to the New Federalism is
a feeling that although a joint federal-state-local
effort is important and essential, all three levels
cannot expect to have a lead role in each action
One level should have the lead or initiative for’
one particular task.
It should be in a position to
take the necessary initiative that triggers the involve
ment of the other partners. For most of the tasks
of the nation the burden of proof must be in the
direction of the state and local governments as
triggering devices.
The closer to a citizen it
can be handled, the better. If it must be done by
the federal government, then move it out of Washington
to the federal regional or area office level.155
However, since the primary factor hindering

effective management of intergovernmental relations at the
state and local level is the grant system, which has

become primarily a national program, then it is the federal
government that must take the first steps toward reform.
In providing these initial remedies, the Nixon Adminis

tration pursued three options:

general revenue sharing,

special revenue sharing, and reforming the existing grant

system..

Revenue sharing was implemented in 19 73, but

154
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special revenue sharing has yet to receive the necessary

congressional support.

The greatest potential, however,

lies in reforming the grant administration system.
approaches can be categorized as:

planning and review,

The

(1) an emphasis on

(2) decentralization,

(3) coordina

tion, and (4) elimination of categorical grants.156
These approaches to reform were embodied in the

establishment of the Federal Assistance Review (FAR)
program.

Basically, FAR is attempting to redesign the
federal part of the system through the establish
ment of standard federal regions and regional
councils, decentralization of programs, simpli
fication, of federal grant processes, standardization
of administrative requirements, integrated grants
administration, more reliance on state and local
government, and the A-95 process.157

President Nixon launched the FAR program on
March 27, 19 69, when he directed the Bureau of the Budget
and all ten Urban Affairs Council agencies "to mobilize
a three-year interagency program to cut red tape and

streamline the delivery of federal assistance."!^
President specifically ordered:
of eight uniform regions,

The

(1) the establishment

(2) an expansion of the regional

council concept, and (3) the "systematic restructuring

156_
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of domestic programs."159

Under the Bureau of the Budget chairmanship,
representatives from the various agencies and departments

affected by the President's directive drafted a work pro

gram designed to achieve the President's goals within three
years.

This work program included nine specific elements:

(1) common regional boundaries,
(3) cutting red tape,

(2) regional councils,

(4) reduction in processing time,

(5) greater reliance on state and local government,
centralization,

(7) consistency of procedures,

(6) de

(8) joint

funding simplification, and (9) grant consolidation and
16 0
coordination.

Significant steps were taken during the first year
to effectuate each of these nine points:

1. Common regional boundaries were established,
By September, 19 70 , HEW, HUD, DOL, OEO, and SBA had
realigned their regional boundaries and moved their
offices to those cities designated as headquarters for each region.
iFed®ral Regional Councils (FRC’s) were estabisned at the headquarters of each region to facilia e greater coordination of federal programs, as well
as to provide for a more consistent relationship beween e eral agencies and state and local governments.
3*
order to cut the red tape and the voluminous
an of paperwork involved in the grant machinery.
_
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U.S. Office of the White House Press Secretary,
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various departments and agencies conducted reviews
and instituted remedies. HEW reformed twenty-two
of thirty-nine formula grant programs which required
state plans that ranged from 100 to 2,000 pages each
by a contract-like document of five to ten pages
HEW also made a forty percent reduction in its re
quired reports. OEO, HUD and other departments and
agencies made similar efforts.

4. Various departments and agencies reduced the
processing time for grants. HEW streamlined twenty
project grant programs. Health Service grants, for
example, were reduced from 171 days to seventy'days.
5. A few agencies also made measureable progress
in the direction of greater reliance on state and
local governments. DOT, for example, authorized
State Highway Departments to approve state public
utility agreements up to $25,000 which were previously
subject to prior federal review.

6. HEW fully decentralized Head Start, Short Term
Training, Air Pollution Control Planning, Development
and Health Services, and Migrant Health.
7. A number of long-range interagency programs
were established to create greater consistency of
procedures such as application forms, audit standards,
and reporting requirements. An experimental project
in this area was established in the Seattle region.
8. In order to achieve joint funding simplifi
cation four pilot projects were established in 1969.
On one project HUD acted on behalf of six other parti
cipating agencies.

9. HUD was intially the most active in grant con
solidation.
It consolidated four of its programs into
two programs.1
The FAR program reported even more successes during

its second year.

Administrative routines were overhauled,

and wasteful procedures were dropped.

In HEW alone, over

400,000 pages of state plans had been eliminated from

twenty-eight grant programs.

DOT reduced the entire state

application process from seventy to thirty days.
161
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of FRC’s was further clarified and councils began to
consider such diverse things as the problems of urban

and rural Indians in California, the economy in Seattle,
and consolidated planning applications from Indianapolis.
Similar gains were made inthe other areas of FAR.162

One particular malady which FAR attempted to re
form was the circuitous route generally traversed by grants
from application to approval and then to implementation.

Instead of going from regional offices to Washington,
where they were subsequently passed on to functional
specialists for time consuming review, FAR located approval

and coordinating authority with agency regional directors.
The result has been not only speedier grant approval, but

it has also eliminated another link in the chain of
functional autocracies.

By mid-1973, ninety-nine grant

programs totalling approximately $15 billion, had been

decentralized.163

In addition, the OMB established the Integrated
Grant Administration

(IGA) by issuing Circular A-102.

IGA was designed to allow state and local governments to

aPPly for various grants from different federal agencies
through a single application.

Not only was IGA designed

162
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to remedy the complexity and confusion in filling out

reams of applications, it was also designed to reform

the most basic problems of the categorical grant system
by allowing state and local governments to set their own
priorities, maintain a single account, and be audited by

only one agency.

By the end of 19 73. there were twenty

seven pilot IGA projects and full implementation is

expected by June, 1974.
While FAR has by no means totally resolved the

problems plaguing the grant system, it has established
a cooperative administrative mechanism to allow federal,

state and local governments to work together.

Although

there is still plenty of red tape, administrative proces
ses yet to be simplified, and examples of delay persist,
the simplification of the federal grant process is no

longer a chief item on the agendas of most state and local
meetings or national conferences.

Neither do Washington

bureaucrats nor congressmen receive the large number of

complaints about this subject that they did four years ago.165
Despite such glowing statistical reports of spe

cific improvements, the success of FAR and President Nixon’s

New Federalism depends on how successfully the grant

system as a whole is decentralized and coordinated.

It

also depends on both the compliance of federal agencies
164

alism."
165

Ink, "The Origin and Thrusts of the New FederIbid.
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and the initiative of state and local governments
Unfortunately many federal agencies are not abiding

by the A-85 procedures for direct consultations with
166
state and local governments.
Also, if the Inter
governmental Cooperation Act can be used as an accurate

sample of state and local response to a potential reformed
delivery system, it could reasonably be expected that FAR
is doomed to a similar fate.

However, since the task and

authority for implementing FAR was given to the Federal

Regional Councils (FRC's), observing their activity

would provide the best source of information as to the

relative success or failure of the FAR approach.
Development of Federal Regional Councils (FRC's)

The regional council concept had its beginnings
in the Johnson Administration.
In response to the
4
numerous complaints and indictments of the grant admin

istration system, President Johnson appointed Ben W.

Heineman, one of the nation's most successful railroad
executives, to head a secret task force.

This task force

was manned by noted academic experts and high-powered
individuals such as Mayor Richard L. Lee, McGeorge Bundy,

and Robert S. McNamara.

On September 15, 1967, the task

force submitted its report stamped "Administratively
Confidential" and never released to the public.

However,

John Fischer of Harpers Magazine managed to obtain a copy
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and reports:
. . . it was crammed with shrewd analysis of the
country's woes, and recommends bold surgery to
cure them.
It told the President how to reorgan
ize his Cabinet and the White House staff, and
how to get a grip on the runaway bureaucracy.
Anong other things, it urged him to divide the
country into ten federal regions, each with a
single headquarters to replace the 'haphazard
location of regional boundaries and locations.'167
The report also built a case for decentralization

by administrative discretion.

Instead of Washington

issuing specific and categorical policies which hamper

effective administration, general policies should be
provided allowing responsible federal officials in the

state and local communities the discretion to make day-

to-day decisions and to "make them stick."

Although

management experts from the Bureau of the Budget pre

sented eloquent arguments on behalf of these proposals,

President Johnson was obviously preoccupied with Vietnam
and other more pressing problems to give the report his
full attention.

Despite such distractions, a pilot

program was established in four cities:

San Francisco,

Chicago, Atlanta and New York.16^

The Heineman report was resurrected from the
archives when Mr. Nixon assumed the Presidency in 1969.
167

John Fischer, "Can the Nixon Administration
196^°^n^ Anything Right?" Harper's Magazine, October,
168_. . ,

Ibid.

16^Western Federal Regional Council, Concepts and
Operations (October, 1972).
See Appendix B.
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On March 27, 1969, the President issued a Directive

establishing eight standard federal regions to be head
quartered in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Atlanta,

Chicago, Dallas, Denver and San Francisco.

These

standard federal regions were designed to streamline
"the field operations of five agencies by establishing —

for the first time —— common regional boundaries and re-

gional office locations.

The five agencies concerned

were the DOL, HEW, HUD, 0E0, and SBA.

The fact that

these agencies were so closely related to serving the
disadvantaged areas of society provided the logic for
this choice. 171

The Directive also ordered "an expansion of the

regional council concept from the four cities where it
presently operates ... to a.11 eight new regional
centers" while the regional council was described as

"a coordinating body on which each of the involved
agencies is represented," the Directive notably failed
to provide explicit guidelines for the implementation of

the coordination.

In fact, it even limited the power

of councils by barring them from enforcing their decisions
upon their individual members.

Rather, the Directive

merely outlined the council’s potential for coordination —
"it offers an excellent means through which the various

170

Office of the White House Press Secretary,
Statement by the President on the Restructuring of
Government Service Systems.
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arms of the federal government can work closely together

in defining problems, devising strategies to meet them

eliminating friction and duplication, and evaluating
results."

The Directive continued to explain that these

potential services would allow the federal government to
relate to states, localities, private organizations, and
the public at large with a "single voice."172

Such loose guidelines, it appears, were the re
sult of efforts on the part of the Bureau of the Budget

to create a coordinating structure without developing
another autonomous bureaucratic unit.

This paradox and

its effect is described by Melvin B. Mogulof:
If the Bureau of the Budget memorandum bars the
Council from enforcing collective decisions on its
members, the memorandum also rejects centralism on
the Washington level by failing to establish
authority to push for coordinated interagency
behavior by either the Bureau of the Budget or
other groups within the Executive Office of the
President. The net result is that the Council in
theory establishes an interagency arena in which
member agencies can identify conflicting policies
and practices which ought to be coordinated. But
under the current system the Council is authorized
to go no further. The affected agencies must then
choose to accommodate their behavior to that which
has been determined as being more rational by the
Council.173

Because this dilemma produced, at least initially,

such a vague grant of authority, FRC’s were seen as potential
"tea-and-crumpet" social organizations characterized by

173

Melvin B. Mogulof, "Federal Interagency Action
and Inaction: The Federal Regional Council Experience,"
Public Administration Review (May/June, 1972), 236.
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pleasant social banter rather than substantive reforms

in the administration of grant programs.

As a result

many administrative planners considered FRC’s as largely

experimental.

The basic operational approach by the

planners was for the Bureau of the Budget to indicate

problems to regional directors who would try to solve the
problems through the FRC in their regions.

However, since

neither the Presidential Directive nor the Bureau of the

Budget provided guidelines as to how each FRC was to

approach problems, for that would contravene the objective
of decentralization, each FRC was left to develop its own

4. i 174
style.

The dilemma posed by the desire of council members

to effectuate the President’s directive and the lack of

clear guidelines and authority, led them to complain to

the Bureau of the Budget.

The basic issue stemmed from

the fact that the various council members represented
five different, independent agencies whose operations

were directed by law.

Thus, what authority did each

council member have to involve his agency in FRC activi

ties?

The BOB responded by issuing a memorandum more

fully clarifying the role of FRC’s, on January 14, 1970.

Unfortunately, this memorandum added little to the concept
of FRc's.

It simply began by restating parts of the

original directive of March, 1969.

It also tacitly

recognized the experimental nature of the FRC concept by

174

Kolberg,”The New Federalism," pp. 52-53.
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reminding council members that "the councils are an
evolving approach to improving federal interagency

coordination.

The memorandum went on to explain*

(1) The function of the Undersecretaries Group in

Washington is to provide help and support.
councils that must take the initiative.

it is the

(2) Membership

is limited to those five agencies named in the March, 1969
directive.

All other agencies participating in the

councils do so on an ad hoc basis.

(3)

no prescribed pattern of organization.

Councils have
They must meet

at least once a month and may select their own chairman.

Councils were again reminded of the potential of FRC’s
and exhorted to use the framework — such as it was.

Thus, for now, the dilemma of council members remained
intact.
However, the one redeeming feature of this

memorandum which indicated progress in the "evolutionary"
process, was the concise statement of the FRC’s "three
basic objectives. 1,175

1. Identification of conflicting agency policy
and program operating practices which limit the
effectiveness of federal assistance to states,
localities and individuals;
2. Designing coordinated and consistent agency
actions to improve the effectiveness of federal
programs;
3. Directing as individual program managers
he necessary actions within their respective
agencies to strengthen program coordination, and

~
,
U.S. Bureau of the Budget, The Federal Regional
^ncils (January 14, 1970).
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monitoring and evaluating implementation
By September 30, 1970, the field operations of the

five concerned agencies had been realigned within the
ten standard federal regions.

Despite this progress

FRC’s continued to suffer from the dilemma.

In a memor

andum from OMB on Jaunary 25, 1971, FRC’s were again
recognized as "an evolving mechanism."

The memorandum

also attempted to resolve the dilemma by providing

additional guidelines in the form of six specific functions

1.

Monitor existing coordinating mechanisms.

2. Design and initiate new coordination approaches
where some exist or where current arrangements are
inadequate.
3. Solve ad hoc special problems that involve
more than one council agency.

4. Develop and strengthen a real partnership
with state and local government, especially with
governors and mayors.
5.
Identify potential and existing interagency
conflicts in policies, priorities, or operating
procedures, and where possible to develop solutions.

6.
Improve coordination, cooperation and informa
tion exchange between agencies in day-to-day operations
and develop systematic information exchange devices.177
The memorandum also clarified FRC’s relationship
with 0MB, the Regional Council Working Group, and the

Undersecretaries of the various agencies.

The memorandum

further clarified the lack of authority of FRC’s.

Because

they are composed of individuals who are primarily respon176tk^

Ibid.
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U.S. Office of Management and Budget, The
__egional Council Concept (January 25, 1971).
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sible to their own agency, a majority of council members

cannot impose actions on a minority.

The most important

aspect of this memorandum, however, was in the area of
staffing.

Because the Chairman of an FRC was primarily

responsible for tasks within his own agency, the overload

tasks involved in chairing the council suffered.

As a

result, a senior staff member (GS-14 or 15) was assigned
to each council to prepare and allocate staff resources.
Also, each member agency was required to "make available
to its regional director $50,000 which the regional direc

tor can commit to council activities."

Councils were

also reminded to meet regularly "usually every two weeks"

and advised them to obtain letterhead stationary to
facilitate identification by other agencies.178

Thus,

if an institution can be defined as "an organized way of
getting things done," it would appear that FRC’s had

begun the formal process of institutionalizing.
The experimental status of FRC’s came to an end

on February 11, 1972, when President Nixon issued Executive

Order 11647. 179

This Order resolved the dilemma by granting

the "council member agencies authority to cooperate in grant-

making activities." 18^

The Order contained three sections:

178 ...

179

Office of the White House Press Secretary,
Executive Order 11647 (February 22, 1972).
180
Frank C. Carlucci, Memorandum to Chairman of
Federal Executive Board, March 4, 1972, Indian Task Force
File, Western Federal Regional Council, San Francisco, Caliornia. Hereafter this file will be referred to by the ab
breviation "ITTF."
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(1) Section 1 established a Federal Regional Council for

each of the standard federal regions.

The membership of

each FRC vras enlarged by the addition of the Law Enforce
ment Assistance Administration and the Environment Pro

tection Agency.

The Chairman of each council was to be

appointed and serve at the pleasure of the President.

Regional directors from non-member agencies could be in

vited by the FRC chairman to attend and participate in
council meetings and programs that involved their agencies.

(2) Section 2 outlined eight functions of the councils.

(3) Section 3 established the Under Secretaries Group

(USG) .

USG was made up of the Under Secretaries of member

agencies with the Associate Director of OMB serving as
Chariman.

USG was charged with the specific responsibility

"for the proper functioning of the system established by

this Order."181
Less than one month later, on March 10, 1972,

Frank Calluci (Chairman of USG) issued a memorandum con

taining the "Ground Rules and Guidelines for Federal
Regional Councils on Implementation of Executive Order
182
11647."
The reason for the issuance of these ground

rules was that:

the functions as laid out in Section 2 of the
Executive Order require further definition to serve
181

Ibid.

182
Frank C. Carlucci, Memorandum to Regional
Council Members, outlining the implementation of Executive
Order 11647, March 10, 1972, Office of Management and
Budget. ITTF.
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as the basis for implementing action in Washinaton
and in the field during the first year of the
strengthened council system.
The memorandum outlines the structure and duties
of FRC’s under the general headings of "operating pro

cedures" and "functional guidelines."

Operating procedures

included the role and responsibility of FRC chairman, staf
fing, resolution of conflict and the development and

review of work plans. This procedure was especially signi

ficant since the deadline for submitting work plans to
USG was May 1, which forced each FRC to make decisions

concerning their initial thrust of activity.

Functional

guidelines included such things as the development of
short-term interagency strategies, integrated program

and funding plans with governors and local chief execu
tives, IGA and related programs.

Again, each FRC was

charged with accomplishing a specific task by a deadline:
each FRC was required to submit two IGA programs by the

end of the year.184

183T, . ,
Ibid.
184 , .
Ibid. Note: The lack of organized opposition
to this reform can be attributed to the speed with which it
was adopted after President Nixon’s inauguration. The op
position had little time to get organized before it was a
—at accompli.
There was, however, some opposition on the
exact alignment of two of the biggest regions, Region VII and
Region VIII. Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington opposed
the inclusion of his home state in Region VIII, to be headquartered in San Francisco. Not only was this region extrem
ely large (containing the Pacific Coast States, as well as
nzona, Nevada, Alaska, Hawaii and Guam), but it posed, in
Magnuson’s view, the threat of the subordination of his home
state to California. He protested the alignment and had
egion VIII split into two separate regions with Seattle
serving as the headquarters for the new region. Politicians
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The Response of the Western
Federal Regional Council,
Region IX in San Francisco

FRC IX immediately began work to develop its
Annual Work Plan which was submitted to USG in May and

amended in August.
categories:

The Work Plan was divided into three

Activity Plan No. I, No. II, and No. III.

Activity Plan I addressed itself to "devising inter

agency strategies to assist states and localities to
achieve a greater opportunity and ability to plan, manage

and direct public resources."

This strategy involved

such things as IGA programs and flexible funding grants
for state and local government.

HUD and DOL, for example,

were given the "lead agency" responsibility of developing

two pilot IGA programs according to an established time

table.

Activity Plan No. II addresses itself to developing

a delivery system to help special clientele groups whose
problems require special approaches and resources if their

quality of life is to parallel the opportunities and

benefits available to the general population.
activities included in this work plan are:

The specific

Equal Opportunity

Action Plan, Urban Indian Affairs, Reservation Acceleration
and businessmen from Missouri similarly protested Denver as
the regional headquarters for Region VII. Kansas City, they
argued, had long been the location for regional offices of
inany federal departments and agencies, and therefore was the
logical site for a regional headquarters. Besides, the
eleven inter-mountain and plans states made Region VII some
what large and unwieldy. Again the Bureau of the Budget re
sponded by taking four of the states and establishing an
additional region with its headquarters in Kansas City.
Fischer, "The Nixon Administration," 33.
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Program, and Demonstration Project on Aging.

Activity

Plan No. Ill involved the development of administrative

procedures.

This category was added in a revision on

August, 1972.185
In order to achieve the goals included in this
Work Plan, the FRC Secretariat under the direction of

the council outlined the functions, policies and pro
cedures of the FRC.

Of the eight functions of FRC’s

listed in this outline, the sixth is the primary concern
• 4-study.186
ofr 4-U
this

Under Executive Order No. 11647, the Council consti
tutes a body within which member agencies, to the
maximum extent feasible, conduct their grant-making
activities in concert through . . . the development
of long-term regional interagency and intergovern
mental strategies for resource allocations to better, Q
respond to the needs of state and local communities. 87
The "nuts and bolts" work of the Council was as

signed to task forces which were organized on an inter
agency basis and served at the pleasure of the council.^88

On May 1, 19 73, FRC published its Annual Report of
Work Plan Activities in accordance with USG guidelines.
185

Western Federal Regional Council, Annual Report
of Work Plan Activities, 1972-1973 (May 1, 1973) , see
Appendix A.
"
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WFRC, Policies and Procedures for Regional
_ouncil Task Forces (October, 1972) , see Appendix C.
]_ g g

189

Frank C. Carlucci, Memorandum to Regional
council Members, March 10, 1972.

98

While the report generally described the status of each

activity and thereby met the USG requirements, it failed

to provide sufficient specific data to facilitate the
type of analysis that would indicate specific causes of
successes or failures of WFRC.

In order to obtain such

data, a more intimate review of specific activities is
necessary.

CHAPTER III
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE WFRC:

A CASE STUDY

OF THE INDIAN TASK FORCE
Introduction
The primary responsibility of FRC’s is to admin

istratively pragmatize the categorical grant system.
While nobody expects FRC’s to achieve this objective over
night, interested observers are uncertain about the progress
of FRC s to date.

What exactly have they done?

progress have they made?

How much

What problems have they experienced?

Since FRC’s have been asked to play such an important role

in the administration of grants, these and other questions
should not remain the subject of mere speculation.

Ironically, while administration has been recognized

for over a decade as
government,

the heart of the modern problem of

there have been very few in-depth analyses

into the nature and complexities of intergovernmental re

lations.

Even the literature on federalism has paid little

attention to the administrative side.

It is no wonder

that there is precious little theory building in the dis

cipline of public administration.

Therefore, the following

study is designed not only to provide some information about
the development of FRC’s to date, it is also anticipated

99
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that the information will help to remedy the research

gap and contribute to empirical theory building about
inter-governmental relations.

The research design for this dissertation will
be the case study method which is an "in depth" study of

a particular phenomenon.

Case studies have the advantage

of permitting exploration into the causal factors of a
phenomenon about which there is too little knowledge to

form causal hypotheses which presuppose sufficient infor

mation to develop independent and dependent variables
as well as operational definitions.

Since so little is

known about the WFRC, a logical place to begin is with
one of its task forces.

The particular task force chosen

by this study is the Reservation Acceleration Program

(RAP) Task Force, later called the Indian Task Force,

created by the WFRC with the objective of providing tech
nical assistance to help Indians in the Western Federal

Region obtain desired grant programs.

It is important to note the limitations of case
studies.

Case studies can lead to the precarious assump

tion that many of the problems, difficulties, and suc
cesses are shared by other task forces.

Such inductive

logic may be acceptable under experimental conditions
which feature controls.

Conditions in case studies are

not controlled and the data collected may be the most
readily available rather than the most significant.

investigator must also remember that the findings and

The
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conclusions of case studies are based on a relatively
small number of observations.

Thus, the ability of the

investigator to generalize from his findings are severely
limited.

However, if case studies were made of all FRC

task forces, and they provided similar findings, it would
allow generalization.

This case study, therefore, can be

considered as a beginning.

The Formative Stage of the Reservation
Acceleration Program (Rap)-----

The first glimpse
The first exposure of WFRC to Indian affairs came

on March 8, 1970 when Robert H. Baida received a request
from the Director of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
that the WFRC invite the Salt River Pinia-Maricopa Com

munity Council of Arizona to make a presentation of its

comprehensive plans.

The BIA Office Director cited the

Zuni Reservation presentation to the Dallas-Fort Worth
FRC as a precedent.

The council initially agreed to

meet with the Indians, but since the BIA was an agency

of the Department of the Interior (DOI) which was not

an FRC member, they decided to inform the tribe that a
meeting would be postponed until February, 1972.^^^

190_
Robert H. Baida, Memorandum to Kenneth Kugel
$e9ional Councils and Indian Communities, December 21,
971, Indian Task Force File (ITFF) , Western Federal
egional Cohncil, San Francisco, California.
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The Zuni Plan
The development of a comprehensive planning approach

was not a recent innovation among many Indian tribes.

Since the mid-1960's, HUD had provided project grants to

Indian communities under the provisions of Section 701
of the 1954 Housing Act.

By 1972, these 701 grants in

volved the expenditure of more than $1 billion on almost
500 projects involving states, metropolitan regions, and
.
191
Indian reservations.
Most of the 701 grants involving

Indian reservations were used for the development of

comprehensive planning for land use management.192
The Zuni Plan, however, was not funded by a 701

grant.

It was the result of the personal initiative of

the newly elected Governor of the Zuni Pueblo in 1965.
Upon assuming office, he set about establishing community

priorities.

With the approval and assistance of the Zuni

council he surveyed a sample of the pueblo residents to

determine what the community expected of him during his
tenure, and the goals they had for the community as a

whole.

Drawing from over 5 00 responses, the Governor and

council established ten priorities.

The Governor then

approached BIA for technical assistance and support.

The

result was a plan which called for the expenditure of $55

roillion in community development during the next five

. .
1

191„
•
Public Law 33-560, Stat. 590, 640; 40 USC. 461.
19 2 _
interview with Bruce Daniels, HUD representat0 ■I'ndian Task Force, Los Angeles, California, May 9,

years.
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From the vantage point of the Indians, the Zuni

Plan was significant because it was the first systematic

effort of the Zuni Pueblo at determining their own com
munity priorities and planning.

Under the 701 aran<-=
y•*- ciii to

consultants and appropriate "experts" were usually brought

in to determine community needs.193

However, from the

vantage point of this study, the significance of the

Zuni Plan was its comprehensive nature.
Because the Zuni plan was so much more compre
hensive than previous plans generally initiated by the
BIA, it forced the BIA to look beyond the normal range of

programs for assistance.

The necessity of tapping all

possible resources did not go unrecognized in Washington.

In a special message to Congress on July 8, 1970, the
President said:
Economic planning is another area where our efforts
can be significantly improved. The comprehensive
economic development plans that have been created
by both the Pima-Maricopa and Zuni Tribes provide
outstanding examples of interagency and cooperation
m fostering Indian economic growth. The Zuni Plan,
for example, extends for at least five years and
involves a total of $55 million from the Depart
ments of Interior, Housing and Urban Development,
and Health Education and Welfare and from the
Office of Economic Opportunity, and the Economic
Development Administration.
I am directing the
Secretary of the Interior to play an active role ,
m coordinating additional projects of this kind.

.
Interview with John Gray, Director of Planning
ror Zuni Pueblo, May 10, 1974.
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Frank C. Carlucci, Memorandum to Regional
ouncrl Chairmen on Indian Reversation Development,
March 15, 1972, ITFF.
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OMB becomes involved
Meanwhile, other FRC's had become involved
unilateraly in Indian Affairs,

in April 1970, the North

west FRC located in Seattle had established an Urban
Indian Task Force,

it was not until September, 1971,

that they informed USWG that the Task Force Charter was
"amended to include an interagency mechanism for the

coordination of services on Indian reservations as well

as in urban areas."

The memo also included a Task Force

work plan and a request that funds be decentralized to

FRC "to mount a coordinated and effective Regional Council

effort to meet the needs of the Indian people in the
Northwest.
Kugel immediately informed each member of the

USWG of this request and asked them to prepare to consider
the request at their next meeting by identifying any urban
Indian programs in their various departments and agencies
which could be decentralized.

By December, a tentative, if incomplete, program
approach had been developed.

All FRC's were informed that

USWG together with BIA and the National Council of Indian

Opportunity (NCIO) was exploring "what councils can and
should be doing about Federal activities of interest
195_
Jessee C. Ramaker, Memorandum to Ken Kugel on
ITFF°na^ Authority for Indian Programs, October 21, 1971,
196v
n .
Kugel, Memorandum to The Working Group, on
ITFF°na^ Authority for Indian Programs, October 26, 1971,
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Meanwhile, FRC’^ wara
'
s were encouraged
to make contact unilaterally with BIA offices "to look
to Indian communities.

for productive models of council-lndian community re
n ...
lations
. ,,19 7
Robert H. Baida responded to Kugel's directive

by informing him that the WFRC "first learned of OMB's
interest in Indian affairs when the Phoenix BIA director

asked them to invite the Pima-Maricopa Community Council
to make presentations of comprehensive plans citing as

a precedent the Zuni presentation to the Dallas-Fort

Worth Regional Council.

Baida continued by reproving

0MB for not informing him sooner of OMB-BIA discussions.
He also observed that the Zuni request which Washington

apparently considered the model to follow, was replete with
unfulfillable expectations and that FRC’s should be in

volved with Indian Tribes as they begin to formulate

comprehensive plans.

Baida concluded that, "Hopefully,

we can contribute some expertise in the direction of
tailoring the plans to a realistic expectation of the
federal agencies’ ability to deliver.198

The BIA takes the initiative
On January 10, 1972, Louis R. Bruce, the Com

missioner of Indian Affairs

c

197

(CIA) informed thirty-five

Kugel, Memorandum to FRC members on Regional
unciis and Indian Communities, December 9, 1971, ITFF.
198D
K- Baida, Memorandum to K. Kugel, December 21,

tribes

199

that they had been chosen to apply to partici_

pate in the Reservation Acceleration Program (rap).

These

tribes were told that they would receive help from BIA
"in getting the comprehensive planning activities imple

mented.

Attached to this formal announcement was ad

ditional information about RAP under the heading of
"Questions and Answers about RAP," a prospective time

table for implementation by October 2, 1973, and a questior

naire seeking information about the relative progress of
each tribe in developing comprehensive plans.

A RAP

questionnaire to determine which of the thirty—five
tribes were most prepared for RAP was also attached.

Each

tribe was informed that only eleven of the thirty-five

tribes were to be selected.200

All BIA area directors and

superintendents received the same information, including

the notice that James Hena, Bruce’s Executive Assistant,
was charged with directing RAP.201
The attached "Questions and Answers about RAP"
followed the Zuni Plan precedent of allowing the tribes

to develop their own priorities, which would be presented

199
. The tribes were chosen by The Economic DevelopAdministration because of their considerable experience
comprehensive planning. Of the thirty-six tribes invi ed to participate in RAP, only twenty-eight responded,
ee K. Kugel, Memorandum to FRC Chairman on Guidelines for
regional Council Participation in RAP, June 27, 1972, ITFF.
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Louis R. Bruce, to Thirty-Six Tribes appearing in
EDA Selected Reservation Program List, January 10,
1972, ITFF.
201T d
L. Bruce, Memorandum to All Area Directors and
endents, on RAP, January 14, 1972, ITFF.
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for negotiation (or "rapping") on three levelslevels: agency
(BIA), area, and Washington. It was assumed that this

negotiation would facilitate the following functions:

( 1) allow the "fullest possible backing of the Bureau

of Indian Affairs," (2) afford participating tribes the
opportunity to familiarize themselves totally with the
BIA budget and to negotiate changes in that budget, such

as "changing emphasis of social service programs to stress
rehabilitation of welfare clients," (3) to assist tribes

in obtaining financial, technical and staff assistance of
other government agencies.202
WFRC learns of RAP

Baida first learned of RAP within a fortnight of
its announcement to applicant tribes.

After briefly

explaining the RAP concept and objectives, Bruce described
the role of FRC's as one of helping review the plans of

RAP tribes.

However, other than assuring Baida that the

tribes selected in Region IX would contact him, he was

given no information of a substantive nature.

What ex

actly did Bruce mean by the statement that FRC's would

be of particular help in reviewing the plans of RAP
Did this simply mean the council would tell

chosen tribes if their plans were feasible and where to
9

for assistance, or would the council get involved in

202_ n
Questi
Bruce, Memorandum to Thirty-six Tribes,
ions and Answers About RAP, January 10, 1972, ITFF.
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th. “rapping" on b.h.li oi tte trlb.s ..

to th. „„o„„.a

„a dep„t„nta. „

as discreet intermediaries — a sort nF »
sort of goods offices"
for the rappers? These and other
fter na99ing questions were
responded to when the council met with three
BIA Directors
on January 28, to get a briefing on RAP and .
s procedures.2$$
Notwithstanding these questions, the primary

concern of the council at the time was the inability of
the member agencies to respond to the Salt River Pima-

Maricopa Tribe's request for assistance.
sequently informed of this problem.

OMB was sub

Meanwhile, the council

deleted the RAP work Plan and informed

tribe ,fc

postponing its meeting until further clarification was

received from OMB.204

However, while additional clarifi

cation from headquarters of BIA and OMB were forthcoming,

the nagging questions concerning the council's role

always seemed to remain a problem throughout the life of
RAP.

WFRC becomes invo1 ve d
in rap
The actual development of the program was further

retarded by the failure of the USG to provide clear admin-

203
Jannas nr L• Bruce to R« Baida, Letter describing RAP,
January 25, 19 72, ITFF.
204
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Western Federal Regional Council Secretariat,
dUm to Re9ional Council, on RAP, March 24, 19 72,

istrative guidelines,
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it was assumed by USG and BIA

that since the FRC's had been informed of the nrohlem
they would somehow automatically initiate involvement.

Although the council members were far from antagonistic

to RAP involvement, the fact that it included the BIA, an
agency of the Department of the Interior (DOI) which

itself was not a member of the council, posed an admin

istrative problem which only the USG or OMB could resolve

Also, the involvement of FRC's in Indian affairs at this
point was strictly informal.

Kugai's memorandum to FRC's

on December 9, 1971, simply "encouraged councils to

develop contacts."

It was as though someone at OMB sug

gested that "maybe FRC's could help," and before long
everyone at OMB assumed that the FRC's would help.205

Frank Carlucci, chairman of the Under Secretaires

Group for Regional Operations took several steps toward
resolving these difficulties in his March 15 memorandum

to the FRC with instructions to review Indian plans with
two objectives in mind:

Providing guidance and technical assistance
o tribes on regulations, standards, criteria or
other requirements of the member agencies, and
considering how existing and available funds
Y-?1? each program area can be better related to
tribal priorities.206

1974.

205_ 4.
interview with Hardy Pearce, Indian Task Force
e Secretary, San Francisco, California, April 9,
206

F. Carlucci, Memorandum to FRC Chairman, on
Indian Reservation Development, March 15, 1972, ITFF.
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Additional directions were also attached to the memor
andum guiding FRC’s review of tribal plans,

in order to

implement the above mentioned objectives, each FRC was

required to designate "a task force of other liaison point
for contact with RAP tribes."

The Department of the In

terior was also made an ad hoc member of the council and
the BIA Area Directors were instructed to serve as ex-

officio members on the task force.

The Area Directors

were responsible for assisting tribes in maintaining

liaison with the council. 20
In response to these instructions, the WFRC
Secretariat set out to clarify the guidelines received from

0MB and the history of RAP to date, to each council member.
It also recommended that a meeting be arranged with the
Area Directors of BIA to discuss problems and procedures.20^
On April 6, BIA released the names of thirteen
tribes chosen for RAP, together with the BIA manual for

RAP procedures.
tribes:

The Western Federal Region was given four

Gila River, Hoopa, Salt River and San Carlos.

The manual was intended as an "initial guidance to its
field offices on RAP."209

Kugel of USWG further clarified

the role of the four regions involved in RAP in a memorandum
°n April 20.

Although the primary involvement was BIA’s,

207-,. ,
Ibid.
2Q8
Secretariat to Regional Council, March 24, 1974.
209
L. Bruce, Memorandum to Holders of Bureau of
fndian Affairs Manual BIAM, on RAP, April 6, 1972, ITFF.
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tribes were directed by use of Form 5-0603 and with the
assistance of FRC's to identify on a project-by-project

basis potential sources for non-BIA input.

BIA estimated

FRC's would receive Form 5-0603 from designated tribes by
mid-May, but no deadline was imposed so that tribes would

have sufficient time to negotiate with BIA.210

The Formalization of rap
A task force is created

On June 19, the council established the RAP Task
Force.

Since DOI was the lead agency, Bill Monroe of DOI

was assigned the chairmanship of the Task Force and each

council member was instructed by Aguirre to assign a
representative.

Although the council did not provide

the task force with formal guidelines until July 25, the

Secretariat proceeded immediately to establish informal
contacts with Bill Monroe and other agency representatives.

The first meeting was held June 30, and there were numerous
behind-the-scenes” contacts between the Secretariat staff

and the task force members in an effort to get each agency
representative fully involved.

While most of the members

attended the meetings, they paid little attention to the

briefings.

After all, most of them were already burdened

210
p
.
K- Kugel, Memorandum of FRC Chairman, on FRC
Participation in RAP, April 20, 1972, ITFF.
211
,
Western Federal Regional Council, Minutes of
-^Regional Council Meeting, June 19, 1972. Also, interV1ew with H. Pearce, April 4, 1974.
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with responsibilities within their own agencies and t-h3 vj-co, ana this
was merely an experimental program. Besides
k
most members
expected, the chairman to assume the
primary responsibility
since BIA was the lead agency.212

Administrative difficulties
However, some of the task force members did respond

formally to the behind-the-scenes contacts from the Secre
tariat.

Those who did respond expressed their misgivings

about RAP in general and the council's expectations of

their particular agency's commitments specifically.
Leonard Johnson of DOT, for example, felt that the August 13
deadline for submitting a work plan was unrealistic in light

of the fact that only one of the four tribes was ready to
develop comprehensive plans.

He reminded the Secretariat

that DOT anticipated a limited amount of support for RAP,

generally in the form of highway engineering expertise,
rather than grants of money as had been suggested.

He

also expressed his misgivings about the capacity of the
Indians to participate in sophisticated negotiations.213
This conflict of expectations was also reflected
within the task force itself.

the task force meetings.

Bill Monroe rarely attended

He was notably absent during

first meeting on June 30, as well as the second meeting

------------- 212 ~----- '
Interview with Hardy Pearce, April 9, 1974.

213t
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Leonard W. Johnson, Letter to Karen Christianson,
discussing rap, juiy 10/ 1972.

m
Instead of
1 assummg personal
leadership, Monroe appointed Don Rodeen, a retired salesman
214

several weeks later.

with three months government "experience" as his Executive

Director.

Since many of the task force members were

members by order rather than desire, the lack of lead agency

commitment served to undermine any potential commitment on

their part.

Although informal reports from the task force

were received by HEW and other member agencies, fewer than

fifty percent of the task force attended its meetings and
little was done during the meetings aside from "warming
the chairs."215

This condition became so intolerable that several
task force members openly called for the removal of Bill

Monroe under the pretext that DOI was only an ad hoc
member of the council and unfamiliar with the type of work

involved in heading an FRC task force.

Monroe as a thorough-going incompetent.
he had

Others saw Bill

Whatever the reason

been unable to meet the commitments required of the

Chairman of the RAP Task Force."216

No immediate action was

taken on this proposal, however, and the initial commitment
of the members of the task force -- such as they were —
deteriorated further.

Given this state of affairs, it is no

214^
.
,
Edward Aquirre, Memorandum to K. Kugai, Status
Port on RAP, September 25, 1972, ITFF.

Tact p
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July 19, 1972, ITFF.

114

wonder that both the task force members

staff began to view the whole endeavour

, . «217
edy

and supporting
as a "giant com-

In spite of these problems, however, the task force

succeeded in contacting the four pilot tribes and arranaed
for visits early in September.218

The Indians, however,

were somewhat suspicious of the task force.

Although they

were by no means enamoured of the performance and record

of the BIA, it was a known quantity and it did provide

access to Washington.

The task force, on the other hand,

was not only a new structure, it was viewed as a potential
obstacle to direct contact with Washington.

While it is

true that the Indians had initiated contact with the

council in October, 19 71, it was with the hope of additional
sources of assistance rather than a substitute.

These fears were expressed to Chuck Hughes, OMB

staff assigned to RAP, when he met with BIA officials and
Salt River Tribe representatives in the middle of July.
According to the Indians, the operating procedures of

the task force were unbelievably confusing.

While working

with a task force was a new experience for the Indians,

the structure and operations of this task force was an
217

Don Rodeen, April 9, 1974.
218^ n
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E. Aquirre to K. Kugel, Memorandum: Status
eport on RAP; Paul J. Smith, President of Salt River
ribal Council, interview by telephone, April 12, 1974.
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Interview with Frank Archambault, Special Pro
jects Officer for Pyramid Lake Piute Tribe, San Francisco,
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enigma.

Who, for example, was the authoritative figure

The answer was in theory, of course, the chairman.

But

since Monroe was unavailable, the responsibility of
answering questions and inquiries fell upon individual
task force members who could only speak for their
tive agencies.

respec
As a result, their responses were always

hedged with so many "ifs," "buts," and "dependings,"

that the Indians became suspicious of RAP promises and
doubted its ability to deliver.220
The Indians, Hughes also discovered in the course

of the meeting, were "more interested in getting access

to specific project information than in meetings.221
They wanted to know where the money was and how they could

get it.

They also wanted to use the council to achieve

their goals and proposed that it serve as a "clearinghouse
for proposals," rather than a board of review.

Also,

because of the confusion arising from trying to work with
each member of the task force, the Salt River Tribe wanted
a liaison with the council who could provide them with
proper answers."

This request was communicated to the

council Secretariat which, with Aguirre’s approval, in
formed Bob Lykke of LEAA that he was designated as the

RAP liaison person.

This organizational reform proved of

220

Ibid.; this point was confirmed during interviews
with Hardy Pearce and Don Rodeen, April 9, 1974

221

Ibid. ; also see Elaine Handy, Memorandum to Bob
tykke, on RAP, July 27, 1972, ITFF; Charles Hughes/Memorandum
0 K. Kugel, on the Status of RAP, September 28, 1972, ITFF.
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little consequence, however, since the task
cohesive unit ceased to function and lapsed

force as a
into in

*4- 222
activity.
Forceful leadership in a task force

type organi-

zation such as that employed by the council

is a neces
sary ingredient for success, precisely because the leader

alone has the authority to perform the primary function
of coordination.

Because of the obvious lack of leader.

ship, the task force suffered from the lack of communi

cation "between OMB and the council, between D/lnterior
and the council and between the council, the task force

and the Tribes."223
Had Monroe delegated the leadership function to
a practiced and skilled administrator, the task force may

have been able to function according to council/OMB
expectations.

However, the retired salesman with three

months government service was unacquainted with the
workings of large administrative machinery, confused by
the complexity of the regional structure, and impatient

with the formalities of interpersonal relationships.224

In search of a remedy to this condition, the task
force recommended that the council ask Webb Otis, the new
Regional Director of DOI, to personally chair the task

222q
on can
becretariat, Memorandum to Regional Council
on RAP, October 12, 19 72.
223

Ibid.
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force.
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Otis declined the chairmanship, arguing that the

workload of his present new assignment alone provided a

grueling schedule.

He did indicate, however, that DOI

n- iu
•
the request
of the Secretariat staff, Aguirre personally contacted
wanted to continue to chair the task force

Otis and prevailed upon him to assume the chairmanship
with the promise that the council would provide him with
22 5
"full support."
OMB responds to RAP's
administrative difficulties
Evidently all four PRC's participating in RAP had
encountered similar coordinating difficulties.

Upon

learning of this problem, Kugel of USWG dispatched a memo
randum to William Rogers, Deputy Assistant Secretary for

Indian Affairs, informing him of the difficulties encountered

by FRC's in administering RAP and proposing remedies.

PRC's working with and through a lead agency as BTA
^se^oV
1O°k
that ^ency formative"
counsel, policy signals, staff support, and nerhans
cerninaPtheant °f ?U' a feelin9
conT
* Lth Proiect to determine the lead agency's
»
°£ ?rgi;ncyChairmen will almost never want to
narti
f?°nt of the lead agency. This would
ly be true in an area considered policy®
?uch as Indian affairs. A feeling of
Vn™lvement and working relationship on a
ally basis are necessary to assure the FRC that its
trfnvCeSTneeded and its efforts are on the right
tran-o •
lead agency initiatives and working conwill almost always result in hesitant FRC action.
r

?uggested that BIA contact FRC's frequently withas^ed> request FRC meeting time for status
ports on rap or even criticism of FRC response,

225T z.
see Seer r
,terview with Hardy Pearce, April 9, 1974. Also
1972. re ariat» Memorandum to Regional Council, October 12,
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invite FRC personnel to RAP meetings whether n„
reservation or in area offices r-ri ”nettler onspecific suggestions for FRC iAvolvemlnt*3^the tribes on the FRC's and assist tribes i??
•
fives to the FRC, or perform whatever
ltla’
might be helpful to FRC's in crystalliz^ ^nS
roie in specific reservation situations
it
very difficult to issue an "s.o.P " on
x
working partnership.
it can only be achieved0^ °f
BIA and the FRC's in the field nnA,
d by
Washington.
I believe that once a normalized US working
ru^a^On• A estabHshed between BIA and the FRC's
the details of individual reservation programs FRc"
assurance and initiatives will pick up maSy.226

As this letter indicates, OMB was clearly aware
of the problems involved in effectuating the FRC concept

yet it remained steadfast in its belief that it should
not order BIA - the designated lead agency - to initiate

a particular course of aciton.

Rather, it merely suggested

a course of action, thereby reaffirming its dedication to

the idea of decentralization.

It was up to the agencies

to determine exactly how the general objectives of RAP
were to be achieved.

Thus, the dilemma of the FRC concept

the councils lack the authority to enforce decisions upon

their members, yet they are assigned tasks which require
authority to effectuate — is reflected in the initial

activities of the RAP task force.
Early accomplishments
the task force-

Despite the breakdown in communications and the
failure of the task force to meet the initial expectations
of either the council or the Indians, some progress was

DnT
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Kugel to William L. Rogers, Letter requesting
support for RAP, September 20, 1972, ITTF.
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made furing the last months of 1972

The RAP plan sub-

mitted by the Salt River Tribe in July

' Ws resurrected
for review and response.227

Each task force member was

assigned those request affecting his agency,

since many

of the government agencies such as HEW are complex bureau -

racies involving many semi-autonomous functional agencies,

a review and response of tribal requests required intra- '
departmental coordination.

In order to coordinate these

agencies, after reviewing the Salt River requests, De Baca,
the Regional Director of HEW, identified thirteen indivi

duals from four different agencies within HEW as "necessary
99Q
resource personnel."
They were from the Office of

Education, Health Services and Mental Health Administration,

Office of Child Development, and Social and Rehabilitation
■ 229
Services.
On the basis off such intra-departmental ef

forts, the task force had consolidated the initial responses
of the involved agencies into a rough draft by December.
These responses were subsequently submitted to each agency

and tribe for a

critique prior to developing the final

227
RAP r^HjdWard Aquirre to Paul J. Smith, Letter concerning
negotiations, September 28, 1972, ITFF.
228
bee Appendix for samples from the Salt River Plan.
229
Crnimie •
* ’ De ^aca' HEW Regional Director, to Regional
of c!n^1?ner
the Office of Education, Regional Commissioner
and aC1$ an<^ Rehabilitation Services, Regional Health Director
vein
stant Regional Director of the Office of Child DeMemorandum on Agency participation in RAP, No
vember 28, 1972, ITFF.

draft which was submitted for council approval on

uary 9, 1973.
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Jan-

Bill Monroe submitted the final report of
the
task force to Aguirre on December 29, 1972

This
report

however, was not at all optimistic on the subject

of IGA*

While it was considered as "the ultimate and ideal
mechanism of Federal service delivery"

impractical and unworkable because

it was also considered
much of the federal

funding is channeled through state

agencies, without much
involvement at the federal level for expenditure of funds.
The report proceeded to provide

recommendations on the

viability of the RAP task force

concept and the comprehensive plans of the Salt River Tribe.
Recommendations Concerning the RAP Concept

1.

laencS

Ta'k Fo5ce be changed to

the responsibility of the teXn and tte • to,reflect
its activities.
d th lmP°rtance of

ths ™ ?b® federal Regional Council should explore
the possrbriity of establishment of a top-level (posfacilitsthl?h sS cablnet under officer) group to P
^d^direction
general Or
f^s with
appropriate agencies
responsibility directed to

such1^
Feders! lx,

eligible for certain HEW education monies
onstructron funds (school assistance to
affected areas) a reciPient agency must be

230
RAP. Dec^er*^
Letter °n the Progress of
Letter
' 19 72, ITFF; also see Monroe to Aguirre,
December 29 19723 ITFf"1731 SLnniTiat^ori of task force activity,
231
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recognized as a Local Education Agency (LEA) .
However, the new Emergency School Assistance Act
does stipulate that Federally recognized tribal
councils shall be eligible as Local Education
Agencies.
The Federal Regional Council should ask
the General Counsel for a waiver on all other USOE
programs that require applicants be an LEA so as to
be consistent with the most recent Federal legislation
and to put tribal councils in a position to favorably
compete with LEA’s to bring about improvements in the
reservation school systems.

2. The Task Force recommends all agencies touching
upon the educational delivery system of the Salt River
Pima Reservation meet to decide a more effective means
of utilizing educational monies to be compatible with
the Salt River Pima Community’s educational desires.
Affected Federal agencies would include the Bureau of
Indian Affairs program people.

3. The Task Force recommends that the Federal
Regional Council determine whether or not there will
be earmarked RAP funds for the Salt River Pima Tribe.
If not, then negotiations with agency heads. are in
order to assist agencies in rearranging their funds
and priorities to meet the needs identified in the
Salt River Pima plan. Proper coordination and plan
ning would assure timing of available funds be com
mensurate with the tribe’s ability to utilize pro
grams. Premature awarding of programs could be
avoided until facilities exist to acco^^^date them
if the above procedure is implemented.
This report was submitted to the Secretariat

which would pass it on to the council.

However, upon

reviewing the report, the Secretariat staff detected prob
lems which had the potential of creating sufficient con
fusion during the council meeting with the Indians that

it could undermine this RAP review:

"The Reservation

Indian Task Force report addresses the Salt River RAP plan
and the federal interagency problems at the same time.

In order to prevent concern for interagency issues

232 Ibid.
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overshadowing the council’s response to the Salt River

requests, the Secretariat sent a lengthy, detailed
memorandum to the council noting this problem.

It also

analyzed the report, carefully explained each issue

separately, and recommended a format for the July 9
233
meeting of the council.
Separating Salt River from Task Force Issues:

The Council should focus on responding to Salt
River funding requests and follow one of the
alternative methods for dealing with task force
problems.

1. Hold brief (15 minute or less) executive
session with Task Force prior to meeting with
Salt River officials, to ensure a consistent
Federal position.
2. Deal with pertinent task force issues in
the presence of Salt River officials, who are
reasonable and sophisticated.

3. Avoid Task Force issues during meeting,
and raise Council concerns through a memorandum
to the Task Force.
Secretariat Recommendation:
The Secretariat recommends the third alternative
and proposes the following scenario:

-

Operning remarks by Chairman on overview of
RAP; FRC role in RAP; and welcome Salt River
representatives.

-

Brief remarks by Task Force Chairman on RAP
process used by Task Force.

-

Chairman invites Paul Smith to make any
opening remarks.

-

Discussion of Salt River funding requests and
Federal responses between Pau*
“
appropriate Regional Director/Admi

23

1973, ITFF.

3Secretariat to FRC, Memorandum on RAP, January 4,
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Chairman invites Paul Smith, to give his
evaluation of RAP process.

-

.
234
Chairman concludes meeting.

The council meeting on July 9 followed this recommended

format.

Mr. Smith, President of the Salt River Indian

Community Council, was informed that the Regional Council
would prepare a coordinated response to the tribe within
one month.

235

The council response came during the second week of

March.

After reminding the tribe that "the FRC had no

funds" and that extensive changes in the Executive Branch
of the federal government had affected the programs of a

number of FRC agencies, the acting chairman of the council
reported that several responses such as HUD’s had been

completed.

However, most of the responses were in the

form of offers of technical assistance, rather than new

grants.

236

The Salt River Tribe received the council’s response

with guarded enthusiasm.

The amount of grant money was

not as great as they would have liked and their relation

ship with the council was often vague and confusing.

Never

theless, Mr. Smith saw potential in the FRC concept and
conveyed the following recommendations to the council.
234
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Letter, January 17, 1973, ITFF.
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1. The. Indian Task Force established to act
as a permanent coordinating body to both the
Regional Council and applicant tribes should continue
to function. Without the Indian Task Force, applicant
tribes have no one to contact for specific recommenda
tions or answers to specific questions.
2. The Chairman of the Indian Task Force should
be given enough authority to be a source that all
federal agencies will respect and respond to.

3. In order for the Federal Councils to be of any
benefit to Indian tribes, each federal office should
request in their annual budgets, funds sufficient
to meet Indian needs. One way this might be accomp
lished is through the integrated grant or block funding
concept to Indian communities.

4. While I recognize that present legislation in
most of the federal agencies requires state planning,
coordination, and review for federal applications; I
recommend that Indian tribes have the authority to
work through this method, as well as, direct contact,
with Washington offices, even more so, we can maintain
Indian Desks in the Washington office with special
funding for Indian programs.
5. Where many of the agencies can provide techni
cal assistance and very worthwhile programs, it has
been our experience to find that while we might be
able to obtain worthwhile programs within our commun
ity — we do not have the proper facilities in which
these programs can be administered and delivere to
our community. With the phase out of the Of ice o
Economic Opportunity and the Economic Developmen
Administration, the only agencies that provi e
funding of any type for what might be terme
and mortar money," leaves a gaping whole m.our
efforts to progress. We must find a means in w
federal agencies can provide construction monies
ask that agencies such as EDA and 0E0 continue o
function.237
An Evaluation of
the first year
As soon as Webb Otis assumed the chairmanship of
the task force, he proceeded to more fully organize
237Smith to De Baca, Letter, April 26, 1973,
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He appointed Hardy Pearce as Executive Secretary of the
task force and clarified agency representation as one

representative per agency.

Agency representation had

become somewhat of a problem as certain agencies such
as HEW had become more involved in RAP than other

agencies such as 0E0, and had developed a pattern of
sending more than one representative to task force meet

ings.

Also, in response to an OMB request conveyed through

Aguirre, Otis organized a subcommittee to evaluate the
23 8
effectiveness of the task force to date.

This evaluation provided Otis with a formal
exposure to the problems that had confronted the task force
during its first year of operation, as well as a basis to

plan his own approach to effectuating RAP.

This evaluation

revealed that while the vast majority of the task force

members felt that the various lines of communication to
conduct task force business had improved to the point that

they were "working effectively," most members also felt
that the task force was not "operating as an effective
contact point."

This apparent paradox can be explained

by the fact that all except one respondent to the evaluation
questionnaire indicated the lack of necessary authority

t

23^Webster Otis, RAP Task Force c^i™g;ntOFebruary
force members, Memorandum on task force e
Baca,
16, 1973, ITFF; also see Robert Overacker
itFF.
Memorandum on participation in RAP, Fe
lved since BIA
The "problem" of membership has remained unsolved sin^
and DOI both have their own representative ,
they are one and the same department.
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negotiate for technical assistance and program commit

ments with other agencies and with tribal representatives.”

Task force members also felt constrained in their negotiationswith the Indians because of poor state and county
relationships with the Indians.

They all felt that state

and local governments should be involved in the task
force even if only in a liaison capacity.

In spite of

these misgivings, however, most of the members felt that

the task force was generally worthwhile and had made
significant contributions.

239

Webb Otis submitted the Task Force Evaluation to

the council Secretariat on April 24.

Three days later he

also submitted "suggested resolutions for consideration

by the Federal Regional Council . . . based on the Salt

River - Pima Maricopa RAP review.

..240

Suggested Resolution 1 - Whereas it is the policy
of this current Administration to emphasize the
integrated grant approach in the Federal grant
making process, therefore
BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Federal Regional Council
urges the Office of Management and Budget and the
Under Secretaries Group to make available block
grant and loan monies for reservation Indians.
Suggested Resolution 2 - Whereas it is the policy
of this current Administration to allocate certain
Federal funds according to various revenue sharing
formulae, therefore
BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Federal Regional Council
urges the Office of Management and Budget and the
... ..............

239Western Federal Regional council RAP Task
Force Evaluation, Total Tabulation, March 14, 19/J, J-i* /
Otis to Secretariat, Memorandum evaluating RAP Eva ua ion,
April 24, 1973.

24 Secretariat to FRC, Memorandum on RAP Evalua
tion, April 27, 1973, ITFF.
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Under Secretaries Group to revise revenue sharing
formulae to reallocate additional funds to reser
vation Indians.
Suggested Resolution 3 - Whereas the Reservation
Indian Task Force experienced difficulty in dealing
with various State agencies involved with Indians,
therefore
BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Federal Regional Council
will work closely with State legislative bodies and
Governors' offices in a technical Capacity to assist
the states in defining the official legal status of
Indian organizations within their political juris
diction.
Suggested Resolution 4 - Whereas the Reservation
Indian Task Force has discovered that the need
definitely exists for a permanent Federal contact
point for Indian peoples in the Pacific Southwest
Region, therefore
BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Federal Regional Council
will study the possibility of establishing a
permanent Indian Desk in Region IX.241

As usual, the Secretariat evaluated the Task
Force Evaluation together with subsequent resolutions and

made its own recommendations to the council.

It recom

mended the extension of the task force, but opposed the
establishment of a permanent Indian Desk in the Region
because "it would appear to negate interagency approach

which is what the council and its task force are all

about. "242

Qn Resoiution 2, the Secretariat recommended

that the task force be more specific in identifying recom

mended changes.

On Resolution 3, the Secretariat recom

mended that the task force draft the letters to the Governors

for the council Chairman's signature.
2^1Ibid
242 . . ,
Ibid

243_,
. ,
Ibid

When the council
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held its monthly meeting on May 1, the recommendations of
244
the Secretariat were adopted.
Acting upon the Secretariat’s recommendations and
in an effort to get the task force going, the council

requested that the task force "reconsider its structure

and scope of work."

245

It was no secret that the council

had not been unduly impressed by the acomplishments of the

task force during its formative stages.

Neither was the

council enamoured of the behavior of those task force mem
bers who were becoming advocates on behalf of the Indians.
As a result, Council Chairman Aquirre called a special

meeting in February to restate the council’s charge to the
task force.
He stressed that the task force, as an arm of the
federal government, was not to identify with a
constituent group. The group is an independent
task force, capable of forming its own decisions.
Since the task force had appeared to be recommending
a cause, it has begun to loose the confidence of the
Regional Council. Essentially, the task force is to
assist the Indian tribes in planning and finalizing
the grants process.246
The task force members were also reminded that they
were charged with the goal of seeking better utilization

of already available federal funds.

No special grant funds

had been allocated for responding to requests in RAP plans.
244Western Federal Regional Council, Minutes of
Regional Council Meeting, May 1, 1974, ITFF.
2450tis to FRC, Memorandum, June 11, 1973, ITFF.

2460tis to Task Force Members, Memorandum, February
16, 1973, ITFF.
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Rather, the FRC is committed to providing "technical

assistance regarding both better usage and coordination

of existing funds and possible sources for expanded
funding, either through direct federal grants or through

funds administered by state agencies under formula
programs.

247

During the next week, Webb Otis developed and
submitted a brief work plan for Fiscal Year (FY) 1974,
describing how the task force was going to meet the

■ -i 248
charge of the council.
The Task Force Takes the Initiative

During the next six months, the morale and

effectiveness of the task force improved considerably.

249

Under the new title of Reservation Indian Task Force (RITF)
and under the direction of the new chairman, the task force
took the initiative in contacting the remaining three RAP
tribes to set up meetings for the discussion and negotiation

The governors of the states of Nevada,
250
Arizona and California were also contacted.
Moreover,
of their plans.

efforts were made to form the tas^ force into a coherent
group whose members had a sense of identification and a

24?De Baca to HEW agencies, Memorandum on NEW
response to RAP, February 12, 1973, ITFF.
2480tis to FRC, Memorandum, June 11, 1973, ITFF.
249Interview with Hardy Pearce, April 9, 1974.
250On June 28, letters were dispatched to the
governors of the Western Federal Region.

130

consciousness of joint interaction with one another.
Each member was kept abreast of all activities by Hardy

Pearce, the Task Force Executive Secretary.

Each member

was also given definite deadlines for assigned duties

such as submitting their agency’s response to Indian plans.
251
Reminders in the form of "blue envelopes"
were used to
motivate tardy members.

This sense of identification as

a viable task force was further fostered, though indirectly,
be a series of meetings, symposiums and retreats which were

held with the objective of developing future thrusts for
the task force.

252

Such activities enabled the various task force

members to meet as a task force for significant periods
of time away from a competitive environment.

It must be

remembered that each task force member had basic responsi

bilities which assumed a priority status within their

respective agencies.

Task force membership was therefore

additional work, and was consequently accorded a low
priority.

Retreats to such places as the Western White

House in San Clemente also afforded the task force members

an opportunity to get to know each other on a more perso
basis.

Such an intimate non-competitive environment en

abled the task force members to concentrate on deve

plans to implement the council’s charge.

p

The resul

251Blue envelopes are used to designate urgency.

252Interview with Hardy Pearce, April 9, 1974.
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not only an increased commitment by most task force

members to program implementation, but also increased
concern with the actual formulation of Indian policy.253

The outgrowth of all this activity was the refine
ment of task force operating procedures.

Webb Otis sought

council approval of these procedures in the form of two
proposals:

(1) The establishment of standing subcommittees

for each Indian community to be composed of local line

level program people on the reservation, who would report
to the RITF chairman.

The sub-committee was given the

responsibility of pursuing "the commitments made in the

(2) "That the FRC select five additional

Council response."

Indian communities for consideration by the task force

during FY 1974."

These tribes had been identified from

among seventy possible tribes as the most deserving of

conncil consideration.

Without the "benefit" of the

Secretariat’s interpretation and recommendation, the council
acted unanimously to pass both proposals

proved confidence.

a sign of im-

254

Task force activity:
May 1973-July 1947

Armed with more viable administrative machinery and

253Western Federal Regional Council, minutes of
gional Council Meeting, June 19, 1973.
t California
Task
Force,
San
Clemente
Retreat,
Calitornia
members of Indian
May 16, 1974.

254_.., . the council members also asked the SecreIbid
"options" -ther than “recommendatxonsive
tariat to present
Interview with Beau Carter,
to the council.
Secretary, May 29, 1974.
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a sense of purpose, the task force proceeded to work
toward the accomplishment of these proposals.

The primary

activities of the task force was the assistance and negotia

tion of comprehensive plans with the Gila River, Hoopa,

and Papago Tribes, and getting the various agencies to

implement the programs they had agreed to during the negotia
ting process.

By February, 1974, the task force was able

to boast of the following accomplishments:

Salt River

1.

$150,000 from LEAA for construction of public
courts complex

2.

120 units of public housing from HUD

3.

Assurance of continued funding for Salt River
Indian Action Team ($110,000)

4.

EPA Solid Waste Demonstration Grant ($40,000)

5.

Urban Systems Engineering Grant from HUD
($35,000)

6.

Talent Search Grant from HEW ($20,000)

7.

IGA Application

Gila River

1.

$60,000 of HEW money released for hospital
s tudy.

2.

IPA of 19 70 brought to attention of OMB

3.

$1.3 million BIA funds released for Casa Blanca
School

4.

$200,000 LEAA grant for correctional center

Hoopa
1.
$20,250 HUD grant for tennis courts at Community

Building
2.

$371,000 HUD grant for water

distribution system
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’ Other

1.

Beneficial impact on tribal government
operations (Salt River IGA, Papago)

2.

Impact on BIA headquarters (Salt River
Indian Action Team)

3.

Bringing Indian problems to attention in
Washington and getting results (Manpower
Revenue Sharing, IPA)

4.

Education of federal employees (RITE retreat,
HUD 701 Conference)

5.

Interagency approach to urban/rural issues
(ITCC, Region IX American Indian Council) 255

Select examples from this list of accomplishments

will demonstrate the role played by the task force in
effectuating the interagency and intergovernmental coordina
tion necessary to achieve these goals.

The role played

by the task force in bringing the inequities of the Inter

governmental Personnel Act of 1970 to the attention of

0MB as well as the Salt River IGA, provides key insights
into the administrative processes of such coordination.

The task force influence in
Washington:
the IPA of 19 70
On September 7, 1972, the Navajo Tribe in Arizona

requested an opinion from the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
"as to the eligibility of the Navajo Tribe of Indians for
the programs and benefits of the Intergovernmental Personnel

Act (IPA) of 1970.256

The CSC responded that the tribe was

25^Western Federal Regional Council, RITF Accomp
lishments, February, 1974 , ITFF.
256
.
nradlev, Grants Manager
F. Browning Pipestem to *on
eligibility
CSC, letter requesting opinion on Navajo
,Q79 TTFF
for benefits of the IPA 1970, September 7,
/
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eligible

only if the State of Arizona, recognized, the

Navajo Tribe as a local government, that is, a general
purpose political sub-division of the state."257

Upon

further consideration, the General Counsel of the CSC

decided "that nothing in the IPA permits the conclusion
that it was the intent of Congress to include Indian

Tribal Councils within the scope of the Act.

In search

of a remedy forthis inequity, short of becoming a politi
cal sub-division of the state of Arizona, the Navajos

sought assistance and advice from a variety of government

contacts.

As a result, information concerning the in

equities of the IPA became widely circulated among the
259
Indians in the Western Federal Region.
The task force first learned of the Indian’s concern
for a remedy to the IPA exclusion of Indians during negotia

tions with the Gila River tribal council during May-June,

1973.260

Harry Kennedy, HEW's representative on the task

force, was given the responsibility for investigating the
problem and reporting his findings and recommendations.

Kennedy began his investigation by contacting the BIA who,
he assumed, would want to be apprised of the problem and

257Sally Williams to Pipestem, Letter of response,
October 2, 1972, ITFF.
258De Baca to Frank Zarb, OMB, Letter, January 21,
1974, ITFF.

25$Hardy Pearce, telephone interview, June 3, 1974,
San Francisco, California.
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involved in prospective remedial action.

BIA responded,

however, that it simply was not interested.261

Turning

to more familiar resources, Kennedy contacted HEW's General

Counsel and the CSC for advice and assistance.

All contacts

agreed that the exclusion of Indians from the IPA was an
inequity that should be remedied as soon as possible.

In

fact, Kennedy's contacts at the CSC assured him that CSC
was in the process of developing a remedy.

These initial

contacts were, unfortunately, "low" status contacts within

the CSC and were not in a position to inform Kennedy of
the exact nature of the proposed remedy.

However, these

contacts did inform him in November that the CSC had
developed a "general awareness of the personnel management

needs of the Indian Tribal Councils,"

262

and prepared a

"tentative legislative package for the Second Session of
the Ninety-third Congress that includes a recommendation

that the IPA be amended to provide 'full coverage' for
Indian Tribal Councils."2^2

On the basis of this information, the task force

submitted a report to the council recommending that it
solicit OMB' s support on behelf of the Indians.

The task

force, through the council, specifically recommended that

OMB "fully endorse and support CSC's proposed legislative
2 $ ^Interview with Harry Kennedy, San Francisco,
California, June 4, 1974.
2^2Andrew Boesel to Kennedy, Letter, November 26,
1973, ITFF.

Ibid
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amendment of the IPA of 1970."

264

However, when 0MB

proceeded to act on this recommendation and actually
contacted CSC to offer support for the "proposed

legislative amendment," it was informed that the
amendment had not been submitted to Congress.

Instead,

the CSC was attempting to obtain an additional grant of
money from Congress for the Indians.

The "proposed

legislative amendment" had merely been developed for
possible use as a "bargaining point" in the event Congress

proved reluctant to provide additional money.
closure embarrassed both CSC and 0MB.

This dis

CSC was apparently

using Indian dissatisfaction to acquire additional funds
for its budget and 0MB should have been better informed
of all these developments.

265

At the monthly FRC chairman’s meeting with 0MB,
De Baca was informed of this bungle and rebuked on the
grounds that the miscue would not have occurred
WFRC staff done its homework."

had the

De Baca defended his

staff by arguing that he and his staff had proceeded on
the assumption the CSC’s proposed remedy would be in the

form of an amendment to the IPA.

Not only had CSC s

communiques fostered such an assumption, but an amendment

seemed the most logical and practical remedy.

The resul

264Harry Kennedy to Webb Otis, Memorandum, Decem
ber 21, 1973, ITFF.
265lnterview with Hardy Pearce in San Francisco,
California, June 3, 1974.

266t, . ,
Ibid
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of this scenario was that, on the recommendation of OMB,

CSC withdrew efforts to obtain additional money and
instead presented the amendment to the IP A of 1970.267
From the vantage point of the involved task force

members, the miscue was not the result of a deliberate
effort on the part of CSC to mislead them, but a "failure"

on their part to make contact with "higher" ranking mem
bers within CSC who, apparently, were the only ones aware

of the Commission's legislative strategy.

They also feel

that the fact that CSC sought a remedy for the Indians
in any form, as will as its final resolution, was a result

of the type of activity facilitated by the interagency

framework provided by FRC's.

The interagency process:
grant application

26 8

Integrated

The most ambitious interagency program attempted

by the task force was assisting the Salt River Tribe to

develop and obtain FRC approval of an IGA program.

The

Indians interest in an IGA program was the result of the

suggestion, encouragement and work of Jim Trent, a grants
man hired by Paul Smith to maximize the tribe's chances

of acquiring all available monies.

Jim Trent had first

learned of the IGA concept while working as a grantsman

in the Northwest.

Hearing that it was a "miracle-type

267Telephone interview with Hardy Pearce, San
Francisco, California, June 20, 1974.

2 6 interview with Hardy Pearce, San Francisco,
California, May 29, 1974.
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program," he wrote to OMB requesting additional information.

OMB responded by forwarding a standard "Information Packet."

However, it was not until the informal discussions during
the RAP negotiations that the topic of IGA's was raised

for serious consideration.

Those agency representatives

familiar with IGA's mentioned that it "had possibilities.269
After subsequent discussion among tribal leaders, Paul
Smith asked for council "assistance and consideration of

the Salt River Community's program under the IGA Program."

270

The council drafted a letter of response to the

Salt River Tribe's request for assistance.

However, upon

review of the letter, it was felt that it was "too opti

mistic" and may only serve to create unreal expectations
on the part of the Indians.

While the council tried to

decide exactly how to respond to the Salt River request,
the task force staff encouraged Jim Trent to begin work
on the development of an IGA.

It was not until after

Christmas that the council finally informed the tribe,

informally through the task force staff, that it would be

willing to review an IGA.

271

In order to prepare a preliminary IGA for presen

tation at the January 15 meeting of the council, Jim Trent

and the Salt River Tribal staff "worked around the clock
2^9Telephone interview with Jim Trent, Scottsdale,

Arizona, June 20, 1974.
270De Baca to Otis, Memorandum on Salt River IGA,
January 17, 1974, ITFF.

271De Baca to Smith, Letter, January 21, 1974, ITFF
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for about two weeks."

Obtaining approval of the council

by that date was seen as crucial for two reasons: (1) it

was estimated that the IGA review and negotiations would

take aibout six months and the Fiscal Year for both the
federal government and the tribe began on July 1, which
272
was the proposed "launch" date.
Also, Paul Smith was

running for reelection as president of the Salt River

Tribal Council and the acquisition of additional funds
.
.
273
would be a tremendous asset to his campaign.

At its meeting on January 15, 1974, the FRC agreed
to review the submitted IGA.

The application was turned

over to the task force which, in turn, delivered it to the
Salt River Tribal Subcommittee established by the task

force for the initial review.27^

HEW was given the "lead

agency" responsibility for both proceeding with the negotia
tion as well as implementation in the event that the IGA

was finally approved.

275

However, while Otis was visiting the Salt River
Community during the last week in March, he was informed

of HEW's lethargy in leading the review and negotiations

process,by an anxious tribal staff.

This lack of initiative

by HEW stemmed from the failure of De Baca, who was simul
2720tis to De Baca, Blue Envelope Letter, March
25, 1974, ITFF.

272Telephone interview with Hardy Pearce, San Fran
cisco, California, June 24, 1974.
274T
. . ,
Ibid

275

Ibid.
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taneously HEW Regional Director and FRC Chairman, to

appoint a coordinator.

Upon returning to San Francisco,

Otis dispatched a "blue envelope" to De Baca and the

council apprising them of the Indians' anxie.ty and urged
the appointment of a coordinator.

De Baca was also reminded

that OMB was "very interested in awarding an IGA to an
2 76
Indian Community."
De Baca responded immediately by

appointing Harry Kennedy as HEW’s coordinator during the
277
review stage of IGA.
He also began a seaxch for a
man familiar with very technical aspects of grant manage
ment in general and IGA’s in particular to implement the
IGA if and when adopted by the. council.

278

As the task force agencies proceeded to review the
preliminary IGA, they discovered that it suffered from
one major flaw:

it was unrealistic!

Rather than applying

for money already received through various grant programs,
the IGA emphasized applications for new money.

The Salt

River Tribe was apparently working on the assumption that

an IGA could be used to apply for all possibly available
monty without even investigating such factors as eligibility

beforehand.

Unfortunately much of the money they applied

for was administered by the- BIA which worked through con2760tis to De Baca, Blue Envelope Letter, March 25,

1974.

277De Baca to Thomas A. Purvis, Memorandum, May 20,

1974, ITFF.
278De Baca to Sheridan Weinstein, Memorandum,
May 21, 1974, ITFF.
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tracts and were not included in IGA's.

Also, other funds

required state involvement — a prospect totally unaccep
table to the Indians.

Needless to say, these discoveries

were the source of considerable disenchantment with the
IGA process on the part of both the Indians and the task
,
279
force members.
Notwithstanding the problems of this preliminary

IGA, the task force proceeded with its review.

On April 19,

the initial task force review of the IGA was sent to the
Salt River Tribe.

However, the responses of only five

agencies (HUD, DOT, HEW, LEAA, and DOI) were included in
the review.

Also, the comments of these agencies were so

brief, general and non-committal, that the administrators
of the Salt River Tribe were unable to determine what was
needed to revise the IGA into a viable and acceptable
document. 2 80

The frustration of the Indians with this

review was also shared by the task force staff.

2 81

Webb

Otis expressed his dissatisfaction to the task force

members along with a request for another more substantial
review.

On June 4, Webb Otis was able to deliver an "in

depth” response to the tribe.
2^Beau Carter, interview in San Francisco, Cali
fornia, May 29, 1974.

280Otis to Smith, Letter describing the task force
review of the tribe’s IGA, April 19, 1974, ITFF.
28^Interview with Hardy Pearce, June 24, 1974,
interview with Jim Trent, June 20, 1974.
2820tis to Smith, Letter describing in-depth
review of tribe's IGA, June 4, 1974, ITFF.
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The tribal leaders were elated with this review,

as it provided them with both clear ideas of funding
feasibility, suggested alternatives, and key contacts.

While they proceeded to revise their IGA on the basis of

this review, the FRC informally decided to adopt the
IGA formally in their meeting in July, and to include it

in the WFRC Work Plan for FY 1974-75.283
2 83

Interview with Hardy Pearce, June 24, 1974.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

While this approval of the Salt River IGA should
be considered a major accomplishment of the task force, it

should not overshadow the more significant organizational
development of the task force:

the collection of middle

management administrators into a cohesive administrative
group capable of interagency coordinating of intergovern

mental programs.

This capacity, however, has been neither

swiftly arrived at, nor readily developed.

In fact, the

WFRC was reluctant to get involved in Indian affairs, slow

to respond to OMB encouragement, and inept in its initial
organizational efforts.

Notwithstanding these initial short

comings, the subsequent achievements of the Indian Task

Force in coordinating the various federal agencies of the
Western Federal Region to meet the needs of the Indians in

the Western Federal Region — especially the Salt River

Tribe — demonstrates the ability of FRC’s to design and im
plement an organizational framework for interagency and in

tergovernmental coordination of federal grant programs.
This coordination however, was not achieved by the
RAP task force because of the widespread feeling among its
143
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members that they lacked the authority to perform the task
assigned by OMB.

0MB was nevertheless reluctant to grant

councils the authority to force member agencies, who were
represented on the task force, to meet RAP objectives.
While OMB urged and encouraged the lead agency to be more
aggressive in its requests for cooperation from other fed

eral agencies, OMB remained steadfast to its commitment of
decentralized coordination.

As a result, most task force

members saw the task force as little more than a frivolous

experiment of little consequence for either the Indians or

their individual agencies.

This attitude was changed by reorganizing the task
force.

This most significant part of the reorganization was

the appointment of Webb Otis as the new task force chairman.

Under his leadership, the task force members were molded in

to a relatively cohesive group.

This was accomplished by

such innovations as a series of retreats that removed the

task force members from the competitive environment in San

Francisco where they were reminded that they were employed,
evaluated and promoted by HEW, 0E0, EPA or some other agency
but not by the council.

Otis also encouraged, coaxed and in

directly threatened both task force and council members to

cooperate with task force goals.

As a result of such aggre

sive leadership, the task force evolved into an organizati

capable of interagency and intergovernmental coordina
This is not to say that aggressive leadership has
proven sufficient to provide the interagency

coordination re
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qUired of FRC’s.

It simply argues that it is a necessary

feature, precisely because it was the only mechanism that

could reckon with the tendency of federal agencies to be
preoccupied with their own programs.

Aggressive leader

ship, in this case, was not only able to pull these auto

nomous agencies closer together structurally, in the form
of a task force whose members became conscious of the joint

interaction for a common purpose, it was also able to fos
ter the type of intergovernmental planning that V. 0. Key,

Jr. suggests is necessary for rational policy-making, i.e.,
policy-making that is based on the needs and abilities of

all governmental units involved in the administration of
specific policies.

As such, the Indian Task Force has

served as an organizational framework for the intergovern
mental relationships necessary to coordinate the many di

verse grant programs.
Such a conclusion, however, may appear somewhat

simplistic.

After all, it may be argued, the Indians played

an important role in the development of RAP, as well as
bringing the IPA 1970 inequities and the IGA possibilities

to the attention of federal authorities.

The importan

the Salt River Indians’ initiatives was also demonstrat

by the Indians’ obvious desire to work with the counci

their technical skill in the form of a grantsman to effec

tuate that desire.

Such desire and skill was inconsequ

however, when combined with the obvious lack of
in the RAP Task Force.

Moreover, although the desir
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skill of these and similar local governments to work with
the federal government are necessary ingredients for any
meaningful intergovernmental relationship, they cannot

facilitate the kind of intergovernmental relationship that

could coordinate the many autonomous grant-giving agencies.
This coordination, it has already been argued, must occur
at the federal level.

And since, as the Indian Task Force

demonstrated, an aggressive leader such as Webb Otis is

capable of producing such interagency coordination — al
beit a precarious coordination--it must be considered the

primary determinant of the successes of the task force.
This aggressive leadership was most important, how
ever, as a force for more viable intergovernmental relation

ships.

This point was perhaps best demonstrated by the task

force activities involving the Salt River IGA.

While the

Salt River Indians were led to believe that IGA’s were a

"miracle type program,” and that the WFRC was anxious to
help them develop and implement an IGA, the actual response

of the task force member agencies to the initial IGA propo
sal was less than enthusiastic.

This initial IGA proposal

admittedly had its problems, but it was a beginning and it

could be salvaged.

However, the responses of the reviewing

agencies were either negative or so general and vague that
it was virtually impossible for either the task force staff

or the Salt River Indians to identify those parts of the
document that needed to be added to, deleted from, or other
wise embellished to obtain council approval.
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While Webb Otis encouraged and coaxed the task

force members to encourage their agencies to provide a
more substantial review of the Salt River IGA, little was
done until he resorted to the more combative tactic of

issuing the "blue envelope" letter to council members,
reminding them of the importance of the IGA process to OMB,

and the importance of this specific IGA to the Council's
reputation.

Responding to this letter, the agencies pro

ceeded to more thoroughly study and review the Salt River

IGA.

The task force staff organized these independent

reviews into a single document to be passed on to the Salt
River Tribe.

This in-depth review not only specifically

responded to the funding feasibility of each desired grant,

it also specifically suggested alternatives and the indi
viduals to contact in the event the alternative appealed

to the tribe.
Although such a response elated the Indians and
again demonstrated the importance of aggressive leadership,

it also indicated another important, though perhaps more
subtle accomplishment of the task force:

it forced the

federal agencies to consider their programs in the context
of local needs.

By the same token, it also forced the Salt

River Tribe to consider and reconsider its priorities in
terms of federal resources.

Such considerations are impor

tant because they require federal-local deliberations which
serve as the basis for a form of intergovernmental planning.
The most basic shortcoming of 1960-1970 grant pro
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grams was the failure of federal policy-makers to consider
the intergovernmental impact of their grant programs.

This

form of intergovernmental planning acts as an antidote to

the tendency to use grants to achieve exclusively federal
or local purposes.
The basis of a more viable intergovernmental re

lationship would be further strengthened by continuing and
enlarging federal contacts and deliberations with the Salt
River Indians during the actual delivery of the IGA.

How

ever, determining the possibility of such contacts would
require a study during or after delivery.

Pending this,

this study concludes that the activities of the Indian

Task Force not only demonstrate the importance of aggres
sive leadership, they also demonstrate the ability of
FRC's to design and implement intergovernmental relation

ships capable of correcting the most basic maladies plaguing

the administration of grant-in-aid programs.
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Appendix A

Federal Regional Council, Region IX

of Work Plan Activities
(Selective Sample)

April 30, 1973
1. Activity Title/Objective: Relationships with
Chief Executives, Legislative Bodies and Public Interest
Groups. (Page 6, August 1, 1972 Work Plan).
2. Planned Target - May 1, 197 3. Develop follow-up
plans for response to identified problems; plan Council visits
public officials; establish mechanisms for continuing relation
ships.
3. Actual Accomplishments. Council met with a number
of public interest groups, Mayors and Governors, its latest
activity (in March 197 3) having been the meetings with state
and local officials on the President’s budget. In addition,
the council met with the Mayors and their staffs, and with
state officials on Planned Variations, with the Governor of
Guam on possible annual arrangement; with California State
officials on a number of issues and continued to attend
meetings of the California Council on Intergovernmental
Relations. Conferences were held with state officials on
OMB Circular A-95 and with Councils of Government on a planning study in which the Council has been engaged. As indicated
in the Council's FY 1974 work plan, the Council determined
last October that this activity should not be considere a
separate activity, but treated as an integral part of virtually
everything the Council does.

4. Problems/Issues. The biggest problem is finding
the time and resources to properly address the ques ^^pqcarv
raised by state/local officials and to carry out the necess y
information exchange and liaison roles.
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5- Organizational/Resource Highlight. As statos
plan to develop these contacts through our regular task d'
forces and committees and to engender state/local interest ana
support through working with officials at all levels in
d
specific program areas such as A-95, planning requirements
annual arrangements, aging, etc.
4
menrs,
6. Remarks/Comments. Council members have substantiallv
increased their contacts with chief executives, legislators
Y
and public interest groups; the work plan activities for FY
1974 should increase opportunity to develop meaningful working
relationships.
y
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Annual Activity Report

FRC Region IX
April 30, 1973

? , Activity Title/Objective: Planned Variations
Provide Federal support to demonstration of what cities can
do about their own problems when given more authority more
resources and less Federal direction (page 7, Revised'work
Plan of August 1, 1972) .
2- Planned Target - April 30, 1973. Chief Executive
Review and Comment (CERC) operational; Federal agencies
granting city requests for wavier of administrative and
procedural requirements; Council review of Planned Variation
submissions; Council support for requests from state-city
task forces and planned variations cities’ requests for
technical assistance and citizen participation.

3. Actual Accomplishments. All activities are on
schedule. CERC is operational.
(a) An interagency group
was formed to advise consultants; consultants and Council
defined policy issues for future study and action and the
consultants’ evaluation report on Federal support has led to
internal monitoring systems. The Council held day-long on
site reviews with all three P.V. cities.
(b) State-city
task force is active in Arizona, and inactive in California.
Council supports the offices of Intergovernmental Affairs,
recently established in San Jose and Tucson in response to
local CERC issues, thereby strengthening chief executive.
The Council has taken action on consultants’ findings
regarding CERC, Federal and state support. Future consultants'
reports will deal with local response and citizen participation.
The Council decided to extend the consultants' contract until
June.

4. Problems/Issues. Some local P.V. officials
continue to be skeptical of Federal support, and have generated
few requests for waivers of Federal administrative requirements
and technical assistance, in spite of the Council site visits
strategy to relieve this problem. As an additional effort,
the Council is establishing a P.V. information clearinghouse,
and sending clarifying letters on the subjects of minimization/
waivers and non-interfering Federal support.
CERC, as designed, may not be workable in San Jose
because:
(1) the city and the county have equally significant
responsibilities; and (2) the Council/City Manager (weak mayor)
form of government does not lend itself to Chief Executive
sign off.
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5. Organizational/Resources Highlights
At local
government s initiative, a group composed of representative,
from all affected governments is following CERCi™?®
and meeting periodically to resolve issue! ^implementation
6. Remark s/Contments. CERC has been instrumental in
bringing a closer city-county working relationship (part
icularly in San Jose-Santa Clara County) and in stimulating
grant inventories and identification of policy gaps at the
local level.
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1- Activity Title/Objective . Implementation of an
IGA planning grant for the greater Sacramento area
(Pane
14, August 1, 1972, Work Plan).
’
y
2. Planned Target - May 1, 197 3 and June 20, 1973
Development of FY 1974 application and Awarding of Grant. *

3. Actual Accomplishments. The first and second draft
submissions for the continuing application have been reviewed
and commented upon by participating agencies. Additionally,
the DOT Intermodal Planning Group has met with the Task Force
and Planning Commission staff to discuss current DOT require
ment for an Integrated Work Plan. It is expected that the
modified final application will be submitted to the FRC
approximately May 1.

Completion time for several of the elements has been
changed from June 30, 197 3, to September 30, 1973. Part
icipating Federal agencies have forwarded their approval of
this modification to the original application.
4. Problems/Issues. Not all Federal agencies were
able to respond in a timely fashion to the SRAPC continuing
application. This was in part due to the relatively short
lead time for comments and to internal operating obstacles
within the Federal agencies. UMTA (DOT) has been a
particular problem.
A continuing problem has been disagreement among
task force members as to the amount of information to be
furnished by the applicant in response to individual agency
requirements.

5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. Processing
of the continuing application has not required significant
task force time.
6. Remarks/Comments. The task force and the Council
are now working to involve other Council agencies in
Participation in the IGA for FY 1974. Resolution of
conceptual problems referred to in (4) above have been
reviewed with the Secretariat and will be escalated to the
Council level if the task force is unable to resolve them
shortly.
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A successful four-stage conference
federal officials was held April 26, using of city, COG, state,
SRAPC's experience
as a model for integrated planning.
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1. —- ->• x uup j ec11 vp •
Task
Monoplan
.
_______ Support
the development of
and develop mechanisms for coordinating Fe“^t^ master plan
local programs and policies as they pertain f, w
-J16 and
Federal, recreation areas.
(Page 17 of August 1
2. Planned Target - April 30 1977
m
recommend possible FRC participation in in^aratZa F°rC! tO!
local sponsors. FRC to: award and monitor proSt^ tO
feasible.
it

Actual Accomplishments. The Tac-k Pnr™
.
.
with the local sponsors and their “consultants at m met twice
twice made21 presentations
FRC
The FRC
meeting th.t to
the the
exi.ttag
X
? *
structured
m a manner that
made ”
FRC EX™ «*''
•
•
The
le»l .po„,„,
notiiie?

reasons behind it.
They were told that the Council would
reconsider, at any time the sponsors and the State solicited
further FRC participation and were willing to restructure the
planning effort to accomodate FRC agency concerns with the
present design. The Task Force was disbanded in January.

,
. 4* P£oblems/I^sues. The plan contained insufficient
understanding of the social implications of the alternative
plans available to the community. The FRC concluded that this
lack of comprehensiveness, and the too narrow geographical
area of the planning effort, precluded further Council
participation.

5. Qrganizational/Resources Highlights. The Task
orce, with a USDA (Forest Service) lead and composed of both
council and non-Council agency members, fulfilled the assigned
arges in a commendable and, from an interagency standpoint,
nignly cooperative manner.
th

Remarks/Comments . Although the local sponsors have
°rmallY brought a petition for rehearing before the Council,
ey nave informed us that: a broader geographical area has
en included in a newly created APO; and the consultants are
tO recruit social scientists for investigations
° the broader social implications. It is possible this is
ln9 done for a re-presentation to the FRC.

Annual Activity Report
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FRC Region IX
April 30, 1973

^ti^ij£L_Title/Objective: Studv Crm
Prepare a report to the Regibnal Council--

the impact which certain Federal policies and n?
IX'
have upon COG roles, and significant new trends^d^ programs
which have a bearing on future COG activities
?p developments
August 1, 1972 Work Plan).
^ivities. (Page 24 of
2- Planned Target - April 30, 1973. Accordinn
revised change (see Problems/Issues below) ,' submission of
SnMarchP1973
Regl°nal Council to ha*e been accomplished
Actual Accomplishments. Report is in its final
stages of development and will be submitted to the Council in
early May. Members of the Study Group attended the conference
on Progress m Regionalism" sponsored by the Arizona Council
on Intergovernmental Relations in December 1072 and focusina
on Arizona's COGs; local Bay Area hearings of the California
Task Force on Local Government Reform in March 1973- and the
conference on IGA in Sacramento on April 26, sponsored by HUD,
the California Council on Intergovernmental Relations and the
Sacramento Regional Area Planning Commission.
4* Problems/1 ssues. As indicated in the December 1
quarterly report, the Council shifted the focus of this activity
trom an Arizona-oriented task force to a region-wide study
group at its August 15 meeting. The revised timetable for the
study group projected the submission of a final report in
March 1973. The study group has encountered difficulties in
verifying data on COG organization, staffing, and budget provided
y the COGs themselves, as well as information from Federal
agencies regarding direct and indirect funding to COGs in the
region. As a result, the report has fallen behind schedule.

Organizational/Resources Highlights. The study
group encountered some problems with travel demands placed
upon members who were stationed in Los Angeles. As indicated
ln the previous section, some members also found that obtaining
in ormation on Federal funding of COGs from several different
ine agencies of their department, and in some cases from
ate counterpart agencies, to be a much more time-consuming
Process than was originally anticipated.
. . 6. Remarks/Comments. The results of this study group
c ivtty will be used as an element of a new planning requiren s activity of the FRC projected for FY 1974.
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1. Activity Title/Qbjectivp- qAn P
Funding Project, to enable the City to:---- £^£isco Flexible

amona kev nnlir-w
=
m___ .
within and
community services, education
ment) ;
' economic developb.
Broaden coordination among essential local
programs with key metropolitan agencies; and
c
Develop more effective citizen involvement in
determining priorities.
vemenn in

2.

Planned Target - April 30, 1973.
reportSnt^ficati°n of Federal Funding - complete

b.
Draft of Recommendations, summary of findings
description of the Annual Development Program, roles
of Mayor's office and Chief Administrative Officer’s
office - complete report and circulate for comment.

c.
Development of an Annual Development Program
Prototype - complete report.

above.

3.

Actual Accomplishments.

(refer to items in #2

a.
This report is delayed by one month due to
difficulty in obtaining up-to-date, accurate data.
b.
This item has been completed and circulated,
as scheduled.
c. The prototype is now intended to be submitted
as part of the final draft recommendations in June.

.

4.- Problems/Issues. The project did not begin until
gust 2 8, 1972 due to delays in funding transfers from the
FRC memker agencies. Consequently, the project
edule was begun in late August rather than May. There have
en no serious delays since that time.

15 8
5. Organizational/Resource HiahHrrb+.
resources required include the time-oftR^3^' The Pri™ary
and a three-man interagency evaluation teamPrO:l!Ct officer,
by FRC member agency responsible program off' • particiPati<

• Remarks/'Comments. As the FY 74
,
the GRC plans to complete its evaluation of
plan indicates.
Funding Project by June 15; concurrentlv tbec\SF Flexible
its list of concerns and issues which will h«
develoP
discuss the above and future plans and artier W ln July to
x
ux vities
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1. Activity Title/0
g: California Federal Aid
Control System (FACS) Grant.
governmental Management to continue^eveloDin^t1^4-brnncrh employment
pmnlovmpnt of
nF consultant
on 1
x.assistance
__ •
Ping FACS potential
through
(Page 34 of
August 1, 1972, Work Plan).
2 • Planned Target - April 30, 1973
(a) Develop
reports for state government offices from a’survsv
(b) develop reports for local governments, state-wide b! a
upon experience with the P.v. cities- (cl
21?' based
RMIS development and establish with the California FACS?™

3. ,--------------Problems/Issues .
,
(a) The Schedule for iqqn-inrr
the Quarterly Reports on Federal Grant Awards has slipped
because of extensive format changes which were instituted
based upon comments solicited from Federal/State/local govern
ments; (b) the largest concern of this project has been thZ
fear that the RGIS pilot projects might bring considerable
change to the California FACS. Because of this a great deal
of the consultant s time was spent coordinating with the Dallas
FRC to the detriment of other objectives (developing reports
for P.V. cities, other local governments and state offices) .

Organizational/Resource Highlights. In sum, the
consultant spent the amount of time anticipated on FACS main
tenance, less than anticipated on developing a range of reports
and more than anticipated on developing one report and liaison
with the RMIS project.

Remarks/Comments.
(a) The time spent improving the
Quarterly Report of Federal Grant Awards was necessary; it
represents a spirit of cooperation among governments which
will be reflected in a very useful product; (b) the consultant’s
contact with the RGIS project in Dallas is an even more
valuable example of intergovernmental cooperation, in that:
*J- F?Cs
have the advantage of the improved FACS software,
w will be able to use its mechanized SF 240 system for A-98
reporting, and the Region IX FRC has been provided a working
ink with nationwide RMIS project development; (c) as reaffirmed
y the Council at its April 20th meeting, the OEO project
manager will submit an evaluation of the project. The prior
requirement for submission of evaluation criteria has been
topped.
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1- Activity Title/Objective : Urban Indian Affairs.
To promote opportunities for non-reservation Native Americans
to integrate successfully into the mainstream of society.
(Page 41 of August 1972 Work Plan).
Planned Target: April 30, 1973. Had this project
been successfully launched, an interagency committee would now
be in the midst of conducting an evaluation based on objectives
which were to have been established in November 1972.

3. Actual Accomplishments. Following OEO’s assumption
of responsibility for BANAC in September, OEO prepared a status
report which recommended developing a strategy for increasing
local government awareness of non-reservation Indians within
their jurisdictions, promoting selected pilot efforts at
economic development, and building mutual technical assistance
among Indian organizations. Council action was witheld at
OEO’s request on account of events which demonstrated a need
to re-evaluate all non-reservation Indian programs at Regional
and National levels.

4. Problems/Issues. Because of uncertainty regarding
OEO’s status and role since November, no further action has
been recommended to the Council. HEW is independently exploring
options for support to non-reservation Indian programs. A
basic issue is how to reconcile Council activities for nonreservation Indians with the FRC’s intergovernmental purpose.

5.

Organizational/Resources Highlights.

None.

6. Remarks/Comments . Further FRC action in this area
awaits Washington or HEW Regional. It is a projected activity
in the FY 1974 Work Plan.
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1. Activity Title/Qbjective : To review plans of
selected Indian tribes to provide guidance on regulations,
standards, criteria or other requirements of FRC member
agencies’ programs and to consider how existing and available
funds within each program area can also be better related to
tribal priorities.
(Pages 43-44, August 1, 1972, Work Plan).

2. Planned Target: April 30, 1973. On-going review
and specific responses to identified needs of four Indian
tribes in Region IX.
3.

Actual Accomplishments.

a. Salt River Indian Community: An on-site visit
to the Reservation was made on July 17, 1972.
Meetings with Tribal representatives were held on
September 27, November 15, 1972, and January 9,
1973. The task force report on the Salt River
Community was presented to the Council on December
29, 1972. The FRC response to the Tribe was
signed on March 9, 1973. Reaction of the Tribe
to the Council involvement has been enthusiastic.

b. Gila River Indian Community: Meetings with
Tribal represtntatives were held on January 10
and February 28, 1973. An on-site visit was
conducted March 22-23, 1973. The task force
began preparation of its report to the Council
on April 11, 1973.

c. Hoopa Valley Tribe: The task force has met
twice with Tribal representatives, January 10 and
February 28, 1973.

d. San Carlos Apache Tribe: The Tribe presented
an initial report to the task force on April 11,
1973.
4. Problems/Issues. Initial difficulties in working
with tribal representatives have been overcome. Task force
members are often not given the necessary authority to
adequately respond to identified Indian needs.
5. Organizational/Resources Highlights. Contacts
with the Indian tribes have been very successful. Problems
associated with the task force chairman not being a member
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of the FRC will be alleviated once Interior becomes an official
member.
6* Remarks/Comments. The task force is due to terminate
at the end of the Fiscal Year 1973; the task force members
recommend that its existence be allowed to continue. Based
on the assumption the Council will agree to this as its May 1
meeting, a work plan has been prepared for the FY 1974 Work
Plan.
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FRC Region IX

April 30, 1973

1- Activity Title/Objective : Evaluation/Supervision
of Interagency Program Coordination Mechanisms (ICMs). Develop
a set of Regional functions for FR4C, RMCC and RICC which also
fulfill nationally mandated purposes; determine nature and
extent of and mechanisms for, exervise of FRC supervision.
(Page 48, August 1972 Work Plan) .
2. Planned Target - April 30, 1973. Work plan indicates
that evaluations of all ICMs by ad hoc teams were to have been
accomplished and changes implemented by mid October 1972.
3.

Actual Accomplishments.

a. FR4C - Study team evaluation submitted to the
Council March 6, and recommendations adopted re
HEW and FR4C roles and next steps. FR4C committee
is presently drafting specific action recommendations
to Council regarding critical operational issues.
b. RMCC - FRC has assumed de facto responsibility
through responding to DOL request for input
regarding FRC/RMCC roles in proposed Comprehensive
Manpower Planning process, and through acceptance
of appeal from a Council of Governments regarding
RMCC denial of MAPC status (April 20 meeting).

c. RICC - FRC has replaced the RICC as advisory
mechanism (to HUD R/A) on all P.V. submissions and
on consultant contract to evaluate P.V. experiment
in Region IX; RICC performs staff work at request
of Council Secretariat.
d.

Sub-Regional Council - See separate report.

4. Problems/Issues. Conflicting agency priorities,
unclear signals regarding national direction, and finally
the uncertain status of the lead agency, OEO, delayed the
start of the evaluation process until February, when the
FR4C study was undertaken. Subsequently, the Council has
amended the process for gathering data on other ICMs.
(Inclusion of DOT and EPA representatives as study team
members resulted in loss of time owing to leak of familiarity
with social programs, and other factors).
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5. Organizational/Resource Highlights. The FR4C
study generated a high level of interest among 4C members
and has resulted in Council-mandated follow-up activity which
is producing major changes in member agency involvement and
commitment.
6. Remarks/Comments. Delays partially refelct
unrealistic time frames for accomplishing objectives. FY 74
Work Plan will project achievable milestones, growing out
of this year’s experience.

Section IV.

Major Changes and Initiatives.

As a result of the Council’s Work Management Project, sub
stantial changes have been made in the Council's approach to
selection of activities. Some of these changes, the new
initiatives resulting from the Management by Objective
approach, and those undertaken to respond to national directives
are summarized below:
Major Changes.

1. The Equal Opportunity Plan is being dropped from
the work plan as an independent activity and its components
subsumed under the appropriate goal, and implemented by
existing interagency mechanisms or the lead agency. This
realignment of responsibility should save staff time without
diminishing the Council’s effectiveness.
2. The following activities are being eliminated either
because they have been completed, or because the Council can
no longer have a meaningful role: Phoenix flexible funding
project, Mammoth Monoplan, San Diego IGA.
3. The following activities are being continued in
the work plan, but under a different activity title: Relation
ships with Chief Executives, legislative bodies and public
interest groups will be folded into other activities; Development
of a More Effective Federal Response to Guam will be encompassed
in a more comprehensive activity which will embrace Annual
Arrangements and a new component, Consolidation of Federal
Contract/Grant Recipients; the various Planning activities
(Planning and Environmental Impact Requirements and COG Study
Group) will be incorporated into one Planning activity and
expanded.

4. The following activities are in transitional
stages.
It is intended that they be developed farther and
included in theCouncil’s final work plan on July 1: Urban
Indians, additional pilot IGA’s, Public Information Manage
ment, Southern California Sub-regional Council.
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New Initiatives.
Involvement of Council agency program staff in various areas
of expertise was one of the beneficial effects of several
new initiatives during the past year. In addition to project
officer and program analyst participation, legal counsels,
auditors, information specialists and economists formed
special committees in response to Council related problems.
Furthermore, a number of non-Council agencies, as well as
state and local officials, served on task forces or otherwise
participated in the Council’s activities. Major initiatives
reported below include some on which substantial work was done
but which the Council or its staff decided to hold in abeyance
pending further developments.

1. Regional Management Information System. Council
and staff have devoted considerable time to a proposal for a
regional management information system at the request of the
Council and the Policy and Review Group in Washington. Con
currently the Council asked its task force to prepare a work
plan to relate to a regional grant information system, and
to the pending socio-demographic system. This effort will
continue to involve substantial Federal, state and local
staff time.
2. Meetings with State/Local Officials. No activity
undertaken by the Council has resulted in such wide exposure
to state and local officials, legislators and public interest
groups. During this series of seven meetings, the Council met
with three of the four Governors in the Region, the Governor
of American Samoa and the High Commissioner of the Trust
Territories and with state, city, county and regional officials.
The Council furnished material on the Council and member
agencies' programs to all participants. Assisting the Council
were the three FEBs in the Region, the Arizona and California
Councils on Intergovernmental Relations, the California League
of Cities, and state and local officials in all the states.

3. President's Veterans Program. Early this fiscal
year, the Council agreed that each member agency would appoint
PVP coordinators to assess policy and procedures adopted to
implement the PVP within their own agencies and amont their
contractos, provide technical assistance and report to the
Council on progress. This activity will be included in the
FY 1974 work plan.

4. Disaster Response. In recognition of the role
played by Councils in other Regions, particularly after
Hurricane Agnes, and mindful of the vulnerability of
California to earthquakes, this Council conducted a pilot
investigation in cooperation with OEP, in one disaster area,
to attempt to determine its role in long term disaster recovery.
This exercise, was useful in coordinating response in the
particular emergency and preparing for further study, and a
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recommended work plan under the new lead agency in FY 1974.

5. Public Safety. The Council formally established a
Public Safety Task Force in November 1972, with LEAA as lead
agency. Since then LEAA officials have done substantial
internal staff work regarding a proposed task force project
with the City of Compton, working closely with State and
regional criminal justice planning staffs. This proposal
will be discussed at a full task force meeting in early
May, and a final work plan for FY 1974 task force activity
will be approved before the end of the current fiscal year.
6. Public Information Management. A task force of
public affairs officers was also established by the Council
in November 1972. This group has been investigating ways in
which FRC activities can be better communicated to both FRC
"clients'’ and the general public, with initial work focussing
on the design of a Council brochure and alternative communication
devices. In addition, the task force received a charge to
continue work begun elsewhere on the need for, and ayai1abi1ity
of, multi-lingual informational materials. Final decisions
regarding the operation of the task force and specific FY
1974 activities will be made before June 30.

167

Appendix B
Federal Regional Council, Region IX

Council Operating Procedures

October 1972

1.

Background

Following a year-long pilot experiment in four regions (San
Francisco, Chicago, Atlanta, and New York) a Presidential
directive of March 27, 1969, established 10 common Regional
boundaries and extended the Federal Regional Council concept
to all 10 regions. By September, 1970, the realignment of
boundaries was complete for the five human resource agencies
which then made up the Council, and Regional Councils were
functioning as a national pattern of interagency cooperation.
On February 11, 1972 the President issued Executive Order
No. 11647 strengthening the Councils and adding two new
agencies.

11.

Membership

Council membership is composed of the Regional Directors/
Administrators of the Departments of Health, Education and
Welfare (HEW); Housing and Urban Development (HUD); Labor
(DOL); Office of Economic Opportunity )OEO); the Environ
mental Protection Agency (EPA); the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration (LEAA) of the Department of Justice; and the
Regional Representative of the Secretary of Transportation
(DOT).
The Regional Director or other appropriate representative of
other Federal agencies and departments may be invited to
participate as associate members to define and solve inter
agency policy and program problems significantly involving
the interests of their agencies. Under these circumstances,
they will attend Council meetings and participate in Council
deliberations regarding their areas of responsibility. They
also provide support staff as necessary. When a specific
policy or program problem arises, the Council will invite the
affected agency or department to become an ad hoc member
for the period during which the problem is before the Council,
also supplying support staff as necessary.
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111.

Council Direction

The Under Secretaries' Group for Regional Operations (USG)
establishes policy with regard to Regional Council matters,
provides guidance to the Councils, responds to their
initiatives, and seeks to resolve policy matters referred to
it by the Councils. In addition to the Associate Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, who serves as Chairman,
the Under Secretaries' Group is composed of the Under Secretaries
of Labor, Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban
Development, and Transportation, the Administrator of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration, the Deputy Director of
the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Deputy Administrator
of the Environmental Protection Agency.
When the USG Chairman determines that matters which significantly
affect the interest of Federal agencies not represented on the
USG are to be considered, he will invite an appropriate rep
resentative of the involved agency to participate in the
deliverations of the group.

A representative from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
and from the staff of the Under Secretaries' Group attend Council
and staff meetings to provide liaison between the Council and
authorities in Washington.
IV.

Functions and Implementation

A. Functions. Under Presidental Executive Order No.
11647, the Council constitutes a body within which member
agencies, to the maximum extent feasible, conduct their
grant-making activities in concert through:

1. The development of short-term regional interagency
strategies and mechanisms for program delivery;
2. The development of integrated program and funding
plans with Governors and local chief executives;
3. The encouragement of joint and complementary grant
applications for related programs;

4. The expeditious resolution of interagency conflicts
and coordination problems;

5. The evaluation of programs in which two or more
member agencies participate;
6. The development of long-term regional interagency
and intergovernmental strategies for resource allocations
to better respond to the needs of states and local
communities;
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7. The supervision of regional interagency program
coordination mechanisms; and
8. The development of administrative procedures
to facilitate day-to-day interagency and inter
governmental cooperation.

B. Implementation Actions. Council members are to
direct the necessary actions within their own agencies to
support coordinated strategies and management. Where authority
or resources are not available in the regions, the Councils
refer issues to Washington. Similarly, policies or strategies
developed in Washington may be referred to Councils for
implementation. Within the framework of Washington policy,
Councils are expected to initiate actions and determine their
areas of concentration. Councils do not assume any responsibi
lities of other levels of government; they are supportive of,
and responsive to, state and local government.
V.

Resolution of Conflict

The principal means for the resolution of problems will be
through the efforts of individual agencies working together.
This may occur without necessarily involving the Council. In
fact, Council members will attempt to solve any problems
informally through agency discussions before bringing them to
the Council.
When problems arise that cannot be resolved either informally
or by Council action, the members concerned will advise their
respective Under Secretaries.
In turn, (if the Chairman
determines that a significant issue cannot be resolved in
the region, and that the issue involved has been brought to
the attention of the Under Secretaries concerned, he may
transmit the issue to the Under Secretaries' Group). If any
agency feels that the delay caused by such referral will prevent
it from carrying out activities which are indispensable to its
stewardship responsibilities, it will provide the Council with
an explanatory statement and proceed with the necessary
activities.

VI.

Relationships to Other Coordinating Bodies

A. Federal Executive Boards (FEBs). FEBs are
associations of the top Federal executives in the metropolitan
area in which they are located. They work together to implement
Presidential policies and initatives, to improve the management
of their respective agencies, and to make their community a
better place in which to live through a variety of FEBsponsored service activities. Within this region there are
FEBs in San Francisco, Honolulu and Los Angeles with Chair
men elected by the membership. Council members in San
Francisco are also FEB members.
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Southern California Sub-Regional Council (SRC).
The chairman of the Sub-Regional Council is designated by
the Regional Council Chairman and the group is composed of
Council agency representatives. The chairman of the SRC
serves as a non-voting member of the Council. Functions
of the Sub-Regional Council are to:
1. Develop recommendations for and implement Councildirected responses to interagency problems.

2. Identify potential or existing interagency problems
of a significant nature.
3. Serve as a local coordinating body for Council
agency activities to prevent overlapping and duplication
of efforts and to promote improved communication and
coordination among Council agency programs.

4. Serve as on-the-spot representatives of the Council
in crisis or emergency situations, where time or
circumstances require immediate interagency response.
5. Serve in a liaison capacity between the Council and
Los Angeles FEB on interagency matters in which the
Council becomes involved.

c- Regional Program Coordinating Mechanisms. Executive
Order No. 11647 gives Councils responsibility for supervision of
regional coordinating program mechanisms. The Council has
adopted principles governing referral to it of problems from
other regional coordinating groups, such as the Federal Regional
Committee of the Community Coordinated Child Care (4C) Program;
the Regional Interagency Coordinating Committee (RICC), the
Regional Manpower Coordinating Committee (RMCC) and the Southern
California Sub-Regional Council. These principles are:

1. Problems of coordination should be resolved when
ever possible at the regional level rather than referred
to the Washington level of respective coordinating
groups.

2. Members of coordinating groups should advise their
respective Regional Directors promptly of any coor
dination problem requiring attention of a higher
authority. The Regional Director will then decide
whether agency action or Council action is required.
3. When a matter is accepted by the Council, it will
invite in for deliberation and for participation any
other agencies involved which are not Council members.

4. When a matter cannot be resolved, either by the
Regional Director/Administrator or through Council
deliberations, the issue may be referred to the Under
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Secretaries in accordance with Part V Resolution
of Conflicts.

5. Each organization is expected to file with the
Council the group’s recommendations for their
resolution. The Council may assign a member of
the Secretariat to monitor one or more groups, and
to bring to the Council, through the Secretariat, any
unresolved problems.
Vil.

Relationship to State and Local Government.

The Council will maintain continuing relationships with state
and local officials and will encourage use of Council mechanisms
to resolve interagency problems identified by state and local
chief executives. Under Executive Order No. 11647 Council
agencies will, to the maximum extent possible, conduct their
grant-making activities in concert through the development of
integrated program and funding plans with Governors and local
chief executives.

V111.

Relationship to Special Clientele Groups

Special clientele groups which have problems requiring inter
agency response and for which no established channels exist
may refer such problems to the Council.

IX.

Operating Procedures

The following operating procedures govern the present
organization, relationshipd, and practices of the Federal
Regional Council in Region IX.

A.

Organization:
1.

Chairman. One member of the Council is
designated by the President to serve as
Chairman at the pleasure of the President.
In addition to providing leadership to the
Council and presiding at Council meetings,
the Chairman:

a.

Mediates unresolved issues among member
agencies;

b.

Is responsible for the performance of
effective staff support;

c.

Represents the Council in day-to-day
contacts with other levels of government,
non-member Federal agencies, the press,
the public, and national interagency
groups; and
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d.

Represents the Council at quarterly meetings
of Regional Council Chairmen and before the
Under Secretaries Group when required.

Vice Chairman. The Chairman appoints another
member of the Council to serve as Vice Chair
man and to act in his place when he is absent.

3»

Alternates. Each member of the Council may
designate an alternate who shall serve as a
member of the Council and be empowered to speak
for him whenever the regular member is unable
to attend any meeting of the Councail.
Secretariat members may not serve as alternates.

4.

Staff . Each Council member agency assigns one
*
full-time senior level staff member to the
Council Secretariat, exclusive of staff assigned
to Regional Council task forces. Compensation,
travel and other expenses shall be paid by his/
her parent organization. Such a staff member
serves in the dual capacities of staff to the
Regional Council Secretariat and his/her regional
director’s special assistant on Council matters.
In his/her Secretariat function he/she must
meet the Staff Director's needs for assistance
in planning and monitoring the implementation
of all Council activities including problem
identification, issues formulation, fixing
accountability, and progress reporting. Each
such staff member shall have direct access to,
and frequent consultation with his/her own
Council members.

5.

Staff Director. In addition to the above, the
agency of the Council Chairman provides one fulltime senior level staff member to serve as Staff
Director. Under the direction of the Regional
Council Chairman, the Staff Director supervises
and directs the activities of the Secretariat
in the implementation of Regional Council
objectives.

Three support staff are provided on a one-year
basis by the Council Chairman’s agency. Clerical
support for other Council members and their
Secretariat members is furnished by their
individual agencies.

*See Part 11, Secretariat Operating Procedures for more detailed
description of the Council Secretariat.
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6.

B.

**
Task Forces and Committees. Committees and
task forces will be named from time to
time in order to identify and resolve
differences and work on specific projects.
They are designated by the Council for a
specific purpose and serve for a specified
time or until assignment is completed. Upon
establishment of such committees or task forces,
the Council chairman issues a statement
representing the committee or task force
charter. This charter will include designation
of lead agency, membership, objectives, functions,
reporting and coordination requirements, and
target dates for completion of the assignment.
The committee/task force will then develop a
plan of action, work schedule, and reporting
procedure for submission to the Council. The
Council Secretariat may designate one of its
staff as Council liaison, to the task force or
committee. When a member agency is designated
as the lead agency for a Council activity, the
Chairman of the task force or committee will be
designated from that agency and be responsible
to his/her Council member for carrying out the
Council assignment. When an ad hoc agency is
designated as the lead agency and accepts such
designation, the Chairman of the Task Force
designated by the lead agency shall be responsible
to his/her Regional Director/Administrator for
carrying out the Council assignment.

Meetings:

1.

Meeting Dates. Regular meetings of the Council
are held on the 1st and 3rd Tuesdays of each
month. Special meetings may be called at the
Chairman's discretion or upon request of a
Council member.

2.

Quorum. A quorum, which shall consist of four
regular Council members, is required for Council
action. For the purpose of determining the
existence of a quorum, alternates or other
persons other than the regular Council members
may not be counted. In the event of prolonged
absence on the part of a regular member,
however, the Council will consider the request
of the agency concerned that an alternate
member of that agency be counted in determining
a quorum.

**See Part III, Operating Procedures for Task Forces for more
detailed description.

174
3.

Executive Sessions. At the discretion of the
Chairman, or upon request of any regular
Council member, the Council may go into
executive session, for discussion of items on
the agenda or other matters which the Council
wishes to discuss. Whenever the Council goes
into Executive session, the Chairman will
rule on whether the Council staff remains.

4.

Voting. Council decisions will be determined
by a majority vote, and votes will be recorded.
No such vote can bind a member with respect
to a programmatic decision within the purview
of his agency. The Chairman will vote as a
member of the Council, and alternates who are
substituting for regular Council members may
also vote.

5.

Agendas. Agendas for Council meetings are
developed by the Staff Director and Secretariat
under the guidance of the Chairman. Council
members may propose agenda items to the Chairman
directly or through their Secretariat rep
resentative. Ad hoc members from other federal
agencies, state and local organizations, groups
or individuals desiring to place items on the
agenda should present a statement of purpose and
probable implication to the Staff Director.

6.

Staff Papers. The Secretariat is responsible
for the preparation or collection of appropriate
materials for the Council meetings, to be
supplied to members in advance of the meeting.
On items requiring Council action, the Secretariat
makes recommendations on the substance of the
issue as well as procedure.

7.

Minutes. Minutes of Council meetings are drafted
by the Secretariat for the approval of the Council.
Approved minutes are distributed by the Chair
man’s office to Council members, ad hoc members,
the Under Secretaries Group and other agencies,
groups and individuals concerned. Further
distribution within Council agencies may be
made by the individual Council members as
appropriate.

Council Planning, Reporting, and Evaluating
A. Work Plan, Each year
comprehensive work plan.
objectives of the Council
11647 and is submitted to

the Council develops a
The plan addresses the
outlined in Executive Order
the Under Secretariat Group
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for review and comment. The work plan is revised
as needed, and revisions are submitted to the Under
Secretaries Group for review. Annual work plans
are the primary basis for workload planning and
evaluation of results achieved by the Council.
B. Progress Reports. During the year, quarterly
progress reports will be submitted to the Under
Secretaries Group. In addition, the Chairman will
submit a final report assessing the results of the
Council’s efforts for the year.

C. Priorities. To the extent interagency problems
and projects are presented to the Council, those
projects which relate to Council priorities will
receive preferential consideration; however, the
Council expects to be flexible and responsive and
to adjust its priorities, based on the nature of
emerging issues.
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Appendix C

Federal Regional Council, Region IX
Policy and Procedures For
Regional Council Task Forces

October 1972

General
Interagency project task forces of Federal program specialists
are the principal means available to the Federal Regional Council
for implementing its objectives and/or responding to directions
for action from the national level. A project task force may
be an ad hoc group established to complete a specific task
within”a short period of time, or a long-standing task force
with ongoing responsibilities. The group may be composed of
staff representing all or some of the Council agencies and
may include staff of related agencies and/or State or local
governments, agencies, groups or individuals. In agreeing to
establish a task force, Council members commit themselves to
supplying staff to that task force at the required level and
for the time needed to accomplish Council goals.
II.

Task Force Charge

The written charge to the task force, signed by the Regional
Council Chairman, will be its charter and will include, in
the main body of the charge, or as attachments, the following
data:
A. Mission of task force, and any background required.
B.

Designation of lead agency, if any.

C. Whether any Council members are directly involved
and the nature of their involvement.

D. Whether the Chairman is to be appointed or elected.
If appointed, his/her name, title, agency, location,
phone number.
E. Other members, names, title, agencies, locations,
phone numbers.
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F.

Name of Council Secretariat liaison.

G. Date or target date for first meeting of task
force.

H. Time frame for accomplishment of mission, to the
extent possible.

I.

Reporting requirements.

J. Content of reports, e.g. dates of meetings and
those present, procedures being followed, organization,
any sub-committees appointed, progress, assignments
to individual members and their completion, recommenda
tions for action, e.g. continuation or dissolution of
task force, change in functions, Council action
required, etc.
K. Other relevant information, including this
statement of policy.
Ill.

Selection of Members

Within one week of a request by the Secretariat member assigned
as liaison to the task force, each agency will name the person
who will serve for his agency. Communication of the assignment
to supervisors of task force members and others within Council
member agencies will be the responsibility of individual Council
members. The Council Chairman will, on behalf of the Council,
send a copy of the task force charge to each member of the task
force, through his Council member.
IV.

Functions of Members

An individual serving on a Regional Council Task Force and
representing a Federal agency is deemed to represent that
agency as a whole. This individual is responsible for securing
information, coordinating activities, and insuring that the
Task Force objectives are carried out in his/her agency.
Commitments under any federally supported programs are to be
made, however, only under established procedures and through
appropriate channels of the agency directly concerned.
A Federal agency representative serving on a task force will
be responsible to his/her Council member for work performed
on the task force. Task Force members will keep their Council
members advised of progress, any policy or funding implications
for their agency, problems encountered as a result of in
sufficient authority to speak for the agency, etc. Task Force
members will not delegate task force membership without
clearance through their Council member. Although they may
call upon other staff within their agencies to particpate in
task force assignments, they have the ultimate responsibility
for providing in-put until and unless relieved by their Council
member.
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V.

Duties of Chairman

The Task Force Chairman may be selected by the Council or
elected by the task force, as specified in the Council’s
charge to the task force. The task force chairman’s duties
are:
1. Setting regular meeting dates and times, notifying
Council/Secretariat liaison of regular task force
meeting schedule, and providing advance notice of any
schedule changes or special meetings.
2. Assigning responsibility for keeping minutes of
meetings and furnishing the task force members and
the Secretariat liaison with minutes of each meeting.
An attendance list should accompany each report.
Secretariat liaison will provide a copy to the
Council Staff Director.

3. Providing advice to the Council on issues or
problems necessitating the attention of the Council
and submitting reports and recommendations to the
Council in accordance with instructions from the
Council Chairman, or as necessary to carry out task
force objectives.

4. Submitting periodic reports and a final report as
directed in the task force charter. Reports will state
the task force problems considered, the objectives
accomplished during the period and those which will
require a longer time period, the actions planned for
achieving other objectives, and the dates on which
accomplishments are expected. Special reports may
be requested in advance of the Council’s quarterly
progress report to assist the Council in filing its
report and/or amending its work plan.
VI.

*Secretariat Liaison with Task Force

Secretariat liaison will be selected by the Staff Director. The
Secretariat liaison will provide advice on Coundil-related
activities and facilitate communication with the Council
Secretariat and Council Chairman. The Secretariat member will
not be responsible for scheduling meetings of the task force,
except the initial meeting. He/she will not prepare work plans,
progress reports, or minutes for the task forces, or carry out
any of the other duties of the chairman. He/she will:

1. Prepare draft of the task force charge and trans
mittal memo for clearance with Secretariat and Council
Chairman.

**For more complete description of the role of the Council
Secretariat, see Part II of the ’’Secretariat Operating Procedures."
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2. Secure names and identification of Council agency
representatives designated by their Regional Directors/
Administrators to serve on the task force.
3. Provide liaison between Council (Secretariat)
and task force, when appropriate or requested.
4.

Interpret charge as needed.

5. Arrange for any non-Council representation or
technical assistance (other than that secured by
the Task Force members within their own agencies)
needed on an ad hoc basis.
6. Keep task force informed of any matters relating
to the work of the task force emanating from the
Under Secretaries Group or the Council and respond
to specific task force requests for Council-related
information.
7. Attend task force meetings as needed and receive all
minutes and reports from the task force chairman for
circulation to the Secretariat and/or Council with
any additional comments on task force progress that
may be appropriate.
8. Monitor the overall progress of the task force
against the Council charge and insure that any problems
affecting the successful completion of the task force
mission are brought to the immediate attention of the
Staff Director for referral to the Council Chairman so
that corrective action can be taken.
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